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23 July 1985

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

COCA-COLA HURTS VANILLA GROWERS--The international vanilla market is in turmoil and the problems of the Indian Ocean's producers (Madagascar, the Comoros and Reunion) seem far from resolution. As half their combined 1984 output of 1,720 tonnes (1,500 for Madagascar, 180 for the Comoros and 40 for Reunion) remains unsold, and the 1985 season promises to be excellent with a production of more than 1,800 tonnes of processed vanilla, the world's largest consumer of the commodity, the Coca-Cola Company, has just launched a new version of its drink whose formula contains no vanilla whatsoever. As a result, the company is in the process of selling off its entire stock of 180 tonnes of vanilla, the equivalent of one year's output by the Comoros, at around 55 dollars a kilo, as against the official price set by the producers of 70 dollars. The United States Zink & Trieste concern has already bought up 50 tonnes which were stored in the U.S., and the rest of the stock in various parts of the world will be the object of similar deals. For this year, therefore, the producers have to face up both to the unexpected arrival of an extra 180 tonnes of vanilla on the market, and the loss of their most important customer. The vanilla dealers, who since the beginning of the year have been bringing pressure to bear on the Indian Ocean producers to lower their price by at least 20 dollars, will use the Coca-Cola development to the full as ammunition to force them to negotiate without waiting for the next price-fixing session at Nosy Be in March 1986. [Text] [Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER in English 15 Jun 85 p 6]

PTA GETS NEW BANK--The eastern and southern Africa preferential trade area (PTA) will have its own development bank from January next year. The decision, taken at the last PTA summit in Bujumbura, was confirmed this week by the organisation's secretary-general, Bax Nomvotte, following a meeting of PTA officials which took place in Lusaka at the end of May. However, the move still has to be ratified by the PTA's council of ministers in July. This new financial institution, whose headquarters, after discussion, will eventually be in Bujumbura, will have as its purpose the promotion of trade among the 15 PTA member countries and the provision of special assistance to the least-developed members. The bank's capital, as envisaged by the officials at the beginning, was to be 300 million dollars. There has been no indication of the figure finally decided. The establishment of the bank will coincide with the end of the two-year mandate given to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe to act as a clearing house for the PTA. [Text] [Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER in English 8 Jun 85 p 6]

ANGOLA

FORMER UNITA MEMBER CITES PORTUGUESE, RSA LINKS

MB291220 Luanda Domestic Service in Portuguese 0500 GMT 29 Jun 85

/Text/ A former commando of the UNITA puppet group has confirmed in Lisbon the existence of more than 2,000 special Portuguese commandos trained by the South African forces to serve the Angolan counterrevolutionary gang. According to ANGOP, 25-year-old Artur Agostinho Pinto Mateus, had been directly connected with UNITA officials. He said that one of the main objectives of Savimbi is to totally conquer southern Angola with South African aid and form a tribal-based government which would not include Angolans from northern Angola. Artur Pinto Mateus, who took part in operations with Pretoria forces in Cahama and Ongiva, said that he had often transported South African manufactured weapons to puppet bases in Angola from Namibia.

The former UNITA commando acknowledged that there were serious contradictions within the ranks of the gang's leadership as a result of the failure of UNITA operations, which are only maintained with international imperialism's direct support. The Angolan citizen, who left UNITA, told ANGOP that the puppet organization has contacts with certain individuals in Portugal, and he identified Antonio Alves, popularly known as Banana, Victor Rodrigues who work in Oporto and Roland Marques, who is currently in Namibia collaborating with the leaders of the UNITA gang.

Explaining his reasons for leaving UNITA, Artur Agostinho Pinto Mateus said that it was due to the fact that the counterrevolutionary organization had murdered his parents in a farm near the Umpata mission. He was severely tortured for publicly condemning members of UNITA, the former commando of the armed gang said, stressing that on orders of the chieftains of the gang, anybody opposing certain criminal actions is tortured and killed.

Concluding his interview with ANGOP, Pinto Mateus confirmed that the UNITA bandits are waging a campaign of false propaganda in the countryside. He expressed certainty that in our country heads of people returning home are not cut off. He also expressed certainty that no other atrocities are committed, as claimed by the gang chieftains.

CSO: 3400/616

ANGOLA

JMPLA MEETS IN LUBANGO, MINCI OFFICIAL VISITS REGION

Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 26 May 85 p 3

[Excerpt] Lubango--The participants in the fourth meeting of the social and productive work department of the Huila Provincial Secretariat's JMPLA [Youth of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola]-Party Youth, which concluded recently, noted the existence of organizational difficulties on the local level caused by the lack of coordination among the other state agencies.

In the final conclusions, the youth organization's social and productive work department issued instructions to the youth production details and the peasant brigades, and increased the field work with a view toward heightening production in the enterprises.

The consolidation of the youth production details and the young peasant brigades, as well as the signing of protocols aimed at preparing the vacation plan, were other recommendations emerging at the end of that department's methodological meeting.

Visit by MINCI Vice Minister

During his visit to Lubango, the vice minister of home trade, Guerreiro Dias, noted the under-utilization of the shops for sales to the public, the lack of industrial goods storage facilities and the deterioration of the hotel units belonging to the state.

That leader, who was in Huila on a working visit for 3 days, toured the structural agencies of the ministry that he heads, and observed that, after 6 months, the interval since his last visit to the province, the state hotel units are still continuing to deteriorate.

Guerreiro Dias, who spoke at a meeting which marked the conclusion of his visit, said that the public shops are under-utilized and that there are people's stores which have not yet benefited from products of prime necessity since the beginning of the year.

ANGOLA

CZECHOSLOVAKIAN CREDIT EXTENDED THROUGH 1986

Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 19 May 85 pp 1, 12

[Text] Prague (ANGOP)--The third session of the Joint Angolan-Czechoslovakian Commission for Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation concluded on Friday in Prague, with the signing of a protocol and the extension until December 1986 of the credit granted to Angola 5 years ago by Czechoslovakia.

Signing the protocol on behalf of Angola was the minister of industry and chairman of the commission, Henrique Santos "Onambwe," and Bohumil Urban, the minister of foreign trade, signed for the Czechoslovakian side.

The spokesman for the Angolan group, Joao de Freitas, director of the Socialist Countries Department of the State Secretariat of Cooperation, disclosed to ANGOP that, in the investment area, Czechoslovakia will be setting up two tanning and shoe factories in Angola, a brewery and also a furniture manufacturing industry.

It was also agreed that Czechoslovakia would lend its support to forest exploration and increase the technical assistance, most likely in the areas of health and education. Workers from the power, shoe and tannery, glass and brewery industries will be sent to this country to train Angolan cadres.

These important accords now signed are the prelude to an intensification of economic relations between Angola and Czechoslovakia, which were delighted at the end of the session by the results accrued.

A new phase has started and better prospects have been opened up for the bilateral commercial exchange. Although nothing has been said publicly, there is every indication that Angola has the opportunity to provide its partners with ornamental stones, hemp and coffee.

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CSO: 3442/326

ANGOLA

UNITA COMMUNIQUE CITES 18-22 JUNE ACTIVITIES

MB030900 /Clandestine/ Voice of Resistance of the Black Cockerel in Portuguese to Angola 0430 GMT 3 Jul 85

/War communique issued by Brig Alberto Joaquim Chendovava, FALA chief of general staff at UNITA central base at Jamba on 23 Jun/

/Text/ UNITA is determined to pursue the war in Angola for as long as the Russians and Cubans, who support the MPLA government, remain intransigent. Over a 5-day period, from 18 to 22 June, our forces carried out a series of actions including the following:

A train was attacked on the Luanda-Malanje railroad line along the /word indistinct/-Ndalatando railroad section in Luanda Province on 18 June 1985 and many human and material losses were inflicted on the enemy. On the same date a bridge over the Luenha River in the same railroad section was destroyed. On 19 June our forces destroyed nine trucks on the Camabatela-(Zombo)-Quisque road and seized enormous quantities of war equipment. Some three trucks and one BRDM armored car were destroyed on the railroad between Cacuso, (Fazenda) and (?Malanje) on 20 June.

A MiG-21 aircraft with registration C-645 was sabotaged and destroyed at the airport in Huambo town on 23 June.

Our forces attacked and destroyed a detachment of the eighth brigade on the Menongue-cuito Cuanavale road in Cuando Cubango Province on 21 June, destroying 12 trucks, 1 tank and 2 BRDM's. The enemy suffered 53 FAPLA soldiers dead, while 5 Cubans and 2 FAPLA soldiers were captured, and an immense quantity of war equipment and documents seized. A MiG-21 aircraft was shot down near Menongue town on 22 June 1985.

During this period 187 FAPLA men and 11 Cubans were killed. Fifteen FAPLA men and 243 weapons were captured, and 33 trucks, 2 BRDM's and 1 tank were destroyed, 1 MiG-21 was shot down, and 2 trains were destroyed.

UNITA lost (?3) men, had 35 wounded and 2 went missing.

Kwacha /long live/ Africa.

Kwacha Angola

Kwacha UNITA.

Jamba central base, 23 June 1985, year of the total mobilization against Cubans for the defense of the territorial integrity of Angola.

/Signed/ Brig Alberto Quoaquim Chendovava, chief of general staff.

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ANGOLA

PRODUCTION, EXPORT OF HANDICRAFTS TO INCREASE

Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 19 May 85 p 1

[Text] Cabinda--The Handicrafts Promotion and Marketing Enterprise of Angola (ARTIANG-UEE) will soon be exporting to Japan a total of 10,000 handicraft items of every type per year, as JORNAL DE ANGOLA was told by its general director, Gilberto Ferreira de Passos.

Gilberto Passos, who is on a working visit to this province, where he was apprised of the difficulties in the sector which he directs, assured us that his enterprise would also export items, on a small scale, to the Kingdom of Sweden and to Italy, as well as selling handicrafts in larger quantities to the United States, which has recently requested this enterprise of the State Secretariat of Culture that it might make purchases of the work of our handicraft artisans.

The official from the State Secretariat of Culture also remarked: "In the international participation that we have had, we were widely accepted, because we have had several contacts and we are requested to attend events associated with this area."

He declared: "We are currently making contacts with EXPORTANG [Angolan Export Enterprise] to consider the feasibility of making an order for export to Japan, which will be followed by others. However, it so happens that we are also beset by a problem of storing the items; because for the full execution of our activity facilities would be needed, for example, providing the enterprise with equipment that would make it possible to assess the degree of dampness in the items for export, so as not to jeopardize future exports."

The importing of tools, anilines and other necessary materials used to make the items was also a factor cited by the ARTIANG general director.

Like that official, we are of the opinion that our handicraft workers should receive from the handicrafts control structure all possible support; because this method will contribute to an improvement in the quality of the work done in Angola.

The top-ranking head of the handicraft sector also commented: "The acceptance of the handicraft work done by our artists is due partly to the criterion for

selection to which it is subjected. We have competitive prices, thanks to the support from the National Directorate of Enterprise Financing, which has cooperated extensively with us."

Angolan handicrafts, which find a very large number of artists in Cabinda Province, have already shown sufficient evidence of their real value. The items marketed to date, both in the country and abroad, have not only allowed for the entry of foreign exchange into Angola, but also, and primarily, have ensured them the position and acceptance which they, in fact, deserve.

The process of marketing handicrafts, which has recently been improving considerably as a result of the memorandum from the state secretary of culture, Boaventura Cardoso, dated 5 December 1983, could not be undertaken without first organizing the handicraft activity inside the country.

In fact, for greater control of this activity, which is a source of wealth, certain measures were adopted recently which will henceforth regulate the handicrafts sector here in Cabinda Province.

As we were informed, sales of handicraft items are banned in unsuitable places, such as book stores, tobacco shops, etc.; because it was decided at a meeting held 3 days ago to create shops just for the sale of this "small" resource of ours. Furthermore, the handicrafts sector in Cabinda will set up a handicraft cooperative on a site to be ordered, in order to concentrate the artists and the preparation of the items; inasmuch as this will be able to contribute to an improvement in the quality thereof.

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CSO: 3442/326

ANGOLA

DEFICIENT HUAMBO TRANSPORT SYSTEM HAMPERS SONANGOL DELIVERIES

Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 22 May 85 p 3

[Text] Humabo--In an interview with JORNAL DE ANGOLA, Manuel Joao Cangombe (Piriquito), provincial agent of SONANGOL [National Angolan Fuel Company]-Huambo, declared that the work on the large fuel storage facility that has been under construction since January 1984 in this city, under the direction of the Romanian company, ROMPETROL, has been progressing at a satisfactory pace, and it is expected to be completed this year.

These structures will have a capacity for 10,000 cubic meters, aimed at storing a larger quantity of the four products distributed by SONANGOL; and they will make it possible to improve the fuel supply to consumers in this region, as Manuel Cangombe subsequently claimed.

In fact, in giving an explanation of the general features of fuel transportation, that official remarked: "The largest volume of this product has reached the province by means of the Benguela Railway, but a certain amount of irregularity has been noted in this process."

As Manuel Canbombe reports, "This year, SONANGOL, with a fleet consisting of 15 trucks with a 200 cubic meter capacity, received nearly 1.4 million cubic meters of various fuels by highway, and 1.7 million by rail."

Although it has acquired 1.1 million cubic meters of fuel, the SONANGOL agent claimed that, "The products were insufficient to meet the needs of this region's consumers."

As that official remarked, meanwhile, to surmount this situation so as to provide better service to its customers, it has obviously become necessary to increase the number of tank vehicles, as well as that of the SONANGOL cars on the railway trains.

Butane Gas Distribution

Insofar as the distribution of butane gas is concerned, Manuel Cangombe explained that "the quantities received have nevertheless not been satisfactory," justifying this assertion by noting that only 177 tons were received during the first quarter, whereas the province's needs indicated 350 tons.

He continued: "At the present time, owing to the power shortage in the province, SONANGOL has also undertaken the sale of cylinders of gas for oil lamps, in rather small amounts in comparison with the number of consumers."

For the process of distributing butane gas, the oil company's agent reports: "The city of Huambo has 10 resale stations, as well as supplying direct consumers, such as the hotel industry, hospitals, military units, prisons, food serving establishments and various enterprises."

Also in this connection, and as a positive note, that official explained that there are resellers too, in the 12 municipalities comprising the province.

However, insofar as lubricants are concerned, as Manuel Cangombe disclosed, Huambo Province is experiencing enormous difficulties, owing to the meager transportation capacity out of Luanda.

In this respect, he cited the effort which the agency that he directs has undertaken with its own resources, as well as backing from certain local structures, with a view toward minimizing this situation.

On this occasion, Manuel Cangombe announced that the situation appears quite worrisome at present because, as he emphasized, there are large amounts of lubricants in Luanda awaiting removal.

Nevertheless, with regard to the distribution of fuel, the SONANGOL agent explained that the consumers in this province have supply cards with which they can purchase gasoline or gas oil in amounts consistent with the activity of each individual.

Also in this connection, he noted that a sales station was recently set up in this city for small consumers, whose monthly use is under 5 cubic meters. In this way, he added, the flow of customers observed in these facilities will be avoided.

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ANGOLA

BRIEFS

TWENTY-SEVEN SURRENDER FOR 'REINTEGRATION'--Some 12 armed individuals and 15 civilians have given themselves up to the authorities of Mucaba municipality to be reintegrated into the Angolan society. This was reported by the Uige regional radio station, citing a source in the provincial reintegration commission. Civilian compatriots will be reintegrated into various sectors of the country's socioeconomic life and former FNLA members will be reintegrated into the armed forces, as happened with the first batch of deserters. Their reintegration will be part of the second phase of reintegration begun in April 1985 in (Dansi D-sse) where more than 150 former FNLA soldiers were sent. The policy of clemency followed by the MPLA-Labor Party and the government of the People's Republic of Angola in Uige Province, in particular, has had repercussions in the municipalities of Ngaza, Songo and Mucaba, where it is expected that people living in the bush may at any moment abandon that sort of life to return to the authorities to be reintegrated so as to be able to participate in the country's reconstruction. /Text/ /Luanda Domestic Service in Portuguese 0500 GMT 2 Jul 85/

FAPLA OFFENSIVES KILL 99 UNITA--Angolan national defense and security forces of the 7th political and military region have annihilated 70 UNITA bandits in offensives launched in Cubal, Calombo and Chongoroi municipalities in Benguela Province. In these offensives FAPLA forces captured 2 other UNITA bandits and destroyed 3 camps with 800 huts which used to shelter the criminals. A military source told ANGOP that in Moxico and Huambo provinces, UNITA criminal bandits are on the run as a result of the vigorous action of the national defense and security forces who are fighting them. It has been reported that between 5 and 13 June FAPLA forces in the two provinces annihilated 29 UNITA criminals and captured 9 other criminals. /Text/ /Luanda Domestic Service in Portuguese 0500 GMT 26 Jun 85/

1,486 UNITA 'CRIMINALS' KILLED--A total of 1,486 UNITA criminals were annihilated by the national defense and security forces in the last 6 months. In January this year, a UNITA captain, leading 40 armed men and a group of 268 civilians who had been kidnapped, surrendered to the authorities in the Nehone region, Cunene Province. Captain (Geraldo Aldao Valiweya) is part of a group of more than 111 members of that puppet gang who surrendered to the national defense and security forces in several parts of the country in the past 6 months. ANGOP, which disclosed this information citing authorized military sources, added that during the operations which resulted in the death of about 2,500

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/as heard/ UNITA bandits, 1,057 light weapons and other war materiel were captured. More than 5,000 civilians, who had been abducted by the counter-revolutionary groups, were released, and about 1,300 heads of cattle recovered. The document from the Ministry of Defense also gives a breakdown of reconnaissance flights carried out by South Africa over several areas of southern Angola in a total of 71 violations of the Angolan airspace during 6 months.

LUANDA-MALANJE RAILROAD REPAIRS--N'Dalatando--The railroad line connecting the nation's capital with the provinces of Kwanza-Norte and Malange is due to undergo repairs soon, something that will guarantee improvements in the circulation of rail transport in those regions. The director of the Luanda Railroad Enterprise, Manuel Pedro de Carvalho, who gave this report to the local news media, during the visit that the minister of transportation, Bernardo de Sousa, paid to Kwanza-Norte, said that the track repair work, covered in two phases, would be carried out by the Portuguese firm Ferbritas. According to that official, the repair work was supposed to start by September of last year, which did not occur, owing to the politico-military situation then prevailing in certain areas surrounding the line. It should be noted that the operations of that antiquated railroad, which dates back several dozen years, had become irregular during the past 5 months, primarily because of the lack of technical maintenance which caused several train derailments. [Text] [Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 22 May 85 p 3] 2909

OFFICIAL VISITS SOUTHERN BENGUELA--The deputy provincial commissar for the economic and social sector, Eugenio Daka Ya Sunga, recently engaged in intensive government activity in the municipalities located in the southern part of the province. Eugenio Daka Ya Sunga, who was accompanied by several provincial officials, visited the municipality of Chongoroi, where he met with the government authorities of that locality, and was informed of the current operation of the state agencies with headquarters there. Also in Chongoroi, that official held a meeting with the population of the Casingiriti commune, where he stated his steadfastness in annihilating the puppet gangs. As a final phase of his journey, Eugenio Daka Ya Sunga visited the municipalities of Ganda and Caimbanbo, having introduced in the former the new deputy of the Benguela Provincial People's Assembly, Afonso Tchicanha. [Text] [Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 22 May 85 p 3] 2909

ARMED FORCES OFFICIAL VISITS BIE--Kuito--The chairman of the Regional Military Council of the Fourth Politico-Military Region, Lt Col Joao Ernesto dos Santos (Liberdade), who is visiting Bie Province, traveled to the municipality of Chitembo, where he held meetings with the combatants from the defense and security forces of the 48th Brigade. Also in that locality, the chairman of the Fourth Region Military Council met with local authorities, reviewing with them the socioeconomic situation of the municipality, and held a meeting with

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the population of that locality, urging them to redouble their vigilance. He also visited the municipality of Cuemba, where he met with the combatants from the defense and security forces and the military unit stationed at the Munhango commune. It should be pointed out that, during this trip of his, the chairman of the Military Council was accompanied by members of the party and government, and officials from the defense and security forces. [Text] [Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 22 May 85 p 3] 2909

OFFICIAL VISITS LUNDA-SUL--Suarimo--Rodeth dos Santos, member of the MPLA-Labor Party Central Committee and of the State Secretariat of Social Affairs, paid a working visit to Lunda-Sul. The purpose of the visit was to learn "on the spot" about the most pressing problems besetting the Provincial Agency for Social Affairs, mainly with regard to assistance for displaced persons and refugees. During his stay, that official of our government held a meeting with the members of the Executive Commission and with the physically disabled, also making contact with the Zairean refugees and visiting the Children's Centers of Luavur District. On a visit to the locality of Luachimo, he held a brief meeting with the special troops stationed in a military unit, later meeting with all the displaced persons at the Chicapa movie theater. [Text] [Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 22 May 85 p 3] 2909

CABINDA MPLA-PT EXPANSION CAMPAIGN--Cabinda--The press was informed by the coordinator of the department for the organization of the party committee, Jose Emilio Homem, that the second national campaign to expand the MPLA-Labor Party may be considered opened as of the first of this month, in this province, after the formalities for its execution are met. According to that official of the party in the province, as part of the preliminary work, four brigades were set up, coordinated by members of the Provincial Committee, all over the province, and a methodological meeting was also held regarding the event. It is noteworthy that, after the holding of the first campaign for the party's expansion, which included only the rank and file (cell) organizations which had proven to be suitable from a functional standpoint, this campaign will be extended to all cells, nevertheless not neglecting to preserve the social and worker nature of the party. For example, it will affect mainly the worker and peasant sectors, as well as the education and schooling sector, in view of the importance attached to the transformation of the society and the training of the younger generations. Since the MPLA-Labor Party is a selective organization, its members must be the best representatives of the working class as well as its allies. From this standpoint, the question of numbers should not cause one to lose sight of the problem of the members' quality. There are, however, social sectors which should receive greater attention from the party, and party structures should be created in order to improve their production, as that official stressed on this occasion; considering the process of forming cooperatives and associations in the rural areas as one of the means of intensifying the worker-peasant alliance, inextricably linked with the reinforcement of the party's leadership role. [Text] [Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 22 May 85 p 3] 2909

CSO: 3442/325

BENIN

EHUZU SEES NO POSSIBILITY OF COUP IN BENIN

AB091713 Cotonou EHUZU in French 14 Jun 85 pp 1, 8

[Unattributed commentary: "Spreading Rumors To Snatch Up Power"]

[Excerpts] To overthrow a revolutionary power one must organize a reactionary psychological campaign among the popular masses to sap up their morale, isolate power, and then pick it up. This is the new tactic being employed in the invariable strategy of imperialism and internal reaction to bring to question the gains of the people and their revolution. This old rotten gun can no longer be used in the present conditions. But reaction can never understand the reality of the people. Reaction and anarcholeftists think they are dealing with Kerekou's power and not the people's power. And that is the whole misfortune of those who refuse to look reality in the face because they are blinded by their evil design which is inimical to the interests of the people and of their revolution.

Having failed in their attempt to undermine the revolutionary regime by fire and sword on that memorable Sunday, 16 January 1977, reaction is spending the better part of its time orchestrating all sorts of rumors.

In the conditions under which the regime is resolutely struggling against the evil effects of the crisis, one can easily understand why reaction wants to fish in troubled waters, being ignorant of the fact that the popular masses in democratic Benin are no longer fish that will swallow any bait. But the specialists of lies and untruths often become the victims of their own fanciful creation.

This is exactly what has happened to reaction and its spearhead, the anarcholeftists of the National University of Benin who can now see the sociopolitical reality of our country only through the truthless and unrealistic prism of their shortsightedness, thus proving that their strategy of political struggle has no connection with objective reality. By trying to cynically deceive the people through a truncated interpretation of the reality because of political demagoguery, the reactionaries have fallen into their own trap. Having thus become victims of their own vision and surfeited by their imaginary link with the people and the imaginary support which the people would give them, the anarcholeftists thought the time had come to put into practice their infamous theory of general insurrection. But woe betide anyone who approaches social reality in ignorance or absolute disregard of the laws of historical

materialism, for he will break his neck like the bird which lost the use of its wings in midair. That is what happened to our anarcholeftists that Monday, 6 May, 1985.

The revolution remains convinced that the mass of students who were cynically used as guinea-pigs in the experiment of the theory of general insurrection will be able to draw the indispensable lessons once and for all.

It has already been said that the equation of a strike in Cotonou and in Porto Novo matched with a putsch can no longer be used in solving the political problems of our country. The time is gone when any embittered fellow could get up one morning to overthrow the regime by a putch. This is because no major change is now possible without the consent of our people who are now politically organized in our 3,500 villages and city wards.

Halt the deception and whimsical rumors!! Ready for the revolution! The struggle continues!

CSO: 3400/602

BURKINA

NEW FUNCTIONS ASSIGNED TO AIB

AB111658 Ouagadougou Domestic Service in French 1300 GMT 11 Jul 85

/Text/ The BURKINA NEWS AGENCY, AIB, will henceforth be at the service of the toiling masses. In fact, the AIB daily news bulletin, commonly called DEKI, will cease to circulate as of tomorrow, 12 July 1985. According to the editorial board of the AIB, this is in immediate implementation of the reorganization of the national press organs adopted by yesterday's cabinet meeting to make the national media more functional and more committed to the struggle for control and mobilizing information. The AIB editorial board will henceforth concentrate its efforts on the teleprinted service for foreign consumption. To this end and pending the equipping of the agency for the full-range diffusion of new centered on the execution of the popular development program which should be fully completed during the first 5-year development plan of the people's democratic revolution, and while waiting for all the equipment, the new mission of the AIB will be to sustain Burkina's opendoor policy by ensuring the link with the outside world mainly through the PAN-AFRICAN NEWS AGENCY, the pool of agencies of the nonaligned countries, and the Islamic agency. These agencies constitute a stepping-board for a wider diffusion of our news and the AIB will also select national news which it will distribute to agencies of countries that are friends of Burkina so as to assist our anti-imperialist struggle.

It will also send healthy and objective news to our diplomatic representatives abroad every week. Such an approach will help to boost the image of Burkina by disproving the biased news diffused by foreign press institutions. This new option of the agency has come to put a halt to the unfair competition between the AIB and the state-owned organs which are better equipped. As from now, it will rather complement these national organs. That is why its new mission will be to carry the voice of the militant people of Burkina to places where our radio station and our daily SIDWAYA and CARREFOUR AFRICAIN cannot go.

On the national front and in keeping with the wish of the National Council for the Revolution which wishes that news should no longer be a catalogue of reports from major centers--and particularly from the capital--the agency will collect news about the life of our toiling masses now mobilized behind the CNR, through provincial bureaus to be made available to the other press organs. Finally it will produce detailed articles on important events which it will supply to national colleagues for publication.

From a political point of view, such a vision of AIB departs from the reactionary conception of the agency which consisted in performing a routine task without knowing whether the product effectively served the Burkinabe people. We can therefore hope that already, this new mission assigned to the AIB will enable sincere militants employed in all the structures of the agency to be really useful to the Burkinabe people thanks to whose effort the AIB was created and for whom it must commit its existence.

CSO: 3400/626

COMOROS

BRIEFS

MAYOTTE REJECTS TOURIST PROJECT--The planned tourist complex at Longoni put forward by the French company Riss Reunion has been rejected by the Mayotte local council, which wants to reserve the site for a deep-water port. Besides, the financial contribution which the developers were asking from the local authorities was considered exorbitant. In effect, Riss Reunion was told it would have to find another site and make less extravagant demands if it wanted its project to go through. [Text] [Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER in English 15 Jun 85 p 6]

CSO: 3400/572

CONGO

AAPSO TO HOLD PEACE CONFERENCE IN CONGO APRIL 1986

AB081122 Dakar PANA in French 1731 GMT 7 Jul 85

[Text] Dar es Salaam, 5 Jul (PANA)--African delegates at the AAPSO international conference held on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Baudung Conference, decided at a consultative meeting to convene an international conference on peace and development in Africa, Vital Balla, chairman of the Congolese Association of Friendship with Peoples [ACAP] told PANA.

Asked by PANA's special correspondent on the date and place of this conference, Mr Balla specified that the conference will be held in Brazzaville sometime in April 1986 "on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the ACAP." According to Mr Balla, an international preparatory committee has been set up. "This committee, comprising the ANC, SWAPO, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Zambia, Angola, Guinea, USSR, Congo, and the Permanent Secretariat of AAPSO, will meet in September this year in Cairo to "fix the political platform and organizational issues connected with this conference," he said.

CSO: 3400/602

DJIBOUTI

BRIEFS

PRESIDENT'S GUARD PLANNED--President Hassan Gouled is preparing to set up a personal guard of between 120 and 150 men, whose commander will reportedly be Major Mahdi Cheikh, of the same Mamassan ethnic group as the president. The decision comes as the commander of the gendarmerie, Hoch Robleh, prepares to retire, handing over his office to Major Ahmed Yoniss. The future presidential guard will be composed of the same gendarmes who currently ensure the protection of the president, but it will be an autonomous unit. Major Cheikh will notably be on a par with the gendarmerie commander as far as powers and prerogatives are concerned. It is not yet known who will train the guard, but it is noteworthy that three gendarmes who will belong to it returned to Djibouti a few weeks ago after undergoing a six-week weapons course in Austria. [Text] [Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER in English 15 Jun 85 p 3]

CSO: 3400/572

ETHIOPIA

TPLF PROPOSAL FOR UNITED RESISTANCE NOTED

Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER in English 8 Jun 85 p 5

[Text]

The Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), in which a pro-Albanian Marxist-Leninist League is to be officially formed during the last week of June (see I.O.N. N°184), published in March a proposition to Ethiopian opposition and Eritrean movements that a "United Resistance Front" should be formed to co-ordinate the fight against the Addis Ababa regime.

In the view of the TPLF, the front's aim would be to overthrow the Ethiopian "military junta" and end "Soviet interference". It would group all Ethiopian and Eritrean national and multinational armed movements, provided they recognised "the right of peoples to self-determination, including and up to independence".

The reaction of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) to these proposals, which was contained in a long statement published in May, reflects the current tensions between the two organisations in spite of the military assistance they provide each other. The EPLF lays down as a condition for membership of the united front that each organisation should have a common attitude with respect to two important points on which the TPLF and EPLF do not appear to be in agreement at present, namely the right of various Ethiopian ethnic groups to "secede" and the treatment of the two superpowers. On the first point, the EPLF considers that once a democratic state has been created in Ethiopia there will be no reason for certain groups (it names the Oromos and the Afars as examples) to seek independence. On the second point, the EPLF considers that the new front could not accept the membership of an anti-Soviet movement which is openly supported by the United States. Ideologically speaking, the EPLF also considers that the definition of the nature of the Soviet regime as "social imperialist" should not be "a touchstone that divides Ethiopian organisations and the EPLF into two antagonistic camps".

I.O.N.- In short, the EPLF declares itself in favour of a united front only if the object of such a front is the creation of a unitary

democratic state which would recognise the independence of Eritrea, while the other movements opposing the Dergue seem more concerned with the defence of their rights as representatives of distinct nationalities. The Afars, who recently boosted their military capacity with the re-emergence of an Afar Liberation Front, are also the cause of friction between the TPLF and the EPLF, due to their presence in Eritrea, Tigray and Wollo provinces. While the two movements have both fought armed Afar groups during the past three months, they do not have the same conception of the legitimacy of the Afar claims.

CSO: 3400/572

GHANA

JAPAN PRESENTS VEHICLES, AGRICULTURAL EQUIPMENT

ABO]]]]] Accra Domestic Service in English 1800 GMT 2 Jul 85

[Text] Japan today presented a number of vehicles and agricultural equipment worth \$1 million to the Food Production Corporation [FPC] in Accra. The gift included 10 pick-ups, 7 trucks, 15 tractors, 3 jeeps, spareparts, and fertilizers.

The general operations assistant of the Ministry of Agriculture, Colonel Agyemfra, who received them, called on the management of the FPC to ensure that the equipment are fully utilized. He said the provision of machinery and other equipment to the corporation does not automatically ensure efficiency. What is important is the efficient management of production, marketing, and distribution of the products. Colonel Agyemfra said the Provisional National Defense Council will ensure increased production and efficiency in parastatal organizations to justify their continued existence.

The charge d'affaires of the Japanese Embassy, Mr Yushiaki Kotaki, hoped the gift would help to increase Ghana's food production.

CSO: 3400/590

IVORY COAST

BRIEFS

FRIENDSHIP ASSOCIATION WITH ROK--An Ivory Coast-Republic of Korea friendship association, whose objective is to favor cultural exchanges and to foster bonds of friendship between both countries, has been set up in Abidjan, it was learned Thursday in the Ivorian economic capital. The new association is chaired by Edmond Zegbehi Bouazo, deputy speaker of the Ivorian National Assembly. Diplomatic relations between Korea and the Ivory Coast, where Korean nationals (?reside), were established in 1961, a year after the Ivorian state achieved its independence. [Text] [Paris AFP in French 1441 GMT 4 Jul 85]

CSO: 3400/579

LESOTHO

RADIO CITES DESIRE FOR 'PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE'

MB011010 Maseru Domestic Service in English 0500 GMT 1 Jul 85

/Station commentary: "Reflections: Matters of Peace"/

/Text/ A few days ago observers of developments in southern Africa expressed puzzlement about perceptions which indicated a sense of confusion and bewilderment about the government of the region. The cynicism that seems to be creeping into the perceptions of what actually is at issue in southern Africa is a matter that should be of serious concern to our member states of the region.

What is obvious is that the parameters for peaceful coexistence have not been clearly spelled out. Language has become a barrier to understanding of what is the quintessence of human values. Barriers of culture are now being posed as frontiers to seek to divide man from man, and to vitiate what should after all be the goal of all peoples of southern Africa. That goal is the betterment of man in respect of a climate in which women and children can live in peace. The latest reports which come from South Africa indicate a preparedness of a strategy that is obviously aimed at disrupting the peaceful atmosphere in the horizons of southern Africa.

Lesotho has clearly stated that it has a government that pursues a policy that seeks the fulfillment of the betterment of human condition. In Lesotho, by law and by statute, the King's government strives to seek an environment in which everyone is enabled to live in peace and to achieve fulfillment in human endeavor and satisfaction in self-realization. This policy reflects a method of peace, and peace not only for Basotho. Undoubtedly, peace in Lesotho will contribute to the establishment of a framework of this nation's attitudes towards the welfare of other peoples in the region.

But it needs to be restated and reaffirmed in the strongest terms that Lesotho does not as a matter of habit, traditions and customs allow anyone of any political persuasion to agree to a policy that permits the use of Lesotho's soil for unfriendly acts against any other state, nation or people. Again it has to be reiterated, of only for the benefit of the deaf ears of those who continuously ascribe inability to act in a manner that prepares southern Africa for the dignity of man, that they cannot use Lesotho as a pretext for their failures to achieve what, after all, are the noble goals that mankind is striving to achieve for human liberties and freedom.

The king's government has on numerous occasions stated that the quintessence of its policy is the ethos of peace. That quality contains the message of humanity, friendship, respect of the dignity of man and the welfare and political and social justice for all men, women and children. There are men in government and regrettably officials who seem to think that the human condition itself is a debatable matter. The dignity of man does not belong to any international agenda. Basotho should know for their own good that in this country and in this land the values of human dignity and basic rights are fundamental. If there are threats from any quarter, whether domestic or foreign, for enjoyment of those rights, the king's government and the nation are prepared to protect the lives and property of Basotho. Government and sensible people shall continue to champion the cause of peace and development and freedom. Despite anxieties about security of life and foreign threats, the king's government sees no reason to depart from its policy of friendship and not enmity or hostility towards any state or nation.

This nation has the right to cherish their rights and customs and traditions of peace and harmony. They have legitimate grounds for rejecting outright any accusations from any quarter that Basotho by habit or practice have opted for a path of hostility and no accommodation of common interest. The people who are affected in grassroots demand the access of that right as their own and basic expression of human dignity.

CSO: 3400/614

LESOTHO

BRIEFS

DELIAMIATION COMMISSION REPORT--The constituency delimitation commission, which was appointed by his majesty the king on the advice of the prime minister, the Right Honorable Dr Leabua Jonathan, has submitted its report to the prime minister in his capacity as minister of constitutional affairs. In a radio broadcast yesterday, Dr Jonathan said that after accepting the report and having briefed the cabinet, he submitted the constituency delimitation commission's report to his majesty and also tendered appropriate advice to him. The prime minister said that the report of the commission is currently being published by the government printer, and said the main thrust of the report is a delimitation of constituencies for purposes of the coming election. Once the report is available for the public, we shall proceed into the other statutory stages leading to elections, the prime minister added. In the meantime, he said, administrative preparations are continuing smoothly.

CSO: 3400/614

MADAGASCAR

IMPACT OF VANILLA PRICE WAR REPORTED

Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER in English 8 Jun 85 p 6

[Text]

Madagascar and the Comoros will maintain their 1985 vanilla prices at the level that was fixed at the Nosy Be conference of March 1984, i.e. 70 dollars a kilo for Malagasy prepared vanilla, and 69.5 dollars for the Comorian product. The agreement was reached at Antananarivo on May 19 by Madagascar's trade minister, Georges SOLOFOSON, and the Comorian minister for finance and the budget, Ali NASSOR. These prices will also remain unaltered for 1986, pending "Nosy Be II" in March of that year.

I.O.N.- A veritable trial of strength appears to be under way between producers and purchasers of vanilla as the new season begins. Madagascar, whose annual average production of 1,000 tonnes represents 80 per cent of world output, wants to prevent a fall in the world price, even if it has to adjust its production in line with demand. As for the Comoros, whose average vanilla output is of the order of 150 tonnes a year, it is obliged to shelter under the Malagasy "umbrella", particularly since Antananarivo has mended its fences with Moroni and seems ready for increased trade. The composition of the Comorian delegation at last month's talks in the Malagasy capital is revealing in this respect: the three families who monopolise all the archipelago's imports and exports, the KALFANEs, the ABDALLAHs and the MOHAMED AHMEDs, each sent a son or other important representative. Some sources said that if the prospects of increased trade with Madagascar were not so attractive the Comorians would have been ready to lower their vanilla prices.

For indeed the situation is especially critical for Moroni. Up to now only 50 tonnes of vanilla from the 1984 season have been sold out of a total production of 200 tonnes. And there is no guarantee that the 170 tonnes harvested in the present season will not be added to the 150 tonnes now in stock. Moroni has asked for compensation from the European Economic Community's Stabex fund, but EEC officials are very reluctant to pay up, given that the problem is one of marketing and not of production.

Madagascar, which is less dependent on the commodity than the Comoros, has 1,500 tonnes prepared vanilla unsold, and could produce a further 1,200 tonnes this year. But it has not approached the EEC. There is no doubt that, notwithstanding official rhetoric, Madagascar has been slipping some of its production on to the black market at prices below 70 dollars a kilo; it is not known if the "vanilla trial" last August, when heavy fines were imposed on a score of smugglers, put an end to this traffic.

As for the purchasers of vanilla, they refuse to go along with a price of 70 dollars, and seem reluctant to go beyond 55 dollars. The main importers, including McCormik and Zink & Trieste in the United States, and Gervais-Danone in Europe, are waiting for a slump in the price. Some of them predict that it could go as low as 20 dollars a kilo within six months.

CSO: 3400/572

MAURITIUS

BRIEFS

PMSD SUPPORTED--The Interafrican Socialist movement, led by former Senegalese president Leopold Sedar Senghor, gave its support during its 8th session, held in Mauritius, to the PMSD party of deputy prime minister Gaetan Duval. Prime minister Anerood Jugnauth's party, the MSM, was admitted as an observer, while Sir Satcam Boolell's Labour Party, despite being a founder-member of Inter-african Socialist, was not invited to the meeting. I.O.N. This support for the PMSD from a "socialist" institution is surprising. Gaetan Dubal has a solid reputation as a right-winger, if not an extreme right-winger. Last September he headed an impressive PMSD delegation to the 17th conference of the World Anti-Communist League, held at San Diego, California. And it was a member of that delegation, Monas Fakira, who was elected to head the league's African branch. [Text] [Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER in English 8 Jun 85 p 4]

CSO: 3400/572

MOZAMBIQUE

PRESIDENT MACHEL WELCOMES CONGOLESE, FRG AMBASSADORS

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 23 Apr 85 p 3

[Text] President Welcomes Congolese Ambassador

On accepting the credentials proffered to him by the new ambassador of the People's Republic of the Congo to Mozambique on Saturday morning, Marshal Samora Machel, president of the People's Republic of Mozambique, said the following:

"It is with profound happiness that, on behalf of the people and the government of the People's Republic of Mozambique, we accept the credentials accrediting you as ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the People's Republic of the Congo to the People's Republic of Mozambique.

We want, Mr Ambassador, to wish you the warmest welcome to Maputo, the capital of the People's Republic of Mozambique. We hope that you will feel the same warmth and friendship in Maputo as you do in your own homeland.

We have listened attentively, Mr Ambassador, to the words you have just spoken. They go beyond the mere requirements of protocol, because they are the offshoots and the product of the relations of true comradeship which exist between our peoples, parties and governments. They bear witness to and reassert the militant solidarity forged in the harsh years of the armed national liberation struggle in Mozambique and Angola.

In the People's Republic of the Congo, the homeland of the late lamented immortal hero and beloved son of Africa Marien N'Gouabi, we have always encountered militant solidarity with our people and our cause.

In President Denis Sassou-Nguesso we see a consistent revolutionary militant, a great friend of the people of Mozambique and a tireless defender of the friendship and cooperation between our peoples and states for the mutual benefit and the development of our countries.

The relations between our peoples and states have seen an ever-intensifying development.

The treaty of friendship and cooperation signed by our two nations provides a vital framework for the consolidation and development of the relations of friendship, solidarity and economic cooperation on various levels.

We are certain that your appointment to undertake this task, as difficult as it is noble, will contribute in decisive fashion to further improving the political relations existing between the People's Republic of Mozambique and the People's Republic of the Congo, giving substance to these relations in the realm of economic cooperation.

Mr Ambassador: It has been 20 years now that our people have not known one moment of peace.

Twenty years of aggression and continuing warfare have forged in our people a spirit of combativity and unflagging certainty of triumph.

The struggle against the imperialist conspiracy organized against the People's Republic of Mozambique continues to constitute a front for the achievement of stability and peace with a view to economic development and the elimination of the burdensome colonial heritage of our fatherland.

Destroying stability in southern Africa is a weapon developed by the enemies of our peoples for the purpose of perpetuating racial discrimination, dependence and colonialism in the region.

Armed banditry, in its terrorist form and its death agony, barbarously murders defenseless old people, women and children and destroys economic and social infrastructures. Incapable of facing up to the glorious Armed Forces of Mozambique (FPLM [Popular Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique]), the armed branch of the people, the terrorists are revealing their true nature and their goals.

It is with great satisfaction that our people are seeing increasing support throughout Africa, and in particular, the active solidarity of the People's Republic of the Congo.

The People's Republic of Mozambique is pleased by the success of the 20th OAU summit meeting. Our organization has returned to its historic role with the admission of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic to membership in it, and with the analysis of and decisions concerning the economic situation on our continent.

The analysis of the effects of the natural disasters and aid to the countries victimized, including Mozambique, was another important decision made by this last summit meeting.

The international situation continues to demand the greatest attention on the part of our nations.

Namibia still lacks independence, despite the pertinent decisions by the OAU and the United Nations, particularly the adoption of Security Council Resolution No 435.

The South African people continue to be subjected to the apartheid system, which has been condemned internationally, and are waging the struggle for equality, democracy, liberty and peace.

The Palestinian people, headed by the PLO, are continuing to struggle for their sacred right to a fatherland.

In Chad, the bitter fratricidal war is continuing to decimate the population.

In the Middle East, the escalation in the war between two member nations of the Movement of Nonaligned Countries concerns us.

The People's Republic of Mozambique continues firm in its struggle for peace, equality, democracy and social progress, and for the right of the peoples to self-determination and independence.

Welcome once again, Mr Ambassador, to the People's Republic of Mozambique.

Our government offers you full collaboration and support in the fulfillment of your honorable mission.

I urge you to join me in a toast to the future friendship and cooperation between our peoples and nations:

To the health of His Excellency President Denis Sassou-Nguesso!

To fruitful friendship and cooperation between the people of Mozambique and the people of the Congo!

To the health of the ambassador and his wonderful family!

To peace, democracy and social progress in Africa and throughout the world!

The struggle continues!

Thank you very much."

Congolese Ambassador's Response

The following is the full text of the speech delivered by the new ambassador of the People's Republic of the Congo to our country.

"Your Excellency, Comrade President:

On this solemn and memorable day on which I have the honor of presenting to you the credentials by means of which Comrade Denis Sassou-Nguesso, president of the Central Committee of the Congolese Labor Party and president of the People's Republic of the Congo, has accredited me to Your Excellency as ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, allow me first of all to render most profound and respectful homage to you for the historic role you have played in liberating our continent from colonialism.

In entrusting this important and very delicate mission to me, the chief executive of the Congolese revolution, stressed very forcefully the absolute need to develop and consolidate, through concrete actions, the indestructible and active solidarity between the Mozambican Congolese peoples, who are courageously waging the battle for the same cause.

The shining ideal to which the heroic Mozambican people have freely committed themselves, despite a geographic and political situation which up to the present has continued to be one of the most hostile on our continent, this ideal incorporating the building of a fatherland of peace in the heart of Africa, with freedom, social justice, true democracy and fraternal friendship among all the sons of the country, converges in every aspect with the ideal of the People's Republic of the Congo.

Therefore the high esteem and great admiration any citizen of the Congo feels with regard to the Mozambican revolution and its most illustrious helmsman can easily be understood. Your most recent stay in Brazzaville and the historic speech to the cadres and militants of the Congolese Labor Party on that occasion, which was carried on radio and television, remains engraved forever in letters of gold in the history of the militant relations which so satisfactorily link our two peoples.

All of these considerations brilliantly emphasize the extreme delicacy of my mission. Called upon to work in a friendly country, the guarantee which comforts me is that I find in Your Excellency, as well as your glorious party and government, all of the concern I need to carry out my most important mission.

I for my part promise to spare no effort in the search for ways and means which can contribute to the continuous development of the friendship, cooperation and solidarity which already exist between the People's Republic of Mozambique and the People's Republic of the Congo.

I am happy to pass on to Your Excellency the wishes for happiness in your noble and historic task of leading the Mozambican revolution sent to you with all his heart by your brother and friend, President Denis Sassou-Nguesso. The head of the Congolese revolution instructed me with particular insistence to reiterate to Your Excellency what he himself has already had an opportunity to tell you of personally, to wit the unending existence of total, militant and effective solidarity in every aspect of experience between the Mozambican revolution and the Congolese revolution--total, militant and active solidarity with the triumph of our two revolutions.

In conclusion, allow me to submit, most respectfully, the credentials informing you of the appointment henceforth of my predecessor, Ambassador Malela, to other duties, and accrediting me to Your Excellency as ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the People's Republic of the Congo."

Profile of the Ambassador

The new ambassador of the People's Republic of the Congo, Jacob Okanza, who is a member of the Central Committee of the Congolese Labor Party, was born on 21 March 1936, and holds a bachelor's degree in literature, a master's degree in comparative literature and a doctorate (third cycle) in literature.

From 1956 to 1957 and from 1957 to 1959, he worked in primary education as director of the Ste-Radegonda and Ngamia Schools, in the districts of Owando and Abala, respectively. In 1965, he took up his duties as head of the School Planning Department.

A teacher at the Savorgan de Brazza Secondary School in Brazzaville from 1966 to 1967, he then went to the Higher Normal Training School of Central Africa and the National School of Administration as a teacher in 1968. In that same year he also served as Director of Secondary Education. In 1969, Jacob Okanza was appointed secretary general for education.

From 1972 to 1977, he worked in the Presidency of the Republic, serving first as cultural adviser and later as chief of staff of the Presidency of the Republic.

In 1977 he was appointed minister of trade, and he worked in that sector until 1979. He also taught at Marien N'Gouabi University in 1978. In the period between 1968 and 1973, the new Congolese ambassador to our country served as secretary general of the National Congolese Teachers Union. As a member of the Congolese Labor Party, he served as secretary of the Central Committee and a permanent member of the Planning Commission and, finally, president of the Planning Commission of the Central Committee of the Congolese Labor Party.

Jacob Okanza is married and is the father of 10 children.

President Welcomes German Ambassador

In response to the speech delivered by the new ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) to our country, Marshal Samora Moises Machel, president of the People's Republic of Mozambique, said the following:

"On behalf of the people and the government of the People's Republic of Mozambique, we thank you for the words of appreciation and respect you have just spoken to us at this solemn ceremony for the presentation of the credentials accrediting you as ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Federal Republic of Germany to the People's Republic of Mozambique.

Your words express the will and the readiness to develop our bilateral relations and raise them to an ever higher level.

Welcome to the People's Republic of Mozambique. Let us assure you of our support in the execution of the noble task entrusted to you by the government of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Mr Ambassador: You have just been accredited as ambassador to a country which for more than 20 years has had constant war imposed upon it, a country which has won its independence by the force of arms. You are in an African country which is the uncompromising defender of the values and ideals of African unity, a nonaligned and socialist country which loves peace, freedom, equality and justice.

Your accreditation comes at a moment of particular importance both to our country and to all the southern zone of Africa.

The people and the government of the People's Republic of Mozambique are profoundly committed to the battle to eliminate armed banditry and to the struggle for economic development, a necessary condition for the well-being of our working people.

This struggle represents the most profound commitment of the Mozambican people to the conquest of peace and the advancement of socioeconomic development.

In southern Africa, apartheid is the factor causing this instability and violence. Its elimination is a basic condition for the achievement of peace and tranquility in the zone, above all an enduring peace.

As a Front Line country, we are fighting tirelessly for the independence of Namibia and for full equality for all South Africans in South Africa, independent of their race, skin color, sex or religious belief.

Despite the efforts pursued by the international community, Namibia continues to be subject to colonial occupation. South Africa continues adamantly to refuse to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution No 435.

Within the framework of the SADCC, we are searching for cooperative economic actions which will promote interdependence among the member nations and independence from South Africa.

Mozambique, as a country which loves peace and liberty, has always evidenced an open and constructive attitude toward the possibility of using the path of negotiation and dialogue as a way of resolving conflict among nations. Within this context, the People's Republic of Mozambique has spared no effort in the search for peaceful solutions to eliminate the violence and efforts to destroy stability of which the countries in this region are the targets.

There are various centers of tension and violence which threaten international peace and security. War continues to tear Africa and the Middle East apart. The threat of a nuclear war with unforeseeable consequences hovers over our planet. However, the imbalance in the economic development of the North and the South makes the waste of the resources so needed by the underdeveloped countries in order to eliminate their desperate need for food and clothing, their underdevelopment and poverty, intolerable.

The People's Republic of Mozambique favors general and complete disarmament. We support all of the undertakings designed to reduce international tension and to eliminate armed conflict among nations.

We hope that the current talks between the Soviet Union and the United States of America will produce the results desired by all mankind--peace and social progress for the welfare of man.

Mr Ambassador, it is the responsibility of Your Excellency to promote and develop relations between our two nations. We hope that fruitful cooperation will develop between our two countries on all levels, based on mutual benefits.

With a view to this cooperation, I ask you to join me in a toast.

To the health of the president of the Federal Republic of Germany, Dr Richard von Weizsacker!

To the health of Helmut Kohl, the chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany!

To friendship and cooperation between the peoples of Mozambique and the Federal Republic of Germany!

To the health of Your Excellency and your wonderful family!

To peace and international security!

To progress for the peoples!

The struggle continues!

Many thanks."

Response of the German Ambassador

The following is the full text of the speech by the new ambassador of the FRG to Mozambique.

"Mr President:

It is a special honor for me to submit to Your Excellency the credentials with which the president of the Federal Republic of Germany, Dr Richard von Weizsacker, has seen fit to accredit me as ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to your country.

Let me take the liberty of submitting to you at the same time the letter of resignation from his post drafted by my predecessor, Ambassador Hasso Buchrucker.

I regard the fact that the president of the FRG has entrusted to me the noble task of representing our country in the People's Republic of Mozambique and continuing to develop and deepen the relations of friendship existing between our two countries as a great honor. I am happy to be able to undertake to

continue the efficient work done by my predecessor, and I would at the same time ask Your Excellency to grant me the confidence and support he enjoyed.

Mr President, the policy of our two governments is guided by the principles of the United Nations Charter. These principles include the right of the peoples to self-determination, the implementation of human rights, rejection of the use of force, nonintervention and also respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of nations.

Both our societies are based on the principle of equal rights for all men, without distinctions of color, race, religion or origin, and we both seek to encourage the recognition of this basic human right outside our frontiers as well, through political means.

It is the highest goal of the foreign policy of the government of the FRG to contribute to the establishment and maintenance of peace in the world. This means that the government of the FRG, through a consistent policy in favor of peace, is trying to contribute to the reduction of conflict and the creation of the conditions necessary for a just and enduring order. It continues to have as its primary goal the achievement soon of independence for Namibia, on the basis of Security Council Resolution No 435, as well as the abolition of the apartheid system in South Africa.

There is no place in our world for colonialism and racism, whatever their form. We categorically reject the policy of apartheid, which is a violation of human rights, and in particular the expulsion of individuals by means of acts of violence. We are, moreover, also of the opinion that there is no reasonable alternative to dialogue and negotiation. We have always been committed to the rejection of the use of force on the international scene, and we will continue to be.

The signing of the Nkomati Agreement strengthened the hopes of all of those combatting violence and defending peace in southern Africa and the solution of conflicts through negotiation. The government of the Federal Republic of Germany hopes that this accord will establish an enduring basis for a good relationship among the nations involved, and that in addition to this, it will contribute to the resolution of the causes of the tensions existing in the region in peaceful fashion.

Mr President, the government of the Federal Republic of Germany is committed to continuing to expand and consolidate cooperation with Mozambique in all fields, in a spirit of egalitarian cooperation and on the basis of equal rights and mutual confidence. We respect the right of your country to determine its own development on the political, economic and social levels in full sovereignty.

The goal of our egalitarian cooperation with the African nations is to strengthen their independence and their economic consolidation. We are trying to provide the countries on this continent with the political and economic strength needed to maintain and consolidate their independence. Therefore we encourage these nations to pursue a policy of true nonalignment.

We oppose the transfer of the East-West antagonism to Africa, since this would create new types of dependence and new probabilities of conflict.

The East-West confrontation has fatally marked the destiny of our own country, causing its division. Working to establish a situation of peace in Europe in which the German people, in free self-determination, can recover their unity continues to be a goal of the German policy.

Mr President, we are aware that the economy of your country has in past years been subjected to very excessive burdens.

The government of the Federal Republic of Germany is committed to contributing to overcoming the existing difficulties, through economic cooperation. It is pleased by the efforts undertaken by Mozambique to improve its economic situation. The law protecting foreign investments in Mozambique, the association of the country with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, as well as the signing of the Lome Convention, represent important steps contributing to providing Mozambique with better access to the financial resources its economy urgently needs.

The government of the Federal Republic of Germany is following the efforts made by the SADCC nations to intensify regional cooperation in southern Africa with great sympathy. The awareness that international economic cooperation leads to a better use of their own resources and to greater political independence for all is increasing in the southern African nations. Mozambique is playing an important role in this launching of economic association among various African nations.

I am convinced that in the future, the Federal Republic of Germany and the People's Republic of Mozambique, Europe and Africa, will depend increasingly one upon the other. We are neighbors.

The fate of Africa is our fate, the progress of Africa is our progress. The peace in Africa is our peace.

In conclusion, allow me, Mr President, to pass on to you, on the instructions and on behalf of the president of the Federal Republic of Germany, his sincerest wishes for your personal well-being and a happy and peaceful future for the People's Republic of Mozambique and its citizens.

Profile of the Ambassador

Wilfried Noelle, the new ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to our country, was born in Berlin on 6 July 1925. He completed his studies in Oriental languages, ethnology and the science of comparative religion, which he pursued in Marburg, Frankfurt and Tübingen, in 1950.

A doctor of philosophy, he engaged in journalistic and scientific activities in Tübingen, in the FRG, and in Chicago, in the United States, until 1960.

His diplomatic career began in that year, when he served as press attache at the embassy of the FRG in New Delhi. From 1965 to 1970, he served as first

secretary at the embassy of the FRG in La Paz, and from 1970 to 1974, he was first secretary at the embassy in Kuala-Lumpur.

From 1974 to 1977, he served as an adviser on Latin American affairs at his country's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and as a ministerial adviser at the embassy in Ankara.

From 1980 until his appointment as ambassador to the People's Republic of Mozambique, Wilfried Noelle served as the permanent representative of the ambassador at the embassy in Beijing, in the People's Republic of China.

Wilfried Noelle is an honorary professor of Oriental languages and ethnology, and is a corresponding member of various European and South American academies, including the Spanish Royal Academy of History. He is the author of a number of books on historic and Oriental subjects, and has been awarded a number of civilian and military decorations.

The new ambassador of the FRG to our country is married and has one child.

5157

CSO: 8142/1536

23 July 1985

MOZAMBIQUE

VELOSO REPORTEDLY HAPPY WITH NKOMATI

Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER in English 15 Jun 85 p 2

[Text] General Jacinto Veloso, Mozambique's minister for economic affairs, began a week-long visit to France on June 8, mainly devoted to preparing for the meeting of the joint Franco-Mozambican economic commission planned for July.

Referring to international assistance for Mozambique, General Veloso told a press conference in the French capital on June 13 that "if global aid is not increased, it will not enable the living conditions of Mozambicans to be improved." He acknowledged, however, that France, Italy and the Nordic states were making particular efforts in this direction.

Speaking of relations with South Africa, the minister said the joint operational centre which it was recently decided to establish had begun to operate at Nkomati, on the border, but "in limited fashion." He also said that for the moment Maputo did not envisage requesting military assistance from Pretoria "even though several members of the South African Government are said to be in favor of it."

General Veloso, one of the architects of the Nkomati accord, said the past was a success, even if at present its results were "difficult to perceive." He said the world would only really appreciate it in "five of ten years." He added that to combat the Mozambique National Resistance the government had distributed arms to the people, and "terrorism had disappeared" in areas where this was done."

The minister also said that if general elections, already postponed to the end of 1985, had to be put off once more, it would be because the government wanted to concentrate on reviving the economy.

CSO: 3400/547

MOZAMBIQUE

PUNITIVE ACTION TAKEN AGAINST INHAMBANE PROVINCIAL DIRECTORS

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 12 Jun 85 p 8

[Text] The government of Inhambane has decided to punish the provincial directors for home trade and transportation and communications, as well as the chairman of the Inhambane City Executive Council, with the penalty of recorded reprimand, for allowing negligence among workers in their sectors.

The measure was recently announced by the governor of Inhambane, Jose Pascoal Zandamela, during the holding of the provincial government's first special session, which studied the decisions from the last session of the Council of Ministers.

Directors Jossias Nhate, of home trade, and Alberto Mahoque, of transport and communications, failed to act for the purpose of allowing for rapid removal of products from Maputo to supply the population. The chairman of the Inhambane City Executive Council, Vitorino Mucavele, failed to take action against the negligence of the workers responsible for controlling the activity of the fishermen.

The Inhambane provincial government also decided to demote for 6 months the chiefs of the Highway Transport Department, attached to the Provincial Directorate of Transport and Communications, and of the Marketing Department, attached to the Provincial Directorate of Home Trade, Bernardo Andre and Manuel Teixeira Taula, respectively. These two workers did not carry out a mission that they had received, namely, to coordinate transportation facilities for the removal of products held in Maputo. The agent from COGROPA [Wholesale Trade of Foodstuffs], Manuel Peula, who also contributed to the lack of coordination which led to the failure to remove the products, was punished with the penalty of 15 days' reduction in his salary.

The agent from PESCOM [Wholesale Trade of Fish], Pedro Justino Munguno, and the director of fishing for Inhambane City, Jose Bata, were each punished with the penalty of 15 days' reduction in wages for showing negligence in controlling the fishermen's activities.

The agent from AGRICOM [Agricultural Products Marketing Company], Artur Laisse, was punished with the penalty of 20 days' reduction in wages for going to

Maputo unnecessarily, to the detriment of the work that he should have been doing on the agricultural marketing campaign.

The first special session of the provincial government of Inhambane discussed, among other matters, the change in prices of certain agricultural-livestock products, and recommended the formation of brigades to explain and publicize the new prices among the populace. It charged the Provincial Government with the responsibility for making proposals for new product prices.

In the area of making the enterprises profitable, the Inhambane provincial government observed the need for reflecting on the Mangoro mining unit in the district of Inhatrime, from the standpoint of its conversion into a cooperative, in view of the instructions from the Council of Ministers.

In analyzing the cashew nut marketing campaign, the government was of the opinion that some districts would fulfill their goals. As for agricultural production, the consensus of the members of the Inhambane provincial government was that the production indexes for cassava, corn and beans in this agricultural campaign are satisfactory.

2909

CSO: 3442/315

MOZAMBIQUE

PRIVATE FARMERS APPLAUD GOVERNMENT LIBERALIZATION

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 12 Jun 85 p 8

[Text] "The small producers should sell directly to the population, while the large ones market their products in hotels, among food factories and in other places. It sufficed to have control. What is required is to prompt the producers to challenge the speculators and not let the latter set prices." This is the opinion of the two largest private farmers in Sofala, namely, Carlos Nobre and Americo Baptista da Costa, regarding the Council of Ministers' communique on liberalization of prices and free circulation of products to give an incentive to producers.

When approached by our reporter in the city of Beira, these private producers, one of whom, Americo Baptista da Costa, is the largest hog raiser, said that the position adopted by the Council of Ministers was encouraging for production because it offers an incentive and gives more confidence for advancement.

Americo da Costa remarked: "When I heard the communique, I was very gratified because we have waited a long time for the competent structural agencies to adopt measures concerning what was happening to production. But they must be put into practice immediately, so that the matter will not languish on paper."

Carlos Nobre corroborated this opinion: "There were, actually, activities that could not function in this way, and we had already said so. How can a state enterprise in the same category market the products of others?" Americo Baptista da Costa, who holds an area of 588 hectares on which he raises hogs and cattle, and engages in farming, notes that, under these conditions, the benefits from production did not go to the producer, but rather made the parallel state enterprises rich.

Speculation

The existence of many intermediate enterprises, some of which have production obligations, has, in the opinion of these farmers and livestock raisers, caused the diversion of raw materials and even of products to speculation.

Americo da Costa comments: "In the distribution of feed and other materials, we cannot be subjugated to the state enterprise in the same category. If I

were director, I admit, sincerely, that I too would give priority to my own enterprises and to the others later, in this instance, to the private ones. it is not fair for this to continue, to our detriment."

Previously, according to the explanation given by these farmers, they had obtained their quotas of bran in MOBEIRA. Now, the State Hog Enterprise controls all the activity and executes the distribution. They claimed: "This not only harms us, but also gives rise to speculation which, we can attest if necessary, is always caused by middlemen."

They added: "Speculators of that kind depend on our production and our lack of control. It is easier and more fair for us to set up our own stalls or sell on the market or on sites indicated by the structural agencies, so as to market the products among the population. There would be no speculation to challenge us."

Pork

In the view of breeder Americo Baptista da Costa, little has been said about pork. "It was only noted that the prices are being maintained, but they are doubtful and fluctuating in many locations at present. I think that this matter of pork should have been considered in greater detail, because if the production were well supported, it would more quickly solve the matter of the meat shortage problem than would cattle raising, which takes more time."

2909

CSO: 3442/315

MOZAMBIQUE

NEW SPECIALISTS TRAINED IN CHEMICAL FIELDS

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 12 Jun 85 p 2

[Text] A total of 430 technicians in various branches of the field of chemistry have been graduated in Mozambique since the revision of the course, with two more branches added to the only field, general chemistry, offered during the colonial regime, namely, laboratory chemistry and technological chemistry. Sources from the State Secretariat of Technical-Professional Education expressed the opinion that the introduction of the two branches is being aimed at creating conditions to address the problems of the various sectors existing in the country.

Up until 1975, only the specialty of general chemistry was offered in the country, the provision for which was directed toward the training of cadres to ensure the operation of the only specialized company existing in Mozambique, the one for general chemistry, as well as other sectors which the regime considered essential.

As occurred in connection with several other sectors, the question of the country's overall development was not taken into consideration. Hence, the technicians for other fields either had to come from abroad, or they also had to be trained abroad.

The revision of the course, which took place after independence, emerged as a response to the need to create foundations for the training of the necessary technicians for the country.

At present, the training is being given on four levels, with two basic, one intermediate and another for the training of instructors.

The basic level courses are given in the Matola and May Day Industrial Schools in Maputo. The one on the intermediate level is given at the Maputo Industrial Institute, and the same holds true for the one in pedagogical chemistry. It should be noted that this course had been given at the Umbeluzi Pedagogical Institute but, owing to the lack of instructors, the classes in this special field had to be transferred to the Maputo Industrial Institute.

Information provided by the Planning Directorate of the State Secretariat of Technical Professional Education indicates that, at the present time, there are

110 attending the course in analytical (laboratory) chemistry in daytime classes and 40 attending the industrial (technological) chemistry course in nighttime classes.

Chemistry and Production

Urbano Gove, from the SETEP [State Secretariat of Technical-Professional Education] Curricular Planning Department, explained: "Chemistry is a little known but quite important field, particularly for production sectors. Its applications are extremely vast. The greater the development, the greater its applications. In the concrete instance of Mozambique, despite the existence of a specialized (general chemistry) enterprise, there are chemical laboratories in many production sectors which play a major role in the production process itself."

According to that official, the application of chemistry in productive sectors begins in the initial production process, because it is first necessary to know the condition of the raw materials. He added: "The process continues thereafter during the course of production and, finally in the quality control of the product."

Sectors such as health, and enterprises such as the ones for water and petroleum processing are among others which also have in the chemical field a component that is important and essential for engaging in their activity.

It is in this context that the training of technicians for the various branches of the chemical field in our country appears as one of the most important areas of the educational programs.

Who Trains Our Cadres

In the course of the revision of this special field, which resulted in the creation of two more branches (previously cited), two questions cropped up, requiring an immediate solution: the creation of a teaching staff and the supplying of schools which, among other specialties, would be devoted to the training of cadres in this field.

On this topic, the subject of our interview announced that most of the first courses were given by co-operant instructors, while at the same time the Ministry of Education's structural agencies took action to train Mozambican instructors. "In some instances, it was the students from the most advanced courses who gave instruction to the lower-level classes, while others attended accelerated courses and other types."

Despite the fact that the problem of instructors has not been completely solved, the situation does not appear to be so critical as it was previously. There are Mozambican instructors participating in the training of the future technicians.

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CSO: 3442/315

MOZAMBIQUE

NEW CONTEMPORARY PORTUGUESE GRAMMAR INTRODUCED

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 7 Jun 85 p 8

[Text] On Wednesday night, the Portuguese professor, literary critic, journalist and poet, Pires Aurelio, delivered a lecture devoted to the topic "Contemporary Portuguese Literature." These lectures are being held in connection with the launching of the "New Contemporary Portuguese Grammar" in Mozambique. For this purpose, a Portuguese delegation headed by the roving ambassador for cultural relations with countries having Portuguese as an official language, Fernandez Fafe, traveled to our country.

In attendance at Wednesday's lecture were the vice minister of education, Dr Carlos Beirao; the state secretary of culture, Luis Bernardo Honwana; the minister of industry and power, Antonio Branco; the Portuguese ambassador to Mozambique, Dr Palouro das Neves; and other prominent persons, both Mozambican and Portuguese.

"Contemporary Portuguese Literature" was the subject discussed by lecturer Pires Aurelio who, in a brilliant manner, provided the audience with important information for understanding the present status of literature in Portugal. The meager amount of Portuguese literature that has succeeded in entering Mozambique by way of those traveling or through persons sending books to relatives and friends has not afforded us an updated knowledge concerning it.

For obvious reasons, Portuguese literary production stopped being available in Mozambique after 1974. Pires Aurelio stressed this point, in introducing us to the subject, and then discussed works of Portuguese authors who have become prominent in recent years and have helped to raise the international prestige of Portuguese literature.

Jose Cardoso Pires, Jose Saramago and Augustina Beca were the authors through whom the lecturer put the Mozambican audience in contact with contemporary Portuguese literature, because they are individuals who, during the past few years, have earned a fame transcending the borders of Portuguese territory.

Since this was a lecture given in a country where Portuguese is the official language, the lecturer did not fail to explain the fact that, on the international level, Portuguese and Brazilian literature has already been introduced

and fittingly defined, whereas that of the other countries which use the same language is still far removed from acceptance.

Without treating precisely the topic of the literature of the African countries which have adopted the Portuguese language as official, Pires Aurelio noted that they will achieve this only when they become capable of reflecting on the realities of their societies, and do not confine themselves merely to well prepared writings which, nevertheless, are not identified with their origins.

The launching of the "New Contemporary Portuguese Grammar" is an event that has been surrounded by a great deal of affection on the part of the Mozambican entities associated with the sector and the audiences that have appeared, both at the conferences and the lectures, have been people impassioned by the subject of language. In short, one has the impression that the "Portuguese Grammar" is something for which a need was sensed in our country. That everyone should have access to it is a desire which reality has already shown.

2909

CSO: 3442/315

MOZAMBIQUE

PARENTS VISIT CHILDREN STUDYING IN CUBA

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 6 Jun 85 p 2

[Text] "The visit that we paid to the Mozambican schools in Cuba enabled us to view close at hand the manner in which our children's studies are progressing in that socialist country of Central America. They are living in a family environment with good comradeship. We also visited some centers of technical and economic interest, and we exchanged views with Cuban workers." This is the mutual opinion expressed to our reporter by the parents who recently returned to the country after having visited their children who have been studying in the Republic of Cuba since 1982.

With a total of eight persons representing the provinces of Niassa, Nampula, Sofala, Inhambane, Manica, Gaza, Maputo and City of Maputo, with the exception of the provinces of Cabo Delgado, Tete and Zambezia which, because of communication and transportation difficulties, could not send anyone on time to the nation's capital, the parents of the Mozambican students in Cuba remained in that country for 2 weeks.

In a talk with our reporter, the parents voiced their joy at having visited that socialist country for the first time and having had the opportunity to see the children whom they had not seen for 3 years.

How the Visit Happened

In a first contact, we spoke with the group chief, Jose Teodoro, from the Ministry of Education's Foreign Relations Department, who stated: "This visit is the follow-up of the work started last year by the Ministry of Education aimed at informing the parents of the activities being carried out by their children in that country. It is also an incentive for the Mozambican students in Cuba, and in a way contributed to the improvement of the student's learning achievement."

The Joy of Traveling

At our request, the parents described how the trip took place. Mario Fortes, from Manica Province, said: "It was a very pleasant visit for me. I was very happy about that initiative of the Ministry of Education, sponsoring annual visits to Cuba. I greatly admired the Cuban people, who are always willing to

receive our children and make them future technicians for our country. The relations between ourselves and the Cubans were good."

The second person with whom we talked was Adriano Maponde, from Gaza Province, who, after making an assessment of the relations between the Mozambican students and their instructors, remarked: "The Cuban teachers treat our children with love and affection, as if they were their own children. There is no distinction between a teacher and a student. But there are no hesitations when it is a matter of work. That is the feature which I admired greatly. I enjoyed the trip very much; I consider it a good initiative, because it enables us to learn about our children's daily activities."

The conversation took place in a friendly manner, and everyone wanted to tell what impressed him most.

Luisa Joao Siteo expressed her emotion: "I enjoyed the visit greatly; I thank the party and the government of our country which gave us the opportunity to go and visit our children. I liked very much the way in which the Cuban government structures received us. It was a festive, happy atmosphere. It was very good in my view and, besides, this was the first time that I have traveled by plane."

Among various opinions on the visit to Cuba, particularly in the educational area, Jose Naene, from Inhambane Province, commented: "I enjoyed the trip immensely; I was able to see my son, whom I had not seen for a long time. I found him already grown up; I almost didn't recognize him. The visit was very interesting for me; it helped me to dispel many doubts about things that many people were saying about our children in that country. They are really there to study and to specialize. This year, my son has prospects for attending the ninth grade," he claimed.

The discipline and good achievement are the most dominant features of the Mozambican students in Cuba, as we were told by the parents who visited there. This conduct was stressed by the Mozambican and Cuban instructors everywhere they went, as they emphasized.

When our conversation had nearly ended, they declared: "Our children complain about the lack of correspondence from their relatives. They write to them only when there are unhappy times in the family. This is the message that we take to our provinces, to the parents who have children in Cuba."

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CSO: 3442/315

MOZAMBIQUE

BRIEFS

CUBAN WORKERS HAIL 10TH ANNIVERSARY--Last Saturday and Sunday, the Cuban internationalists serving in the various socioeconomic sectors of the nation's capital held their second sports festival, marking the 10th anniversary of national independence and the 12th World Festival of Youth and Students, to be held during July of this year in the city of Moscow, capital of the USSR. Led by the Cuban ambassador to Maputo, Manuel Torres Muniz, the opening ceremony for the festival took place on Saturday afternoon, in the basketball court of the Costa do Sol Sport Club, with the participation of several youth officials and officials from the Cuban Communist Party, in addition to scores of athletes and other Cuban workers and Mozambican enthusiasts who went to the site. Participating in the festival were athletes who represented various work groups of Cuban internationalists serving in the capital in the areas of fishing, agriculture, construction, health, and intermediate and higher education, engaging in the sports of handball, basketball, gymnastics, volleyball, ping-pong and baseball. Speaking at the event, an official from the Communist Party of Cuba, who also took part in the ceremony, declared that the Cuban internationalists serving in the RPM hail the 10th anniversary of Mozambican independence, which is also a victory for the Cuban people and for all peace-loving peoples and those struggling against colonialism and for a better future for all mankind. [Text] [Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 6 Jun 85 p 2] 2909

GAS PUMP FOR BEIRA COOPERATIVE--A gas pump for the monthly supply of 1,000 liters will soon be opened at the "People's Power" consumer cooperative in the city of Beira, with the installation of the respective tank currently being completed, the work for which had been assigned to Metalotecnica. This cooperative also intends to open a sales station and a fish market, in activities which are a part of its development programs. Furthermore, officials from this popular association uphold the permanent full time integration of workers in the consumer cooperatives, so as to avoid a series of problems the consequences of which would impede their growth. Information provided to NOTICIAS indicates that steps will be taken with the Home Trade Directorate to procure authorization enabling the "People's Power" consumer cooperative to install the pump and to engage in the sale of gas to its members. This cooperative is located in the 12th Maraza District of the city of Beira, and to date has 3,750 members. With the provision of certain amounts of fuel, it will be possible for the cooperative members to surmount some difficulties that they are facing in purchasing this product. Moreover, the opening of the new sales station, which will be located at the "E" communal unit, will solve other problems

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stemming from a constant increase in members of the cooperative, because the three stations which exist at present lack the capacity for serving the 3,750 members. As for the fish market, which will also be opened at the "People's Power" consumer cooperative, there are reports claiming that it will make use of a cold storage facility which has been abandoned and which is close to the three sales stations. According to the officials of the "People's Power" consumer cooperative, the integration of the workers in a permanent, and full-time system, will make it possible to solve many of the problems now besetting several cooperatives, the results of which are having negative repercussions on their growth. This problem, combined with the constant changes in members of the management commissions and the disproportionate, improper selection of the respective technical complement, has also been discussed several times at meetings with the members of this cooperative and also with the overseeing structures, but without positive results, at least to date. These officials claim that there has been a certain amount of disorganization in the consumer cooperatives because their heads have not concerned themselves with the organizational aspects, claiming that, a year from now, they will leave the cooperative. Moreover, the selection and assignment of the members for the management and control commissions have not been done with the proper stringency, much less investigating the extent to which these individuals would be equipped to direct the process of managing the cooperatives. "There have been times when responsibilities have been given to certain individuals in the cooperatives who are not familiar with certain principles of management. How can these individuals ensure the operation of the establishments under those conditions without at least undergoing a refresher course?" they inquire. [Text] [Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 6 Jun 85 p 2] 2909

VARIOUS DEFENSE SPENDING FIGURES--During April and May of this year, the Administration and Finance Department of the Presidency of the Republic took in a total of 5,542,071.50 meticals, a contribution from the population and national institutions to reinforce our country's defense capacity. A note from that department which reached our editorial offices yesterday specifies that the contributions were made by vigilance groups from the TEXTAFRICA enterprise of Chimoio (10,000.00 meticals), officers and petty officers from Manhica (6,593.00 meticals), residents of the communal village of Bocodane (1,000 meticals), the government of Manica Province (11,076.00 meticals), the People's Development Bank (3,650.00 meticals) teachers and students from the Maputo Business School (10,000 and 425.00 meticals), vanguard combatants (10,000.00 meticals), the population of Morrumbala (207,820.00 meticals), the Ministry of National Defense (5,000 meticals), the population and workers of Nampula Province (277,000 meticals) and students from the first course for training assistants for the district of Manica (4,507.50 meticals). [Text] [Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 6 Jun 85 p 1] 2909

SOVIETS HELP SMALL FARMERS--The Soviet Union is to provide Mozambique with aid worth 11.5 million dollars in the form of an assortment of consumer goods to be used in agricultural campaigns, being exchanged with peasants for their produce. This is the second such assistance given to Mozambique in less than a year. [Text] [Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER in English 8 Jun 85 p 2]

CAR THIEVES FIGHT POLICE--Armed men have been attacking cars belonging to Mozambican miners returning from work in South Africa, though police say the only motive is robbery. Attacks have occurred in Matola and in Maputo itself, where on May 27 there was a shootout between police and robbers and three men were arrested. This battle was so fierce that local residents thought that guerrilla warfare had reached the centre of the capital. Police have since increased roadside checks and night patrols in the area. [Text] [Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER in English 1 Jun 85 p 3]

CAHORA BASSA POWER PYLON REPAIR--Mozambican sourffective [as received] security caused by the deployment of security on too many fronts, poor roads, and inadequate aerial surveillance have prevented repair teams from restoring the number of Cahora Bassa power pylons blasted by RENAMO. According to the sources, the Mozambican Government has given no time limit for the restoration of the power flow to South Africa. The pylons are being repaired by Mozambican technicians, with material and equipment supplied fo ESCOM [Electricity Supply Commission]. Our Johannesburg staff reports that about 30 pylons in rugged areas have been damaged in the past year. Last month Mozambique abandoned a plan to recruit a mercenary force to guard the power line. There is speculation now that the Mozambican Government is trying to recruit a pan-African force, but that it is unlikely to get off the ground because of logistical problems. [Text] [Johannesburg Domestic Service in English 1115 GMT 21 Jun 85]

CSO: 3400/518

NAMIBIA

BRIEFS

ALLEGED SWAPO CAMPS INVESTIGATED--A spokesman for the West German Embassy in Pretoria has confirmed that West German embassies in southern Africa are investigating allegations that special SWAPO camps exist in Angola and Zambia. However, the spokesman denied reports that the investigation was the result of a special request by the West German Government. He said investigations such as these were normal in the performance of duties by West German embassy personnel throughout the world, and that regular reports were sent to the government. The spokesman said the embassies had been aware of the alleged SWAPO camps in Angola and Zambia for a number of months already. /Text/ /Johannesburg Domestic Service in English 0500 GMT 9 Jul 85/

CSO: 3400/616

REUNION

BRIEFS

POLITICIANS UNITE--Representatives of Reunion's regional council showed themselves united on measures that should be taken to help the island when they met French government officials in Paris from May 22 to 30. Despite belonging to different political tendencies, five local leaders in the delegation led by council chairman Mario Hoareau (Paul Verges of the Communist Party, Gilbert Bourhis and Auguste Legros of the right-wing UDRP and RPR respectively) said they were unanimous on the priorities which must be met to avoid a "social explosion" on Reunion before 1990. The delegation put forward two demands: an end to the requirement for recipients of family and housing allowances to be in paid work, and the organisation on "roundtable" discussions between Reunion and government representatives. [Text] [Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER in English 8 Jun 85 p 4]

FRENCH MINISTERS VISIT--No fewer than eight French ministers or their underlings will be visiting Reunion one after the other in the coming weeks. There is speculation whether it is the first results of the visit to Paris by a delegation from the island's governing council, or unofficial opening shots in France's 1986 general election campaign. The ministers and junior ministers due from July onwards are Georges Lemoine (overseas territories), Michel Crepeau and Jean-Michel Bockel (trade, small business and tourism), Guy Lengagne (the sea), Michel Delabarre (labour and training), Jean Auroux (town planning, transport and housing), Christian Nucci (cooperation) and Jean Laurain (war veterans). [Text] [Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER in English 15 Jun 85 p 5]

CSO: 3400/572

23 July 1985

SEYCHELLES

'HARD' BARGAINING OVER SATELLITE TRACKING STATION REPORTED

Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER in English 15 Jun 85 p 1

[Text]

The agreement renewed in 1981 which authorised the United States to maintain a satellite tracking station at La Misère on Mahé island in the Seychelles for a further five years expires next year, and is currently at the centre of intense diplomatic activity. Washington is presently paying 2.5 million dollars a year for the station, and while president France Albert RENE is not opposed to the agreement being renewed once again he is demanding a much higher "rent".

It is true that the station, which belongs to the U.S. air force and employs 290 people, is constantly growing in importance, particularly in the context of the "star wars" programme. In October 1983 the organ of the MPR, the Seychelles opposition movement, published a photograph of a U.S.A.F. transport which had just delivered a large amount of equipment for the station.

According to information obtained from senior officials by THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER, the Seychelles tracking station played a capital role in monitoring data during the secret military mission of the U.S. space shuttle Discovery in January this year. Washington's ambassador in Victoria, David FISCHER, personally delivered the results obtained to the Pentagon shortly after the mission ended, the officials said.

In parallel with the negotiations currently under way with the Seychelles for the renewal of the contract, Washington has made a number of approaches to other countries in the region. It appears very unlikely that the Americans are seriously envisaging transporting the station elsewhere, given the cost that this would involve, but they are both hedging their bets and bringing pressure on the Seychelles authorities so that they do not demand too high a rent. It is noteworthy, however, that whereas in 1978 the payment for the station of 6.7 million rupees was the equivalent of 23 per cent of the Seychelles state revenue, today it represents less than five per cent.

Among the countries approached was Kenya, where the station would be sited at Mombasa. More recently the U.S. ambassador to the Comoros, Robert KEATING, who is based in Antananarivo, raised the question with

president Ahmed ABDALLAH and the minister of state for presidential affairs and defence, Ahmed ABDOU.

It may be recalled that before erecting the station in the Seychelles, the United States asked France permission to install it in the Comoros, which was still a French possession at the time. Paris refused, and suggested Madagascar, where there were important French military facilities. However the fall of president Philibert TSIRANANA put paid to the idea.

In the event that the Americans were obliged to dismantle the station in the Seychelles, there seems no doubt that the Comoros would be the most suitable alternative site. President ABDALLAH is particularly interested, and would be prepared to make substantial concessions to conclude a deal, above all if the station ended up in his own island of Anjouan. The president, who is having increasing difficulty in keeping political control over the country, appears to be tempted once more by seceding with Anjouan. "When the time comes, Anjouan must be isolated", he told close supporters some ten days ago. If necessary, Washington could go along with that.

CSO: 3400/572

SEYCHELLES

BRIEFS

AGREEMENT WITH SPAIN--The Seychelles minister for national development, Jacques Hodoul, has said his visit to Europe to settle various problems connected with fishing had positive results. According to Mr Hodoul, the third session of the joint commission of the Seychelles and Spain was able to reach a compromise on the cost of licences owing to the Victoria government by Spanish boatowners who have had 15 seine-netters operating in Seychelles waters for the past year. Victoria was demanding five percent of the total value of each catch, which the fishermen were refusing to pay. After discussions this tax was reduced to 3.5 percent, the difference being made up by the Spanish government in the form of technical aid. Mr Hodoul has also announced that the Seychelles will start operating its first tuna boat, owned by the Societe Thoniere Seychelloise, in September, while the archipelago's first tuna cannery will start up in March next year. [Text] [Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER in English 8 Jun 85 p 7]

CSO: 3400/572

SOUTH AFRICA

COMMENTARY DISCUSSES NEED FOR CROSS-BORDER RAIDS

MB280930 Johannesburg International Service in English 0630 GMT 28 Jun 85

[Station commentary: "Terrorism and Regional Development"]

[Text] There is a clear warning contained in the terrorist incidents that occurred in South Africa and Transkei this week. In one incident on the East Rand near Johannesburg eight people who were evidently members of the ANC died when attempts to attack houses of policemen failed. The eight were all killed when hand grenades exploded too soon and went off in their hands. In the other incidents, damage was caused to an electricity substation and fuel tanks when limpet mines placed by ANC members went off at Umtata, the capital of Transkei.

The acts in which the eight destroyed themselves on the East Rand provide the strong proof of the information that led the SADF to strike at ANC bases in Gaborone in Botswana recently. It was found at that time that small groups of ANC members were being trained in Gaborone as so-called suicide squads to attack civilian targets in South Africa with hand grenades. The background to the Umtata attack is less clear.

It was reported earlier this week that intelligence sources had discovered that ANC terrorist groups were now being controlled from Maseru in Lesotho, as well as Botswana. It is known that on previous occasions the ANC has launched terrorist attacks at states which were close to the countries from which they were operating, like the attacks that were launched in earlier years against Kwazulu from Mozambique, and against Ciskei from Lesotho.

Whatever the facts are, there must be no doubt about the South African response to terrorism. The South African Government has stated repeatedly that it wishes to cooperate peacefully with all southern African countries, and it is willing to provide assistance to others in developing their economies. It is up to the governments of other southern African countries to decide where they stand in this regard. Those who reject peaceful relations and assist the ANC in its campaign of terrorism against whites and black South Africans must expect that South Africa will act to defend itself. Where necessary, it will cross borders to eliminate ANC terrorist bases. It is up to each country in the region to choose its stand, and of course those who choose to resist peace must realize that any country which is attacked will defend itself.

CSO: 3400/518

SOUTH AFRICA

COMPLEXITIES OF LOCAL, PROVINCIAL FUTURE GOVERNMENTS EXPLAINED

Durban DAILY NEWS in English 10 Jun 85 p 8

[Article by Bruce Cameron]

[Text]

"I LOVE it when a plan comes together," Minister of Constitutional Development, Mr Chris Heunis, must be saying as he puts the finishing touches to one of the most intricate constitutional blueprints ever devised.

And it is not a plan that has come easily, stretching back to that first abortive effort in 1977.

Having started the reconstruction from the top, the new tricameral Parliament is now finalising the lower levels of Government and should be operational by next year.

It has been like watching a jigsaw being put together with all the pieces being left upside down until being fitted into place.

As with the central level of Government the new lower levels are constructed on a racial basis with the division into common (general) or racially exclusive (own) affairs being even more finely balanced than at the central level.

As the plan has unfolded at local and provincial level it has become clear that once again the Government has made major changes to include and improve the position of other race groups but at the same time has ensured that the white majority party in Parliament will maintain the ultimate control.

But there has been one major shift this has been to include blacks at the local government level and the possibility of them even being drawn in at provincial level (this is

one of the jigsaw pieces that is still missing).

The whole local government and provincial system cross-pollinates all the way up the line because of the division of functions and powers into own and general affairs.


Starting at the bottom are the primary local authorities, which could be fully-fledged local authorities or management and local affairs committees with limited powers or other groupings representing "non-viable communities, farmers and even farm workers."

These primary authorities will concern themselves with "own" affairs such as community halls and swimming pools.

Although the latest legislation establishing the new lower tiers of Government does not mention race, in terms of the Constitution the bodies and their territories must be based on race. The stringent segregation of the past has however been eased and it will be possible for people of different race groups to own property in areas designated for other race groups, particularly in the case of industrial and commercial properties.

The Government has also moved deliberately to ensure that white municipalities will no longer automatically be entitled to all the major income generating areas and has given notice that they will now be more fairly divided.

PROPOSED PROVINCIAL REFORMS



POSSIBLE GENERAL FUNCTIONAL AREAS

And the division of the spoils will be done by multiracial demarcation board albeit that it is to be appointed by the Government.

The demarcation boards will not have the final say but will have to make recommendations to the provincial administrations who will be able to make changes.

Although the Government would dearly love to foist local government autonomy on the larger Indian and Coloured areas it appears to have backed off and is leaving events to take their course. This could as a result of having greater powers conferred on them be virtually autonomous in all but name.

The carrot of course remains

that by taking autonomy the greater their powers will be.


The primary local authorities then have links in two directions. One to the Regional Services Councils (RSCs) and to the regional offices of central government own affairs administrations. It is here where black local authorities are to be drawn, being given representation on the RSCs.

The RSCs will basically be responsible for the supply of common services such as water, lights, sewage and fire fighting.

But the composition of RSC's is one of the stumbling blocks.

By deciding on representation and voting power by the the con-

STRUCTURES FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT



sumption of services the system is loaded in favour of whites.

However in an attempt to ease this the Government has written into the legislation that the RSCs will have to favour the less developed regions under their control.

This will help prevent the situation which has occurred in many areas in the past where white municipalities spent the bare minimum on facilities and services for their non-white communities.

The RSCs will have no control over the primary authorities which will be answerable to a regional own affairs office.

The RSCs will in turn be responsible to the Government-appointed provincial administrators in executive committee.

The Government obviously struck a problem at provincial level.

It could not repeat its tricameral system at this level because of the expense and the sheer volume of people who would have to be involved.

At the same time there was clearly no way it would accept unicameral, multiracial provincial councils, even if elected on separate rolls.

The only answer it could find was to scrap elected provincial councils with legislative powers.

Instead they have created Administrators with executive committees which will have enormous powers — but only in general affairs.

Unlike public representatives at the first and third tiers of government the second tier of government will no longer be accountable to the electorate but only to the State President.

There will be special councils to advise the provincial executives but they will also be appointed by the government and will have no powers. The Government has however committed itself to including Indians and Coloureds on the pro-

vincial executives and has left the door open for black appointments.

The checks and balances, the increased number of people involved and the fact that town hall politics have always been more controversial will make the task of getting the system working difficult.

There is still widespread opposition to the system but Mr Heunis is using his well-known persuasive powers to get it off the ground.

The opposition is to the extra taxes to finance the system and the loading in favour of whites.

But Mr Heunis argues that it is a massive change in Government attitude because for the first time blacks are being included there is a financial bias in favour of less affluent communities.

This is virtually a repeat of the "step-in-the right-direction" argument used so successfully to get the new central government system going despite its massive flaws.

SOUTH AFRICA

DE KOCK CALLS FOR MONEY TARGETS

Recommendations Listed

Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 19 Jun 85 p 1

[Article by Harold Fridjhon]

[Text] GRADUAL abolition of almost all exchange controls on residents, the removal of prescribed investment requirements on financial institutions and the setting of money supply growth targets are among the main recommendations of the final report of the De Kock Commission which is released today.

The main thrust of the report is that inflation over the past 25 years has been caused by excessive money creation and spending. Its recommendations are aimed at enhancing market-orientated controls to inhibit these factors.

The commission, appointed in 1977, submitted two interim reports. The first, Exchange Rates in South Africa, was presented in 1978. The second on building societies was released in 1982. The final report covers the entire monetary system and monetary policy in the country.

Many of the recommendations have already been implemented by the Reserve Bank. But there are other wide-sweeping recommendations which could make considerable positive changes to the financial structure of South Africa and enable the maintenance of more stable prices.

Of wide interest are De Kock's recommendations on exchange control. The commission urges relaxation of exchange controls on portfolio investment, but recommends that the remaining exchange control over residents be substantially relaxed and simplified as part of an orderly evolutionary process.

The alternative of completely abolishing exchange control, as was done in the United Kingdom, would have important

advantages but this is not recommended by the commission at this stage.

The commission envisages that its recommendations would in due course lead to either the complete phasing out of exchange control or the retention of only a limited set of precautionary controls involving a minimum of red tape.

In reaching its decision not to recommend the complete abolition of exchange control at this stage, the commission took special note of the political uncertainties in the country.

The commission recommends that the present liberal application of exchange control on direct foreign investment by South Africans be continued and progressively extended until approval becomes automatic for foreign investments that could promote South African exports or protect strategic imports.

A big step forward is the recommendation that exchange control over portfolio foreign investments by South African residents be relaxed. This would start with the granting of permission to registered insurers, pension funds and mutual funds to invest about 10% of the net annual addition to their funds in foreign securities approved by the Registrar of Financial Institutions.

In due course similar provisions could be applied to other financial institutions and corporate bodies such as the mining houses. Naturally, the timing of such liberalisation would depend on the state of both the balance of payments and the domestic economy.

The commission recommends that control over emigrants' blocked funds be relaxed in two ways: first, control over the assets of emigrants who left the country before January 1975 should be

abolished as soon as possible and, second, as far as remaining emigrants are concerned, the limits on the accounts that may be transferred should be doubled from R100 000 to R200 000.

Other recommendations:

- ☐ The Reserve Bank should reintroduce bank rate as the banks' rediscount rate but the commercial banks' prime rate would be free to move as bankers felt fit;
- ☐ Bank rate would be flexible;

- ☐ The Reserve Bank should conduct active open market operations in both the money market and the bond market;
- ☐ Supervision of banks and building societies should be transferred to the Reserve Bank from the office of the Registrar of Financial Institutions; and
- ☐ The Reserve Bank should withdraw from the forward foreign exchange market and the banks should be given greater freedom to participate.

Streamlining Monetarism

Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 19 Jun 85 p 6

[Editorial]

[Text]

The rand was firmer yesterday. There were a number of reasons why. But not insignificant among them was probably news of the final recommendations of the De Kock Commission.

Simply put, the outcome of the policies and reforms spelled out by the commission should mean that the general price level in SA will see greater stability in the years ahead. That has to be good for the currency.

The report rightly identifies too much money creation and spending as the cause of 25 years of rising domestic prices. And it sets the country firmly towards a monetarist solution to that problem, recommending a monetary policy and monetary system better to enable more timely disciplines to prevail in the future.

Essentially, it means that increasingly the key prices in the economy will be determined by market forces of supply and demand. The economically wasteful distortions that past direct controls and government interference nearly entrenched will now be whittled away. The report is a commitment to freedom through the application of sensible, classical policies of demand management.

In practical terms it does not mean that the exchange rate, interest rates and other important

and related prices will be let rip. It does mean that they will be subject not to arbitrary — and often suspect — controls of bureaucrats and politicians, but to the more telling disciplines of the market place.

One measure of the influence and importance of the commission's chairman, Gerhard de Kock, who is also Governor of the Reserve Bank, is that debate on the report's final recommendations began long before its release last night.

For in fact the main thrust of the recommendations has already been implemented. They are implicit in the creating of a foreign exchange market in Johannesburg, in the rise and depoliticisation of the mortgage rate and the rise in prime rate to record heights.

The monetary system that the report envisages — and which is largely in place already — recognises the economic advantages of having sophisticated financial markets. It simply puts forward more streamlined means of applying money creating restraints through them to greater effect.

The improved technical mechanisms and introduction of monetary aggregate targetting will make it more difficult for the monetary authorities not to take appropriate action when danger signals flash. Politicians

too will have to take greater note.

Under the old monetary system, it was too easy for the Reserve Bank to succumb to pressure for excessive money creation. This was partly an inherent defect as contrary action would have created destabilising shocks, especially to agricultural financing.

Some monetarists will argue that the latest De Kock recommendations do not go far enough to remove these defects. The nature of the proposed aggregate targetting is one aspect where there is some validity in this view. For while these targets must command greater adherence to a monetary rule than before, they will still be moving targets.

Moreover, it is probably an illusion for the commissioners to believe that this targetting can be low-key and avoid the glare of publicity. If that happens, part of the objective is defeated. And, as the financial press gains in sophistication along with the financial markets, it will not be allowed to happen.

There is a robust rebuttal in the report of those free-lunch economists who believe inflation is caused mainly by structural rigidities — lack of competition, low productivity and so on — and that therein lies the key to its cure.

All those phenomenon certainly ratchet up general price rises, but the cause remains too much money chasing too few goods

which is rooted in the creation of too much credit. Until that is adequately addressed, prices will continue to rise regardless of productivity gains or increased competition.

The result is precisely the same in any economy, be it developed or under-developed. And the most effective means of curbing money creation is through market as opposed to direct controls. In fact the less developed the economy the more efficient market controls operate. Part of the problem in SA is that the financial markets have become more sophisticated than the market controls devised so far.

To upgrade these mechanisms it is clear that remaining exchange and other controls must go and that new markets, such as one in forward rand, need to be encouraged to complement what already exists.

These and other technical means recommended by the commission to enhance existing financial markets will mean greater not less monetary discipline in future. The degree to which the commission is prepared to go in this respect may be a matter of opinion. The direction is indisputably correct.

The heights to which interest rates in this country have been forced is not an indication of "overkill" as some economists would have us believe. It is a result of the sophistication of financial markets outstripping earlier crude direct control measures.

SOUTH AFRICA

GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS REACT FAVORABLY TO DE KOCK REPORT

Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 19 Jun 85 p 6

[Article by Paul Bell]

[Text]

GOVERNMENT would give immediate attention to the De Kock Commission's recommendation that official targets for the growth of the money supply be introduced, President P W Botha said yesterday.

Botha said some of the commission's recommendations had already been implemented by the Reserve Bank and the Treasury.

Others were on the point of being implemented: for example, the Financial Institutions Amendment

Bill now before Parliament provided for a number of changes to the Banks Act recommended by the commission.

Botha said he was gratified to note that the commission had found that South Africa had a well-functioning, sophisticated and sound banking and financial system.

The report also illustrated the importance attached in South Africa to the achievement and maintenance of internal and external monetary stability.

Parsons Welcomes 'Overall Thrust' of Final Report

ORGANISED commerce has welcomed "the overall thrust" of the final report of the De Kock Commission, with its emphasis on market related economic policies whenever possible.

Assocom's chief executive Raymond Parsons said yesterday while much of the thinking in the report was incorporated in existing policy, the report remained an incisive forward-looking document cast in an evolutionary mould.

Assocom hoped government would accept the basic findings of the commission.

"The recommendations must be seen as a total policy 'package', as the underlying economic philosophy is interdependent. If the report —

with its commitment to financial discipline — is accepted by government, it will further enhance South Africa's international credit worthiness compared with most other developing nations." Parsons said organised commerce also welcomed the commission's flexible and pragmatic approach to the use of monetary aggregates as a policy yardstick.

"Monetary policy will now nonetheless be placed in an identifiable framework of financial discipline, with clear 'warning lights' to signal departures from the norm. While there will undoubtedly be a process of trial and error, it is evident that monetary targets will only remain credible in the longer term if monetary and fiscal discipline is maintained."

CSO: 3400/568

SOUTH AFRICA

GOVERNMENT ADVISED TO STAY IN MARKET PLACE

Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 19 Jun 85 p 6

[Article by Harold Fridjhon]

[Text]

THE final report of the De Kock commission which inquired into the monetary system and monetary policy, re-states unambiguously the basic principle enunciated in its first interim report: that monetary policy must be market related.

"It is the commission's conviction that in South Africa's sophisticated financial system a market-orientated monetary strategy will serve the national interest better than any set of non-market-orientated or 'direct' monetary controls," says the report.

Markets function best in the national interest if they are reasonably free, competitive, active and broad, and produce realistic market-related interest and exchange rates. Monetary policy should be applied so that it does not undermine the efficient functioning of these markets.

One of the main findings of the commission is that many of the deficiencies of the past were the result of controls on rates, controls on bank ceilings and inadequately monitored and stabilised rates of increase in the monetary aggregates.

The commission comes to the conclusion that the excessive and unstable growth of the monetary aggregates not only permitted and accommodated the relatively high rate of price increases during the past 20 years, but was also a major

cause of this inflation.

There were three major reasons why market-related policies were not applied in the past:

- An inadequate appreciation of the significance of the rapidly developing markets and of their implications for monetary policy.
- A lack of faith in the ability of these markets to produce optimal economic results.
- The fear that an untrammelled operation of the financial markets would have certain socially unacceptable consequences such as high interest rates on housing and agricultural finance.

The commission is satisfied that South Africa has a relatively advanced monetary and banking system and a set of reasonably broad, active and expanding financial markets.

There had been a tendency in the past to equate monetary policy largely with the control of credit extended by the banking sector to the private sector, the report says.

"The weakness of this unduly narrow view ... was that it tended to focus attention mainly on instruments of monetary policy aimed at controlling bank credit to the private sector ... with insufficient attention being given to ... public debt management, open market operations, discount policy and exchange rate and exchange control policy."

Ultimate Monetary Aim Is Stability

MONETARY policy as defined by the commission specifically includes intervention by the Reserve Bank and the Treasury in financial markets, including the foreign exchange market.

"A decision by the monetary authorities to permit natural economic forces to bring about, say, a depreciation of the currency or a rise in interest rates, is just as much the implementation of monetary policy as intervention in the markets concerned to counteract such developments.

The long-term objective of monetary policy should be the maintenance of reasonable stability of the domestic price level with an effective measure of freedom for relative prices to change.

One important recommendation is that the Reserve Bank adopt specific intermediate objectives of monetary policy in the form of target rates of growth for one or more selected monetary aggregates. It is realised that the adoption of such money supply targets would strictly limit the number of combinations on the level and structure of interest rates and on spot and forward

exchange rates that could be hoped for simultaneously.

A rigid over-riding money rule that leaves interest rates and exchange rates completely free to find their own levels is not recommended.

Targetting should be applied in South Africa with a "fair measure of flexibility and with a low profile."

One method of doing this would be to use three-months moving average for the monetary aggregates and to announce in February each year, the target ranges for the increases between the fourth quarter of the previous year and the fourth quarter of the current year. Provision should be made for a revision of the prevailing targets between normal reviewing dates if considered desirable.

The commission recommends that the target rates should be publically announced but from the outset it should be made known that the targets are not sacrosanct and that failure to meet them on any specific date should not be viewed in a serious light.

Bank's Functions Need Closer Definition

WHILE the responsibility for broad monetary policy should rest jointly with the Reserve Bank and the Treasury acting together as "the monetary authorities", the commission considers this close co-ordination as essential.

This applies particularly in planning the strategy for public debt management (including the financing of the budget deficit before borrowing), open market operations and both exchange rate and control.

It recommends the bank be entrusted with considerable independence in initiating, formulating and implementing monetary policy.

The Treasury has a variety of

functions in carrying out official economic policy, but the Reserve Bank should be primarily charged with maintaining monetary stability and protecting the internal and external value of the currency.

"The bank should be ensured of considerable independence in matters of monetary policy — subject only to the constraints of the broad policy framework laid down by the government."

There is a need to define the responsibility of the Reserve Bank more closely.

The commission recommends:

● A section should be added to the Reserve Bank Act specifically

charging the bank to regulate the money supply and the availability of credit with a view to influencing the total money demand in the economy.

- The Governor of the bank should be required to submit an annual report to the State President to be tabled in Parliament.

This would entrench a high degree of independence for the bank and assure a corresponding degree of accountability, reinforced by the suggestion that the Governor or a Deputy Governor testifies in Parliament to the finance committee.

- The Reserve Bank's board of directors should be nominated or elected on a non-political basis.

- It is also suggested that an effort should be made to entrench the tradition that the Reserve Bank is the main channel through which banks, discount houses, building societies and, at times, other financial institutions make representations to the Finance Minister and ultimately to the State President and the Cabinet.

- To fill the void left by the dissolution of the National Finance Corporation, the commission recommends that a consultative body with a composition similar to the NFC board should be appointed.

Named the Reserve Bank Consultative Council it should meet at least twice a year.

CSO: 3400/568

SOUTH AFRICA

WHAT DE KOCK RECOMMENDS DETAILED

Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 19 Jun 85 p 6

[Text]

THESE are the commission's recommendations, point by point:

FINANCIAL MARKETS

Many of the commission's recommendation affecting the money markets have already been implemented. These include:

- ☐ The tender system for Treasury bills (TB);
- ☐ The Treasury bill rate be determined largely by private tenderers;
- ☐ The amount of the TB tender be varied according to the Treasury's needs as well as the needs of monetary policy;
- ☐ The issuing of tax-anticipation TBs;
- ☐ The Reserve Bank should be a buyer and seller of TBs;

GOVERNMENT BONDS

The commission recommends that the prescribed investment regulations be withdrawn.

This might create transitional problems if the institutions decide to reduce the proportion of their assets held in public sector stock, but the commission suggests the Department of Finance and the Reserve Bank hold prior negotiations with the Life Offices' Association and the Association of Pension and Provident Funds to obviate such problems.

This recommendation about the abolition of prescribed investments depends on government adopting related reforms in such areas as credit control, money market management and exchange rate policy.

Without these reforms a distortion of the structure and level of interest rates could again hamstring the public sector's borrowing and the Reserve Bank's operations in an open capital market.

- ☐ The issuing of government bonds by means of tender is welcomed but this should be discussed with the major institutions;

- ☐ With each issue of government bonds there should be a draw-down period not exceeding three months;
 - ☐ The issuing of non-marketable government bonds such as loans levies, tax-free bonds, and bills should be kept down to a minimum;
- BAs, TRADE BILLS AND PROMISORY BILLS**

The commission takes the view that financial claims of any nature, such as bankers acceptances, accommodation paper, trade bills and promissory notes should be traded in the markets with a minimum of regulation.

Self-liquidating bankers' acceptances drawn for the movement of goods would qualify — as they do at present — as liquid assets but accommodation paper drawn for bridging finance for capital projects would not qualify as a liquid asset.

As banks' cash reserve bases become more adequately controlled by open market operations, discount policy and exchange market intervention, the ratio on certain types of liquid assets can be dispensed with and the market's capacity to absorb bankers acceptances will fall away.

The commission recommends that building societies should be permitted to hold BAs as liquid assets.

It also considers that the local bill market has the potential to expand along the lines of the US commercial paper market but this requires an

amendment to the Companies Act. The commission recommends that this be referred to the standing advisory committee on company law to consider the feasibility of the issue of company paper to bearer.

BANKS

The commission recommends the use of a cash reserve system of controlling bank credit rather than a liquid asset system.

The report says the minimum basic liquid asset ratios laid down by the Banks Act should be further reduced to 20% on short-term liabilities to the public and 15% on medium term. They are currently 22% and 16% respectively.

Other recommendations are:

- ☐ The Reserve Bank's powers to impose supplementary liquid asset requirements be revoked;
- ☐ The banks' minimum basic cash reserve balance should be 8% of short-term liabilities and 4% on medium term;
- ☐ The Reserve Bank should have the right to call for supplementary cash reserve balances against both short- and medium-term liabilities as well as the power to reduce the basic cash reserve requirements.

The commission endorses new legislation which lays down that banks must provide capital and unimpaired reserves to cover domestic and foreign contingent liabilities issued against clients' overseas bor-

rowings, as well as reserve asset requirements for banks' direct foreign borrowings entered into either in the banks' names or on behalf of clients.

The commission supports the principle that minimum capital and reserve fund requirements for banks should make allowance for banks' foreign operations conducted by foreign subsidiaries, branches or agencies.

An important recommendation is that the Minister of Finance should investigate the transfer of supervisory powers over banks and building societies from the Registrar of Financial Institutions to the Reserve Bank.

LAND BANK

No problems are seen in the Land Bank granting long-term mortgage loans to farmers in certain categories at rates below free-market levels.

But the commission warns that these rates should be set close to those in the market because unrealistic rates cause land values to be bid up "so that the intended advantage of low interest rates for purchasers turns out to be largely illusory and in time disappears altogether".

Funds raised by the Land Bank by bank advances or by bills should not be used for mortgage lending or other forms of medium- to long-term financing.

SOUTH AFRICA

CONCEPT OF ETHNICITY, NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION EXPLORED

Johannesburg POLITIKON in English Jun 84 pp 43-54

[Text]

GERHARD TÖTEMEYER *

ABSTRACT

In this article the concept of ethnicity is fully explicated and attention is drawn to the way in which the South African government uses "ethnicity" to legitimize its continuing hegemony. The major component of the article is a comparative survey of black university students on the theme of ethnic identification. A major finding is that students predominantly identify with a South African or African identity - in preference to ethnic identity. In addition, the author also explores the reality of multiple loyalties in the South African context.

The South African government's policy of separate development enforces decisions to be loyal to ethnicity as a 'manifestation of parochial practices and perspectives' (Hanna, 1979:130) instead of identification with the national entity of South Africa, and simultaneously enforces acceptance of the allocation of scarce resources in the ethnic conceived "homelands" instead of participation in the affluence of the political entity South Africa. The under-lying premise of the homeland policy as construed by the South African government is that ethnic groups are homogeneous in cultural values and political orientation, that these values and orientations are unchanging, and that separate development is therefore the only viable policy to accommodate ethnic diversity (see Du Pisani, in Töttemeyer, 1980:168). The South African government feels justified to impose this policy as defined by it on ethnic groups. Cohen (1980:365) considers South Africa a "dramatic example of a situation in which ethnic diacritics plus power differences are lumped together ... to clearly identify and mark ethnic divisions".

CONCEPTUALIZING ETHNICITY

The concept ethnicity needs further clarification. Talcott Parsons (1976:53) refers to ethnicity as a group concept with an own identity, that is "the organization of plural persons into distinctive groups". He also mentions the solidarity and the loyalties of individual members to such groups. The ethnic group is considered to be a social phenomenon and one primary example of a large genus of types of social collective organization which might be called the diffusely solitary collectivity. Glazer and Moynihan (1976:15) concur with Parsons that ethnicity constitutes an organizing principle. It refers to different groups with different norms and values and to a peculiar bond (the content of which is shared culture) among persons that causes them to consider themselves a group distinguishable from others (Enloe, 1973:15). Ethnicity is thus made central to the identification of groups.

An ethnic group is composed of what has been called 'primordial affinities and attachments' (Isaacs, 1976:30), a sense of belonging to a particular organised body. According to Isaacs it is the identity made up of what a person is born with or acquires at birth: "He acquires the history and origins of the group into which he is born. The group's

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culture-past automatically endows him, among other things, with his nationality or other condition of national, regional, or tribal affiliation, his language, religion, and value system – the inherited clusters of mores, ethics, aesthetics, and the attributes that come out of the geography or topography of his birthplace itself, all shaping the outlook and way of life upon which the new individual centers from his first day”. The ethnic group is thus viewed as the primary socialising agency in the individual’s maturation process (Kofele-Kale, 1980:171).

Parsons (1976:54) identifies language (linguistic uniformity) and common cultural traditions (oral and written) as prominent aspects of ethnicity when considered as a cultural concept. To this Isaacs (1976:33) adds history, mythology, folklore, art, literature, religious beliefs and practices. Ethnic units thus are cultural clusters which share common beliefs and values. The term ethnicity then refers to a social group whose membership is determined by similar basic cultural characteristics and an assumed common descent. It can be a group based on real or putative kinship ties and it is used in preference to the concept ‘tribal’ with its derogatory colonial associations.

It would be mistaken to assess ethnicity as a closed concept with definite boundaries. Ethnic groups are not only subject to change but they also become networks of regular communication and interaction (Enloe, 1973:18-19). Ethnicity, according to Cohen (1980:365), is a set of descent based identifiers that can increase or decrease in number in inverse relation to the degree of inclusiveness and exclusiveness of its members. This assumption is in direct contrast to the belief of traditional ethnographers who refer to ethnic groups as closed systems with hard and firm boundaries which relate to all other systems as outgroups. For them in most cases, the ‘primary ethnic unit’ has been the ‘tribe’, which is usually defined in terms of shared descent patterns from a real or mythical ancestor, a relatively homogeneous cultural and linguistic base, and, in the framework of some analysts, a shared political system (Kaufert, 1980:42).

Ethnicity as a social phenomenon and force in Africa is harshly criticised by Marxists who see it as a product of colonialism. According to Nnoli (1977:2) ethnicity in Africa was an instrument for the perpetuation of imperialism and, therefore, a counter-revolutionary force. Nnoli (1977:4) believes that ethnicity emerged as a mechanism for the colonised to adapt to the colonial situation, contributing to the smooth functioning of the imperialist structures, and could therefore not be antagonistic to the aims and objectives of imperialism. Nnoli maintains (1977:5) that part of the relationship between ethnicity and imperialism concerns the efforts of the colonailists to ensure efficient and inexpensive colonial administration by indirect rule. Finally, he says that ethnicity has emerged in part as a mechanism employed by the colonialists to divide the colonised and therefore, maintain domination over them. It was used by the colonisers to curb African nationalism and to manipulate the prevalent fears of ethnic domination “exploiting regional imbalances or preying on inter-ethnic hostility and tension” (1977:6).

In these various ways, the author maintains (1977:7), ethnicity in Africa emerged and persisted either as a mechanism for adaptation to the imperialist system or as an instrument for ensuring a more effective domination and exploitation of the colonised. He considers that in both cases, it served the reactionary purpose of the system: The inferiorisation of the African in order to facilitate his own exploitation.

The thrust of Nnoli’s argument is that ethnicity has become a mask for class privilege and an ‘opium for the oppressed masses’ (1977:10). The task of revolutionaries in Africa is therefore, according to the author, (1977:11-12) to confront ethnic consciousness with class consciousness. Nnoli and other Marxists believe as Glazer and Moynihan (1976:7) put it, that eventually class circumstances will become the main line of division between

people, erasing the earlier lines of tribe, language, religion, national origin, and that thereafter, these class divisions will disappear: "Thus Karl Marx and his followers reacted with impatience to the heritage of the past, as they saw it, in the form of ethnic attachments. Interest should guide rational men – or drive them – in social action; and interest was determined by economic position".

Glazer and Moynihan comment (1977:15) that ethnic differences, are indeed differences, or are at least seen as such. Marxists thought they would disappear. But they did not. Ethnicity remains a reality despite it being at odds with Marxist-Leninist theory. Ethnicity will continue to remain based in group consciousness, in different groups with different sets of social norms, values, and interests. What is new in the present situation is "that interest is pursued effectively by ethnic groups today as well as by interest-defined groups" (Glazer and Moynihan, 1977:7). In general Glazer and Moynihan (1977:20-25) believe that ethnic identity has become more salient, ethnic self-assertion stronger, ethnic conflict more marked and that "as a political idea, as a mobilising principle, ethnicity has spread around the world with other such phenomena." Concepts such as ethnic pluralism, ethnic solidarity, ethnic conflict, ethnic tension, ethnic consciousness and awareness have gained relevance in social research.

Cohen (1980:365) reiterates that ethnicity is a powerful factor in modern African life: As an entity with variable boundaries, it becomes salient and effective once it is triggered or activated by devices that intensify it. Public policies and their outcomes can also be used to ameliorate its disintegrative or tension-creating capabilities. Cohen (1980:366) maintains that African leaders know ethnicity is to be correlated with internal inequity; and, that for reasons of both morality and political wisdom, such inequities must be countered.

ETHNICITY AND LEGITIMATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

Enloe (1973:24-25) refers to the concept racial ethnicity which is largely applicable in the South African situation. It is according to Enloe characterised by values and bonds stemming from physical and biological distinctions. Racial ethnic groups are the result of someone else's prejudice, Enloe maintains, more than either tribal or nationality groups.

In the South African situation the racialization and politicization of ethnicity have become a normative political pattern (Adam, 1982:3). Ethnicity, culture and identity function primarily according to Adam, to lay claims, rather than as an intrinsic value in themselves: "Ethnicity in the sense of who belongs and who is excluded is also permanently redefined according to tactical needs of the power holders and their challengers". Adam accuses the white South African leaders of manipulation of ethnicity which adds to ideological instability and possible resulting conflict. In South Africa a minority ethnicity wields the power while the majority is disenfranchised on an ethnic basis. Adam stresses that whatever furthers the ethnic group in power seems to be legitimate – it is a matter of self-preservation of a white minority group which is not prepared to risk its power base and existence. Illegitimacy then becomes the norm.

The legitimacy and morality of the South African government's policy of divisive ethnic politics are challenged by the black population. It is a policy of ascribing attributes to particular groups which are expected to live and exist socially, economically and politically apart. Cultural and racial attributes are assigned to particular groups to serve as legitimization for political compartmentalisation and geographic separateness. Ethnicity has become central to the political culture dimension of authority. But this policy lacks legitimacy and is therefore constantly exposed to a legitimization crisis which, according to Jürgen Habermas (as quoted by Adam, 1982:1), is characterised by the inability of a

system to ensure mass-loyalty, engender meaning and integrate disparate interests. The South African state, its political institutions, and the white political leaders in power, fail to command support in the black population for its policy of entrenched ethnicity and enforced ethnic political entities. Adam (1982:2) is correct when he states that "instead of the politicised integration practiced in advanced liberal capitalism, South Africa politicises its majority by denationalisation".

SURVEY OF ETHNIC IDENTITY

There is a fallacy among the white power holders in South Africa that the politicisation of ethnicity was the wish of the black population and that this process has convinced the respective black ethnicities of the validity and correctness thereof. It is also a wrong assumption that the process of ethnic identification has succeeded, and that ethnic identity precedes national identity. When the question was put to students at some black Southern African universities in the "homelands" whether in their political thinking they primarily think in ethnic terms or in terms of South Africa, the overwhelming reply was that national identity precedes ethnic identity.¹ (See table 1).

TABLE 1

In your political thinking do you think primarily in ethnic terms or in terms of South Africa?					
Terms	Unitra % —	Unive %	Unibo %	Uniqwa %	Fort Hare ² %
Primarily ethnic	19	33	22	14	20
Primarily South Africa	81	67	78	86	80

This question was succeeded by a more elaborate question on the identification either with Africa, South Africa, homeland/ethnic state, or ethnic group. The various replies are explicated in Table 2.

TABLE 2

If you were asked to reckon you own sense of socio-political identity, in what order would you place the following? (number in order of importance)					
Identification with: *	Unitra %	Unive %	Unibo %	Uniqwa %	Fort Hare %
Africa	63 (11)	46 (41)	46 (19)	34 (17)	58 (10)
South Africa	20 (18)	21 (9)	35 (12)	42 (9)	30 (8)
Homeland/ ethnic national state	8 (44)	14 (14)	8 (31)	14 (37)	3 (61)
Ethnic group	9 (27)	19 (36)	11 (38)	10 (37)	9 (21)

(*the figures in brackets reflect the fourth choice).

The choice for either the continent Africa or the nation-state South Africa dominates. It is assumed that when the students made their choice they were acquainted with the most important denominators of a nation-state, such as a sovereign territorial area, political independence, cohesiveness, legitimation, autonomy, and national identity.

A third question aimed to identify preferences in the respondent's social identity. The question was put: How would you compare the following as elements of your own social identity (sense of belonging to social categories)? The five preferences which the students were asked to judge are listed in Table 3.

TABLE 3

South African identity is stronger than homestate (homeland) identity.					
	Unitra %	Unive %	Unibo %	Uniqwa %	Fort Hare %
Yes	89	81	91	92	89
No	11	19	9	8	11
African identity is stronger than South African identity.					
Yes	80	57	63	45	76
No	20	43	37	55	24
Home (urban/rural) community identity is stronger than ethnic identity.					
Yes	65	52	79	65	71
No	35	48	21	35	29
South African identity is stronger than ethnic identity.					
Yes	69	70	89	84	76
No	31	30	11	16	24
Home (urban/rural) community identity is stronger than South African identity.					
Yes	33	20	37	25	30
No	67	80	63	75	70

When the students were asked how a government should act about ethnic loyalties, the replies reflected similarities with the observations made by researchers on students' attitudes elsewhere in Africa. Except for the University of Qwa Qwa – strongly in favour of abolishing ethnic loyalties – the majority of the students at the other universities in Southern Africa expressed the wish that the government should conciliate ethnic loyalties. Probably for most of them ethnic loyalty and national (South African) identity are not considered to be mutually exclusive but complementary instead. (See Table 4).

TABLE 4

How government should act about ethnic loyalties.					
Action	Unitra %	Unive %	Unibo %	Uniqwa %	Fort Hare %
Ignore them	16	11	14	12	17
Abolish them	29	30	25	42	28
Conciliate them	55	59	61	46	55

Only a minority indicated that their social life would follow ethnic lines in ten or fifteen years from now, while the majority is either not sure (can't say) or adamant that it will not be. It seems that students want at least to diminish and if possible eliminate ethnic identity from national life. Against the background of their previous statements on ethnicity this is not surprising. This does not do away with the acknowledgement or the reality of the existence of ethnic values and any personal feelings towards it. What is rejected is any enforced and imposed loyalty towards a particular ethnic identity. The students are critical towards ethnic values and cultural premises but have to acknowledge the reality of it both in society and in themselves. (See Table 5). These findings coincide to a large extent with those by Beckett and O'Connell (1978:80) among Nigerian students.

TABLE 5

Whether in 10 or 15 years the student's closest friendship and social life will tend to follow 'ethnic' lines.					
Tendency	Unitra %	Unive %	Unibo %	Uniqwa %	Fort Hare %
Yes	10	23	6	8	6
No	42	46	44	51	47
Can't say	48	31	50	41	47

THE RESULTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

The replies to the question in tables 1-3 indicate a strong preference for national thinking and identification as against identification with or belonging to a particular ethnic group. The socio-political identification with the continent of Africa is even stronger than with the nation-state South Africa. This overall tendency has also been confirmed in the questions on social identity. Again ethnic identity figures very low against the preference for urban/community, or South African identity. South African identity is preferred to homeland identity and identification with the continent of Africa to South Africa.

The answers to the previous questions are somewhat in contradiction with the findings of Klineberg and Zavalloni (1969:239) and those of Beckett and O'Connell (1978:6874) among Nigerian students. A comparative study undertaken by Klineberg and Zavalloni among students in Senegal, Ghana, Ethiopia, Zaire, Uganda has confirmed ethnic identity to be higher among Nigerian students than among the others. A study by Agyeman (1974) on education and nation-forming in Ghana has indicated that among pupils and students the identification with the nation-state Ghana is overwhelmingly stronger than with ethnicity. It seems then that the Nigerian students are an exception within Africa context. Their identification with ethnicity figures much higher than among students in Southern Africa. On the other hand, national identity is stronger than continental identity among Nigerian students.

Beckett and O'Connell discovered among the Nigerian students that, on average, ethnic identity is stronger than Nigerian identity; home state and home community identity stronger than Nigerian identity; and home community by far stronger than ethnic identity. In the Nigerian context with its more than two hundred languages and group identities, historical and political developments such as the establishment of the Nigerian federation, has to be taken into account. The growing of the federal states as intermediaries between home community and the federation has nurtured over years a feeling of social identity and allegiance – these facts have to be considered in the evaluation of the replies. Even so, these historic and political reasons cannot possibly be the only reason for the discrepancies in the attitudes between Nigerian and South African students. Ethnicity in the South African context is a (pre) loaded and overloaded concept and is highly ideologised and politicised. It tries to justify separate and homeland development and has caused discrimination on the basis of ascribed cultural and racial criteria. The black students' attitude is one of emotional, social, economic and political rejection of the concept ethnicity as defined and applied by the South African government.

This does not exclude the possibility of a dual loyalty among black students in Southern Africa. As Horowitz (1976:118) indicates, many old identities are in the process of slowly being abandoned for new, and for this reason more than one identity are often claimed. He states that even without such a transitional situation, multiple ascriptive identities are the rule, particularly where the several identities are at different levels of generalisation. A person, he says, who identifies himself as a member of a small kin-group or clan for some purpose may also consider himself a member of a larger ethnic aggregation or 'nationality' or 'race' for others. According to Horowitz there is always the strong possibility of a spillover effect from the ethnic to the national level.

MULTIPLICITY OF LOYALTIES

Multiple loyalties, loyalty to ethnicity or homeland and simultaneously loyalty to the larger entity, South Africa or Africa, are certainly not unique. Kaufert (1980:43) observes in the Ghanaian situation that an elite member or an urban migrant will frequently have a

grid of cross-cutting loyalties and multiple potential foci for ethnic identity and loyalty. He says that a person's identity as a member of his kin group, town, region and ethnic group may be cross-cut by his affiliation with a situationally created ethnic group in the city. Simultaneously supertribal clusters have emerged as a more significant focus for identity and interaction among both the educated and the general population. Regionalism rather than tribalism has emerged as the focus of group identity and exclusiveness below the nation-state level in Ghana, according to Kaufert (1980:62). The responses of the tested students in Southern Africa indicate a stronger nation-state (South Africa) orientation and belonging than identification with a regional (Transkei, Ciskei, Bophuthatswana, Venda) or ethnic (Xhosa, Tswana, Venda) entities. The urge is strong to be primarily identified in terms of the national entity South Africa and not within the context of ethnicity or ethnic homelands.

Research done by Kofele-Kale (1980:21, 170-171) in Cameroon has shown that people were able to retain their attachment to certain ethnic group values and institutions and simultaneously maintain a fairly high level of identification with the nation-state. Ethnic ties and loyalty did not detract from national orientations, neither did ethnic identity contradict national identity. What is important about the findings of Kaufert, Horowitz and Kofele-Kale, is that Africans do not define loyalty as a zero-sum phenomenon in which the new national loyalty necessarily detracts from ethnic group loyalty, and vice versa Kofele-Kale is correct in his statement that it is wrong to assess the African as a one-dimensional man incapable of relating concurrently to the ethnic group and the nation-state. Most African students are ethnic and national depending upon the issue and particular circumstances. National integration can, however, not succeed if people consider themselves as belonging primarily to an ethnic group and only secondarily to the nation. The research findings in other African countries seem to indicate that if the South African government should decide to do away with the ethnic homeland policy and instead enable homelands to join forces with the black majority to work for an integrated and unfragmented South Africa, ethnic groups may wish to retain their attachment with certain ethnic group values and institutions, but will simultaneously pursue a fairly high level of identification with the nation state. Such a development would have distinct implications for a national integration. Myron Weiner (as quoted by Kofele-Kale, 1980:170) has defined national integration as 'the process of bringing together culturally and socially discrete groups into a single territorial unit and the establishment of a national identity'. In an ethnically pluralistic, but united society national integration will involve "the interplay between ethnic group attachments and national loyalties" (Kofele-Kale, 1980:170). One can fully agree with Kofele-Kale's assessment that the solution is not in exorcising tribalism (or ethnicity) for its putative dysfunctional aspects, "but depoliticising ethnic groups - that is, creating other agencies and institutions for articulating political demands, in which criteria for participation and recruitment are not ascriptively defined". To the detriment of developments in Southern Africa, the South African Government still continues with its policy of politicising ethnicity.

The factual situation that salience of ethnicity does exist as a cleavage in the broader Southern African society cannot be ignored. The ethnic variable as an empirical determinant in the structure of the South African society is omnipresent and entrenched in laws. Ethnic alignment has been enforced by the South African government and any study of the South African society cannot ignore the interactive nature of the ethnic variable.

Van Zyl Slabbert and Welsh (1982:167) consider it as a fact that in any conflict resolution within the South African context the cultural and ethnic dimensions of society cannot be left out - without underplaying or ignoring the importance of structural or underlying factors of conflict in society. They agree that the nature of conflict can be defined as structural

inequality of wealth, status and power. However, they insist that "in a racially divided or plural society there is a very strong tendency to articulate the structural inequalities in racial or ethnic terms and South Africa is no exception in this respect".

The study among the students at the five researched universities has proved that they will not condone ethnic partisanship. The expressed attitudes subscribe to a statement by Young (1981:148) that as a moral universe, the values of higher education, universalism, national engagement, developmentalism, are profoundly antithetic to granting ethnicity any legitimate place.

The study was unable to discern any kind of aversion among the students to any ethnic group in Southern Africa. It has, however, to be noted that with the exception of the University of Fort Hare with its strong multi-ethnic student body, all the other researched universities are frequented predominantly by a particular ethnic group. Members of other ethnic groups are minorities at these universities. But even at the University of Fort Hare no ethnic group aversion among the black students could be traced. One reason which makes it unlikely that the ethnic group variable will even in the future be of any significance or a matter of contention among the students, is their total antipathy towards the South African government's policy of ethnic separation. The noted attitude of condemnation will rather unite than divide the black student population. The black student body is nearly totally united in its commitment to prove the incorrectness of the South African government's policy of ethnic separation and that it is devoid of a defensible moral basis. In the struggle for a rightful and fair share in the running of South Africa, black unity will continue to enjoy a higher premium and relevance than ethnicity and ethnic group consciousness.

National affinity is predominantly directed towards South Africa and not towards the homelands as ethnic entities. This political attitude is clearly separated from cultural attachment to the own environment, the predominant language spoken, family and tradition. The students want to be at liberty to decide for themselves which cultural values to adhere to. If they decide to express attachment to a particular ethnic group this is to be seen as a cultural decision and should not be mistaken as a political affinity to the peer group. A distinct and definite distinction is made between ethnic and political affinity, of which the latter is considered by the students as of far more importance to them.

CONCLUSION

The South African government's declared policy to entrench ethnic criteria in the black universities of South Africa (e.g. University of Zululand, University of the North, University of Westville, University of Western Cape) has provoked reaction at the universities in the homelands. It has become the declared policy of the universities in these areas to strictly adhere to the principle of non-racialism and non-ethnicity when admitting students or appointing lecturers. This goes without denying that there is always a possibility that even "fervent support for universalistic criteria may not be devoid of ethnic (or class) interest" (Young, 1981:162), how undesirable it may be. There is no evidence that ethnicity, especially in its cultural content, will gradually disappear from the scene. Young claims it will always be a latent element which becomes manifest in particular circumstances. He rightly states that the other side of the coin is that moments of ethnic crisis in a university are not necessarily permanent, but merely episodes which can clarify issues.

Something which universities in greater South Africa cannot afford and have to contain is any kind of ethnic ("tribal") chauvinism, by which ethnicity ("tribalism") is used as an instrument for attaining personal ends. To exploit parochial and clannish sentiments

instead of promoting national integration will only please those in South Africa who have devised a policy of separate development, and thus also ethnic based universities. It would be wiser to heed the advice of Absalom Vilakazi (1983:16) that African education, for its part, must reject all attempts to develop away from that common destiny into small ethnic enclaves which will have neither meaning nor relevance for the future of our children.

Samuel Huntington in his paper on 'Reform and Stability in the South African Context' (1981:35) concludes that the issues of reform and stability in the multi-ethnic society of South Africa are fraught with irony and paradox, opportunity and danger. He forecasts that the days of minority dominated vertical multi-ethnic societies are numbered. The transformation from a plural (vertically structured) to a pluralistic (horizontally structured) society will undoubtedly not be an easy one and will be sown with many obstacles. It can also be expected that a period of transition will be marked by severe tension and conflict. Even so, it would be preferable to an uncontrollable revolutionary 'solution', bloody and self-defeating.

NOTES:

- 1 The questions have been answered by 242 students (14.5% of the total student body in 1982) at the University of Transkei in all five faculties (Arts, Science, Economics, Law, Education) on a basis of an equal percentage in each faculty from first year to post-graduate level. Part-time and full-time students, male and female students, are proportionally represented in the sample, to the total student body. The questions were also put to students at the University of Qwa Qwa (established in 1982 as a branch of the University of the North) and at the University of Venda (established in 1981). Altogether 59 respondents (30% of the total student body in 1982) completed the questionnaire in Qwa Qwa and 70 students (18% of the total student number in 1982) in Venda. Utmost care was taken to make the sample at the universities as representative as possible.

During late 1982 and early 1983 the questions were completed by 38 students (8% of the total student number of 1982/83) at the University of Bophuthatswana. As only Political Science and Law students could be included in the sample, it cannot be considered to be fully representative of the total student community at this university. Circumstances beyond the control of the author made it also impossible to make the samples at the University of Fort Hare fully representative of the total student community. Only students in the departments of Political Science and Public Administration were asked to complete the questionnaire early in 1983. A total of 159 students (8% of the total student body) of this university responded.

- 2

Unitra	- University of Transkei
Unive	- University of Venda
Unibo	- University of Bophuthatswana
Uniqwa	- University of Qwa Qwa
Fort Hare	- University of Fort Hare (Ciskei)

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SOUTH AFRICA

CORRELATION BETWEEN CONSOCIATIONALISM, CORPORATISM EXPLORED

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[Text]

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ABSTRACT

This article explores the theoretical correlation between consociationalism and corporatism, and relates recent tendencies in the political economy and the restructuring, along consociational lines, of forms of political representation and state intervention in South Africa with corporatist developments. Different dimensions of the concept corporatism are analysed, and the author emphasises the way in which corporatist arrangements effect the balance of class forces in social formations. The author concludes by arguing that consociationalism and corporatism are complementary modes of political domination, and suggests that corporatism can be used to secure conditions for capital accumulation and to legitimate the social reproduction of capitalist relations in South Africa.

INTRODUCTION

Recently a seasoned observer of the South African political scene, Heribert Adam, has argued that 'consociationalism', in the form of a deracialised 'bourgeois democracy', constitutes a second best solution to the problem of political representation in South Africa. This solution, argues Adam, is preferable to no democracy at all, and is certainly better than either the "present social authoritarianism or the repressive, Latin American style corporatist state that South Africa threatens to become" (Adam in Southall, 1983:83).

In the light of the possible realisation of the "coming corporatism" onto the South African political terrain, this article first of all briefly highlights some of the most important limitations of consociationalism as a solution to the problem of political representation; explores the theoretical correlation between consociationalism and corporatism; and relates recent tendencies in the political economy, and changes, along consociational lines, in the forms of political representation, state intervention and interest intermediation with corporatist developments. The emphasis of this article is on the way in which corporatist arrangements effect the balance of class forces in social formations. Finally, and by challenging Adam's implicit contra-positioning of the concepts 'consociationalism' and 'corporatism', I shall argue that consociationalism and corporatism are complementary modes of political domination, and suggest that corporatist arrangements can function to secure conditions for capitalist accumulation, and perhaps more importantly in the South African context, can function to legitimate the social reproduction of capitalist relations.

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CRITICISMS OF CONSOCIATIONALISM

Various political groups in South Africa, including the ruling National Party (NP), the white opposition Progressive Federal Party (PFP), and the Zulu-based Inkatha movement, base and / or present their policies and alternative models for constitutional and political reform explicitly on consociational theory. And although their specific articulation of consociational political reform differ significantly, their proposals all share most of the basic principles of consociational theory.¹ But as consociationalism in the South African context has been the focus of many recent academic studies, I shall, for the purpose of the arguments in this article, only highlight some of the most pertinent criticisms of consociationalism.

The most frequent and pertinent criticisms of consociational theories of democratic representation can briefly be stated as follows. First, consociational theory, and especially Lijphart's writings, constitutes a highly conservative definition of democracy as a form of elite rule – democracy is seen as a system of government in which the role of the people is limited to the selection of their leadership. Furthermore, it can be argued that the principles of grand coalitions, entrenched plural divisions and proportional representation violate the democratic requirements of competition and equality, and severely restrict opportunities for popular participation in decision-making and leadership accountability to the electorate. These factors greatly hamper collaboration across cleavage lines by the disprivileged to alter their condition. But the most serious flaw in consociational theory and representation is that it is not 'developmental': it denigrates questions of economic difference and structures in the process of large-scale change, and is silent on issues involving economic-corporate demands and class conflict (Nolutshungu, 1982:30-32).

Moreover, the most serious obstacle to the application of consociationalism to political arrangements in South Africa – whatever form it takes and groups it involves – is the grossly unequal distribution of economic resources in South Africa. And as we have indicated, consociational theory does not address itself to economic-corporate issues, class conflict and distributional mechanisms. On the contrary, consociationalism is frequently presented as an ideological and analytical alternative to class-based societies and analyses. It is this aspect of consociationalism which gives credibility to radical and Marxist criticisms that the consociational proposals for political reform in South Africa is essentially involving the refurbishing of traditional segregationist ideology into internationally acceptable forms by emphasising 'group plurality' rather than race as a basis for continuing white dominance. They argue furthermore that it forms a deliberate and significant part of a ruling class strategy for co-opting subordinate racial elites within a profoundly conservative, yet deracialised and 'power-sharing' framework which would work to shore up the essential characteristics of South African capitalism (Southall, 1983:77-78).

One possible way in which the theoretical void regarding economic-corporate issues characteristic of consociational theory in general, and political reformist ideas and practices in South Africa in particular, can be remedied, is by exploiting the correlation between consociationalism and corporatism. Several writers have commented on this association, and the following arguments and characteristics serve to demonstrate the 'structural isomorphy' and complementarity of consociationalism and corporatism.²

THE CORRELATION BETWEEN CONSOCIATIONALISM AND CORPORATISM

Just as consociationalism is based on elite representation, co-operation and concordance over ideologically (cultural, linguistic, ethnic, etc.) issues and leadership control over their

various segmental constituencies, the essential characteristics of corporatism are leadership accommodation, and leadership control and discipline over the members of their functionally organised constituencies. In this respect Schmitter's concept of 'intermediation', with its dual functions of representation and control, is crucial for any understanding of corporatism. It implies that the leaders of interest organisations do not only express and represent the interests and members of their organisations, but assume, or are forced to acquire, private governmental functions of resource allocation and social control (Schmitter in Berger, 1981:285).

It is further important to note that both consociationalism and corporatism are political concepts denoting actual political structures which are to be deliberately constructed by dominant political groups and economic classes as a response to popular, mass-based pressures (Schmitter, Sage: 58). Both systems conform to what Offe (1981:125) identifies as a specific type or mode of political rationality with its corresponding form of policy-making. For consociationalism and corporatism are not based on the function of political parties to aggregate and reconcile demands; do not involve the making of 'conjunctural' policies which seek to maximise the adequacy of policy responses to problems as they emerge on the political agenda; and tend to bypass electoral politics and parliamentary representation. On the contrary, both conform to that mode of political rationality which is based on the imperative of keeping policy output constant while channelling demand inputs in a way that appears compatible with available resources. As matters of 'political design', they involve the construction of systems of interest representation and modes of conflict resolution. Accordingly, they involve the making of structural policies which are adopted in response to conditions of economic and institutional crisis. In response to such crises, the physical and economic parameters of production, and the institutional parameters of interest representation, which together constitute the nature of the problem, become subject to redesign (Offe, 1981:125-127). Thus, the central features of corporatist and consociational institutional devices are the removal of certain issues and areas of decision-making from the party-political and parliamentary arena, and the entrustment of major elements of policy-making to negotiations among the interest groups most directly concerned (McRae, 1979:519).

Consociationalism and corporatism also conform to the same mode of decision-making. First, as the major aim of these arrangements is consensus-building, the basic decisional rule involved is that of unanimity. In both bargaining and log-rolling it serves to reconcile the conflicting interests of highly cohesive groups which cannot be adjusted by electoral competition and majority devices. Bargaining power is concentrated in the hands of top level leadership which forms a sort of interlocking directorate of the competing groups (Lehmbruch, 1979:59). Second, decisions are legitimated in terms of functional and pragmatic considerations that purport to be in the 'public' or 'national' interest, usually about issues concerning national security and economic growth and prosperity (Anderson, 1977:134 and 143). Third, support for, and implementation of, these decisions are based on leadership control over interest groups – groups that exhibit strong vertical integration and with little communication among the lower levels of the groups (Lehmbruch, 1979:59).

A very important characteristic of these modes of representation, decision-making and conflict resolution is that it amounts to a mode of political domination. For example, the need to maintain linkages between different arenas or sites of decision-making produces additional responsibilities and opportunities for the elites in each arena and thus reinforces their position in their own respective interest groups (McRae, 1979:529). Furthermore, the principle of unanimity inhibits open competition and gives rise to 'decision by repression'. For example, although there may be a conflict between groups, no competition

in the form of an open vote takes place because the superordinate group is able to repress the demands of the subordinate group. Consensus does not result from a mutual agreement, but rather from the ability of the defenders of the *status quo* to keep certain issues out of the political arena (Steiner, 1981:349).

This *status quo* bias of both consociationalist and corporatist arrangements is clearly demonstrated in capitalist societies where both types of institutions has the effect of maintaining existing class relations and institutionalising conflict, whilst privileging the accumulation needs of capital and enhancing the legitimacy and stability of capitalist relations of production (Panitch, 1979:127). It is in this context that the functional complementarity of corporatism and consociationalism becomes clearly evident. For, as corporatism deals with economic and functional issues, it remedies an aspect not dealt with explicitly in consociationalism. On the other hand, economic issues do not exhaust politically relevant topics, and extra-economic issues are not readily handled through corporatist institutions. This deficiency complicates the efficient operation of a corporatist system and calls into question its ability to secure the political and ideological conditions necessary for accumulation (Jessop, 1983:139-162). In this respect consociationalist institutions can complement corporatism, and can help to articulate extra-economic political and ideological issues, ideas and practices into a coherent hegemonic project.

The close association and functional complementarity between corporatism and consociationalism suggest that the political elite and dominant classes in South Africa, faced by an institutional and economic crisis, can use corporatist structures to complement political reform along consociational lines. Not only will it deracialise conflict in the society and initiate social divisions along class lines, but can also legitimate capitalist relations of production by moving away from the political repression of black working class organisations to the incorporation of these organisations. Corporatist ideas can furthermore serve as an attractive ideological alternative to competitive democracy based on individual participation and equality, as it is based on concepts such as 'plural societies' and 'group rights' – concepts that dominate political discourse in South Africa.

These ideas and practices form an important component of the institutional pluralism of regimes ruling over societies that have reached such a level of social and economic complexity, and social and political mobilisation that they cannot be managed through sheer administration and force, and therefore require some opportunities for political participation.

Therefore, as Linz (in Polsby and Greenstein, 1975:310-311) has argued, the idea of building political institutions through corporate interest representation is particularly tempting to bureaucratic, military, and technocratic elites who reject the idea of open conflict and who believe in a rational, ultimately administrative solution of conflict and who are not guided by an utopian vision of society, but by pragmatic considerations – ideas and practices that play a central role in the very conservative and technocratic nature of the governing elite's reform strategy in South Africa.³ For corporatist and consociational institutions allow the expression of the heterogeneity and plurality of interests, but can also serve to limit the conflictual expression of interests. To show how corporatism can function to secure conditions for accumulation and legitimate capitalist relations of production, further elaboration is needed.

CONCEPTUALISATIONS OF 'CORPORATISM'

In any study of corporatism it is important to note that the concept 'corporatism' does not

describe a situation but rather an 'axis' of development or a set of dimensions. This implies that a political system can be more or less corporatist, more or less advanced in the process of 'corporatisation' depending on the extent to which public status is attributed to organised interest groups. Empirically, approximation to the 'ideal type' of corporatism depends on the number of groups affected and the number of dimensions – in terms of resource, representational, organisational and procedural status – in which they are affected. By status is meant the specifically attributed formal status of a group. Formal status is based on legal statute and formally adopted procedural rules that give the interest group more claim on a specific status.

Accordingly, corporatisation increases with the extent to which:

- 1 The resources of an interest organisation are supplied by the state;
- 2 the range of representation is defined through political decision – including for example, a public definition of the range of substantive areas in which an interest organisation may operate and/or the potential membership, and;
- 3 internal relations between rank-and-file members and executive members are licenced, recognised and invited to assume, together with a specified set of other participants, a role in legislation, the judicial system, policy planning and implementation, or even the right to self administration (Offe, 1981:136-137).

Secondly, the 'bifrontal' functions and 'segmentary' effects of corporatist structures should be recognised. Corporatism is bifrontal to the extent that restrictions are imposed on the power base of some groups, while other groups gain in autonomy. Thus, 'statisation' refers to the conquest and sub-ordination by the state of some organisations of civil society. Usually this applies to working class organisations, and what is to be achieved is restraint, discipline, responsibility and the greater predictability of conflict behaviour that results from bureaucratisation. The second, 'privatist' component involves the 'contracting out' of state power to private groups, and entails the opening of institutional areas of the state to the representation of organised interests of civil society. In this case the right to self-administration is granted, and the dominant motive (or achievement) is the delegation, devolution and transfer of political issues and demands into an arena that in which they do not directly effect the stability of the central government (Offe, 1981:140).⁴

As corporatism involves the delegation of state power to quasi-governmental and private associations, it can also be conceptualised as a state form, in contradistinction to clientelism and parliamentarism. As a state form, corporatism involves the "institutional fusion of political representation – mediated through a system of public 'corporations' which are constituted on the basis of their members' function within the division of labour, and state intervention through these same corporations and for administrative agencies formally accountable to them" (Jessop in Schmitter and Lehbruch, 1979:194-195). The institutional fusion of representation and intervention in corporatism is in contrast to the institutional separation of representation and intervention characteristic of parliamentarism. Parliamentarism involves the fusion of political representation, based on the suffrage and related political rights enjoyed by individual citizens who participate in policy-making indirectly through the election of members of a legislative assembly and/or through the exercise of their rights of free speech and association, and state intervention in the form of legislation or general policies enforced by a permanent rational-legal administration (bureaucracy) in accordance with the rule of law (Jessop, 1983:35).

It is along the axis of intervention and representation, control and autonomy, that a further analytic distinction of corporatism in terms of 'societal' and 'state' corporatism can be made. The difference between societal and state corporatism is largely explained in terms of changes in the CMP,⁵ the balance of class forces, accumulation strategies and changing

forms of the state (Schmitter, 1974:107-108). Societal corporatism is generally associated with liberal democratic regimes in advanced capitalist societies, while state corporatism is associated with authoritarian-bureaucratic regimes. Societal corporatism entails the "opening of the institutional areas of the state to the representation of organised interests in civil society", while state corporatism entails the "conquest and subordination by the state of the organisations of civil society" (O'Donnell, 1977:48). In societal corporatism, policy-making and conflict resolution proceed in a relatively democratic manner, with heavy emphasis on the achievement of consensus through negotiation. Control of the interest organisations is, mostly in exchange for the withdrawal of statutory regulation, largely voluntarily accepted and self-imposed. According to Pretorius (1982:25) "In state corporatism policy-making and 'resolution' of interest conflicts is relatively authoritarian and control is imposed by the state".

But despite these differences, it is worth re-emphasising the essential similarity in terms of function and design of both societal and state corporatism. Both cases of corporatism is closely associated with the needs of capital accumulation, and both form part of a strategy of political domination in which the institutionalised management of class conflict is a central feature.

Thus, under liberal-democratic regimes in advanced capitalist societies, societal corporatism is related to class pressures from 'below' and the need to associate or incorporate dominated classes in the political process as the state expands its facilitative, allocative and regulative functions of capital accumulation (Jessop, 1979:181). This is done by the creation of political structures which integrate organisations of socio-economic producer groups through a system of representation and co-operative mutual interaction at the leadership level, and social control at the mass level (Panitch, 1980:174).

Similarly, in fascist and other authoritarian-bureaucratic regimes, the forceful imposition of state corporatism from 'above' serves as an instrument for rescuing and consolidating capitalism through the repression and control of autonomous organisations of the subordinate classes in situations where the bourgeoisie is too weak, internally divided, externally dependent and / or short of resources to respond in an effective manner to their demands within a liberal-democratic context (Jessop, 1979:187).

'STATE' AND 'SOCIETAL' CORPORATISM AS RESPONSES TO ACCUMULATION CRISES

In order to cast more light on the possible development of corporatism in South Africa, and given the high degree of unequal economic development in that social formation, it is worth looking at the economic and social conditions, and state forms and political power bases associated with both state and societal corporatism.

State corporatism is generally associated with social formations characterised by dependent capitalist development, delayed industrialisation, non-hegemonic class relations and conditions of extreme social inequality.⁶ In such circumstances modernising authoritarian-bureaucratic regimes or 'exceptional' states such as Bonapartist or military regimes, are faced with two problems. First, due to the institutional separation of the state and economy in capitalist societies, the political elite is prohibited to organise production according to its own criteria as property – labour-power as well as capital – is private. This problem is aggravated by the economy's dependence on international capital for investment. And since state power, the political elite's ability to engineer industrial development, and the state's ability to compete militarily in the international/regional sphere rest indirectly on the rate and volume of private accumulation – the state depends on

revenue from taxation – the ruling elite has to:

- 1) Promote conditions favourable to accumulation, especially via the establishment of political control over labour-power; and,
- 2) try to establish greater control over capitalist investment.⁷

Simultaneously, due to the level of economic development, industrialisation and urbanisation, class mobilisation is on the increase which can threaten political stability and capital accumulation if it is organised for revolutionary ends. However, owing to the increased sophistication of industrial production, the organisations of the producing classes cannot simply be suppressed as this does not solve the problem of representation as such. It is therefore necessary to develop new forms of representation that do not threaten the political rule of capital and the legitimation of capitalist relations of production. Accordingly, new forms of representation of the working class must be created that can restrict their organisational autonomy, and control and depoliticise mobilisation in order to maintain social stability under conditions of revolutionary threats or during short-term economic crises.

One way of solving the problems of accumulation, representation and legitimation is through the creation of corporatist structures. The classic example of this solution was the Bonapartist regime in France which “represented the outlines of a coming corporatism” (Naler in Berger, 1981:39). This “coming corporatism” was realised in the 20th century as state corporatist regimes.

The main features of state corporatist regimes include political systems in which territorial sub-units are tightly subordinated to central bureaucratic power; singular, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered, sectorally compartmentalised interest associations exercising representational monopolies and accepting (*de jure* or *de facto*) governmentally imposed or negotiated limitations on the type of leaders they elect and on the demands they routinely make upon the state. Ideally, representation is achieved through multi-tier, indirect elections within a series of constituencies based on grouping such primary units up to a national chamber of corporations or a series of specialised chambers (Ling, 1975:365). Consequently, these corporate bodies attain, in the words of Schmitter:

“a quasi-legal status and a prescriptive right to speak for their segments of the population. They influence the process of government directly, bypassing parliament. They are agents of authority. They deputize for the state in whole sectors of public life, and they have duties delegated to them that properly belong to civil service” (Schmitter, 1974:100).⁸

Other features of society associated with state corporatism include formalised leadership co-optation and bargaining practices; legalisation of group conflict through labour and administrative courts; elaborate state technocratic planning and control agencies and parastatal corporations; and symbiotic client and patrimonialist practices in certain issue areas, regime levels and territorial units (Schmitter, 1974:100).

As a mode of political domination, state corporatism is most effective when the state has a high degree of ‘relative autonomy’ from the dominant classes; the military is the dominant state apparatus, and when a three-fold domination strategy, incorporating institutional, economic and repressive elements is pursued. First, institutional corporatist structures are created to prevent spontaneous mass mobilisation and demand articulation from below. This is effected by creating pre-emptive channels for interest representation; enacting preventive policies to ensure normal participation; encouraging defensive actions by corporate groups on behalf of their members; and by compartmentalising conflict potentials within specialised, non-interacting ‘decisional orders’. Second, selective economic rewards

and social welfare benefits are used as an "agglutinative agent" to bring favoured groups into the state's reward structure and to bind them loyally to the regime. Third, and most crucially, the state employs coercive measures and make use of periodically used but systematic physical repression and anticipatory intimidation to bolster the institutional and economic measures (Schmitter, 1976:58).⁹

Corporatist institutions can also be a feature of democratic states. During the post-war era liberal democracies in advanced capitalist societies have been characterised by a growth in 'societal' corporatist forms of representation and intervention. Conditions associated with this development include: the development of societies with strong class cleavages, high levels of employment, the state's commitment through Keynesian fiscal and monetary policies, to full employment – practices that reflect, to a large extent, the political strength of the working classes and their political allies on this issue; the existence of a high degree of union centralisation and a bureaucratised legal framework for collective bargaining, the ideological dominance of 'social democracy' with its ideas of 'consensus', 'co-operation between classes' and the notion of the 'neutral state'; trends toward the centralisation of power within the state in the executive and administration, with the corresponding decline in the importance of parliamentary power and representation.¹⁰

FORMS OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION

Both state and societal forms of corporatism is associated with a growing autonomisation of the state and a decline in parliamentarism as a form of political representation. This raises interesting questions about the effects of different forms of political representation and intervention on capital accumulation, the balance of class forces in a society, and the operation of class and functional interest organisations.

For example, the democratic republic and parliamentary form of representation can seriously hamper capital accumulation and the rule of capital. In social formations where the bourgeoisie is not politically and ideologically dominant, substantial penetration of parliament by political forces committed to the radical transformation of the relations of production and pattern of political and ideological domination can lead to the establishment of a socialist republic. Such a threat to the rule of capital can frequently only be averted through the institution of an 'exceptional' state in which the continued rule of capital is secured through force and the suppression of popular representation. And even in 'normal' states, party political competition and the growing disarticulation of parliamentary representation from state intervention, especially in the economic sphere, can have dysfunctional consequences for capital accumulation. These dysfunctional consequences are introduced by factors such as the abuse of executive power to secure electoral advantage at the expense of accumulation; and representational and parliamentary crises producing a lack of party co-operation and/or unpredictable changes in government policies which render long term corporate planning difficult – problems that are aggravated to the extent that parliament has effective control over significant means of economic intervention.¹¹

It is in this context that corporatism, with its institutional fusion of representation and intervention, can prove to be a more adequate solution for the problems facing capital accumulation than parliamentarism. And not only is corporatism advantageous to capital accumulation, but can also mobilise political support and enhance the legitimacy of capitalist relations of production. First, corporatism is advantageous to capital accumulation because it entitles the political organs of capital and labour to participate directly in the

formulation and implementation of policies concerned with accumulation – policies dealing with the re-organisation of the labour process and industrial relations, welfare planning, infrastructural provision, industrial regeneration, income policies and economic planning – rather than trusting in the mediation of alternative forms of representation and administration. Second, as participation is conditional on the ‘corporations’ concerned accepting the legitimacy of the overall system within which they operate and confine themselves to an ‘economic-corporate’ role, it means that their participation also involves accepting the imperatives of capital accumulation and consequently the subordination of all policies to those imperatives (Jessop, 1983:32-35).

Furthermore, the representation of organisations of capital and labour in corporatist decision-making implies the mobilisation of political support for particular economic strategies. This process is enhanced to the extent that the ‘corporations’ acquire greater control over their members – a factor which favours capital. For corporatist forms of representation and intervention, although involving the organisations of capital and labour on formally the same basis, have unequal effects on those organisations and on the balance of class forces in society. These outcomes have led many writers to conclude that present forms of corporatist arrangements are specifically designed to impose more far-reaching restrictions on labour than on capital, and form part of a deliberate strategy by ruling political forces and dominant classes to ensure class collaboration on an unequal basis.¹²

According to Offe (1981:146-147) the unequal effects of corporatism can be demonstrated by an examination of the way in which social power is exercised by organisations of capital and labour, and by pointing out the differential implications of legal requirements (governing internal ‘democratisation’ and controls imposed on the leadership) on the organisations of capital and labour. Offe argues that the social power of both capital and labour rests on the ultimate sanction of economic obstruction or withdrawal. Capital, for example, can threaten to stop investment and to discontinue its purchases of capital goods and labour-power, while labour can threaten to withhold labour-power. But, argues Offe, capital can be economic obstructive without being organised and mobilised as an interest organisation, for a firm’s investment decision is governed by one standard of rationality – that of calculations of individual profitability. Employers’ and investors’ associations thus do not primarily function to create power via mobilisation. Their primary function is to provide services to individual firms and to formulate and defend in the political arena those individual interests (taxes, tariffs, regulation of industrial relations) that are common to all or most member firms. Workers, on the other hand, are always simultaneously interested in higher wages, continuity of employment, and improved working conditions – ends that remain to some extent mutually exclusive under capitalist relations of production as labour is treated as if it were a commodity. In this respect an organisation is necessary to provide both the quantitative aggregation of the means of power and the qualitative definition of the ends to which power is to be applied by calculating the ‘optimal’ mix of those conflicting ends and by enforcing it by means of such non-individualistic principles as ‘solidarity’ and ‘discipline’ (Offe, 1981:147).

However, Offe’s argument needs some qualification, for it applies only to the ‘obstructionist’ or ‘veto’ power of capital and labour. Furthermore, his argument is based on an implicit conception of capitalism as an ‘automatic’ process of reproduction. This is not so; for capital accumulation and the realisation of the value form require a constant struggle between capital and labour, while it is also effected by the competition and conflicts of interest among different individual units and fractions of capital according to their moment in the circuit of capital (Jessop, 1983:10-17). Therefore, contrary to Offe’s assertion that capitalist organisations “merely state power positions that are already established and interest definitions that are already decided on” (Offe, 1981:148), it must be pointed out,

as Jessop (1983:25-26) has indicated, that the organisations of capital do play an important role in articulating specific accumulation strategies, and in mobilising economic and political support for these strategies.

Nevertheless, it could be argued that labour is more dependent on collective action and organisation than capital in order to use the withdrawal of labour-power as an intent of political power. For capital does not rely exclusively on employers' associations to enhance its social power, but also use mergers, monopolies and cartels to promote its position. As a result, restrictive political regulation of the forms of association and organisational activities have a stronger impact on labour than on employers' or investors' associations. For example, legal requirements of 'internal democratisation' effect labour organisations negatively in that the absence of a single 'calculus of optimization' that could be used to reconcile conflicting goals makes intra- or inter-organisational competition, disunity and rivalry much more likely than in business organisations. Furthermore, legal controls imposed on the leadership of interest organisations differs along class lines. In business and investors' organisations leaders do not have any substantial control over the actions that their members choose to pursue. They have, for example, no control over members' investment decisions. Conversely, in the case of unions, institutionalisation means an exchange transaction in which co-operation is traded for formal participation in policy decisions or otherwise, moderation is achieved as a consequence of imposed 'democratic' organisational rules (Offe, 1981:148-150).

Another factor which undermines the position of labour is the way in which corporatist representation articulates the collective mass organisations of labour with centralised state apparatuses by encouraging the centralisation of the labour movement. As a result union policy is increasingly made by the permanent, bureaucratised apparatus of confederal labour organisations – a tendency which enhances leadership control. This enhanced leadership control serves to counterbalance the advantage in short-term economic strike power that labour gained under monopoly capitalism (owing to the socialisation of production, technological changes and increased capital intensity of production). Working class organisation and mass participation at the points of production is further weakened through the transfer of bargaining right from shop stewards and rank-and-file movements to national trade union leaders and from firm and industry to the national political level. In addition, centralised corporatist participation encourages the introduction and acceptance of capitalist growth criteria in the formulation of union wage policy – the central aspect being the recognition that profit is the condition for future economic growth and wage determination. Thus, to the extent that organised labour acquires rights or corporatist political representation, it accepts an economic-corporate role and limits the use of industrial action. Finally, it should also be pointed out that corporatist institutions, to the extent that it involves centralised decision-making, favours organised *vis-à-vis* unorganised labour, and also monopoly capital, with its greater concentration and centralisation of capital, *vis-à-vis* small capital (Jessop, 1978:42 and Panitch, 1981).

The preceding arguments would seem to indicate that corporatism is undoubtedly the most appropriate state form favouring capitalist interests. But this conclusion must be qualified, for corporatism, just like parliamentarism, is prone to contradictions and instability. Faced with rapid class mobilisation, corporatist forms of representation can either degenerate into industrial and occupational particularism or result in splits between the leaders of peak organisations and their members. The potential for instability is further enhanced due to the fact that the leaders of organisations representing capital and labour are faced with a permanent organisational and ideological dilemma: Either to compromise the immediate interests of their members for the sake of agreement, thereby risking internal revolt; or give in to the demands of militant members, thereby losing the opportunity for compromises

which would materially benefit them. Furthermore, institutional fusion of representation and intervention in corporatism implies that representational crises can have repercussions in the administrative field, thus hampering effective intervention. In addition, economic issues do not exhaust politically relevant topics, and extra-economic issues are not readily handled through corporatist institutions – issues that may generate conflicts cut across economic divisions. This means that corporatism is not particularly effective in securing the political pre-conditions for accumulation, or in mobilising support and articulating ideologies for unifying hegemonic projects. This explains why corporatism is usually part of a hybrid state form, and is frequently organised in association with consociational and/or social democratic parliamentary representation (Jessop, 1983:33-35). Finally, corporatism, since it explicitly bases political representation on economic divisions, cannot eliminate class conflict over the labour process, nor can it eliminate competition among capitals. For corporatism institutionalises class conflict within the heart of the state apparatus itself, and threatens to disrupt the continuing realisation of the political preconditions of accumulation (Jessop, 1979:200-202).

This raises a very important question of political strategy – namely whether corporatist institutions are essentially a form of capitalist domination, or whether labour can use the new terrains of political struggle opened up by corporatist forms of representation and exploit the contradictions in order to advance its own position. Panitch, arguing against the thesis that corporatist institutions ‘bring class struggle into the administrative heart of the state apparatus’ maintains that the working class will not be able to promote a successful socialist transformation by using corporatist structures, for:

“Long before power can be won on this terrain, the structures will either be dismembered by the state and the bourgeoisie, or they will be turned into repressive facsimiles of their fascist counterparts” (Panitch, 1981:28).

Rebutting Panitch’s argument, Sirianni argues that first, short of a revolutionary crisis, major sections of the organised working class will participate in corporatist political structures if it offers relatively significant benefits; second, Panitch’s argument relies on industrial class struggle as the only true index of socialist policies, thus ignoring the wider socio-political struggle for socialist hegemony; and third, as participation in corporatist political struggle provide opportunities for the implantation of left personnel, of democratic networks, and of infrastructures with the capacity to administer, plan, and contain sabotage in such a way that permits rank-and-file initiatives to expand within a co-ordinated framework, it cannot merely be dismissed as integrative for it can help to strengthen working class mobilisation and enlarge the scope for popular mass struggle, the democratisation of political institutions, and the promotion of socialist policies (Sirianni, 1983:115-116 and 122-125).

Finally, however, it has to be noted that although corporatist structures do provide potential opportunities for the radical working class, this potential has seldom been realised. For, as Schmitter, (1981:321) has recently pointed out, the evidence for class mobilisation has been overestimated and the barriers to it underestimated, which indicates that corporatism is far more stable than generally recognised by its critics. And despite corporatism’s short-coming to mobilise political and ideological support on wide-ranging issues and thus to facilitate hegemonic projects – an aspect that is of less importance in exceptional states – it is wellstructured to promote capital accumulation in general, and accumulation strategies of monopoly capital in particular. This factor can make corporatism a particularly attractive solution as a form of political representation for a reforming authoritarian elite in South Africa. For, as Jessop (1979:200) has argued, corporatism can bloc the growth of a revolutionary movement through the fragmentation of trade unions along functional lines, and through the institutionalisation of reformist policies – a not so insignificant political goal

in a society such as South Africa where the biggest internal political threat to the regime comes from an antagonistic sector of the black working class.

ACCUMULATION STRATEGIES AND THE CREATION OF CORPORATIST INSTITUTIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA

In the final part of this article the development of corporatist institutions in South Africa will be analysed and discussed in terms of the relation between capital accumulation and state forms. With this discussion I endeavour to illustrate the theoretical arguments developed in the preceding sections, and in the subsequent sections I shall try to identify conditions conducive to the further development of corporatist forms of political representation in South Africa.

The system of functional interest group representation changed very little in the first decade of NP rule. Interest organisation interaction with the state was of an ad hoc nature, and the intermediation of functional and economic issues was done primarily indirectly through the party- and parliamentary system. However, in the years 1958-1960 black political and labour unrest posed a serious challenge to the government, and as a response to this challenge and to capital's doubts about the government's policy of 'border areas industrialisation', the first 'corporatisation' of interest organisation intermediation took place with the establishment of the prime minister's Economic Advisory Council (EAC) in March 1960.

The rationale behind the establishment of the EAC was not only to provide opportunities for consultation on, and co-ordination of the state's economic policies as official explanations would have it, but, as Pretorius (1982:11-13) has argued, to institutionalise the incorporation of capitalist associations through the medium of interest representation "into processes related to the design of economic policies which themselves had a manifestly political intent". For the Government needed to mobilise the support of capital for its policy of "border areas industrialisation" – an idea which attracted little enthusiasm from industrialists. This policy was a central element in the Government's homeland policy, and was also clearly linked by Government spokesmen to the unrest in the black townships, who argued for greater co-operation from the private sector on issues such as black wages, work reservation, black trade unions and economic decentralisation. It is against this background that the EAC, a tripartite body consisting of representatives of the state, capital and organised labour, was created (Pretorius, 1982:18).

The creation of this corporatist body was specifically designed to remedy certain shortcomings in the party political and parliamentary forms of representation and state intervention. For, as we have argued in the preceding section, corporatist institutions of policy-making is particularly suited for state intervention in the economic sphere as it attracts direct co-operation from capital and labour, and as the top-level bargaining process 'depoliticise' important issues and remove them from the emotive sphere of party politics. The latter consideration was of particular importance in South Africa where the policy of border area industrialisation, conceived by Afrikaner Nationalists, needed the active support of big, mainly English, capital for its successful implementation. This involved certain trade-offs and a degree of mutual accommodation between the publicly opposed interests of capital and government. Accordingly, this process required a system of interaction for which the 'normal' political process was particularly unsuited, for the exclusionary nature and ideological structures of Afrikaner Nationalism could not allow bargaining between the NP government and big business to be seen (Pretorius, 1982:18-19).

At the time, the creation of the EAC had two important immediate effects. It benefitted capitalist organisations by providing them with much needed access to the highest councils of national economic policy-making. It also benefitted the state in that it helped to restore "business confidence" after Sharpeville, facilitate a stop to the 'flight of capital', and attracted new foreign capital investment needed for the intensification of the state's import-substitution economic growth strategy (Callinicos, 1981:79).

The NP government's political domination and economic strategy of import-substitution produced mixed results. For while the South African economy had a high annual growth rate of 8% in the 1960's, it could not break South Africa's continued dependence on primary exports and capital imports for economic growth. And by the end of the 1960's the import-substitution policy had lost its momentum, so that expansion in the production of intermediate and capital goods for the local market became the dominant growth factor (Viljoen, 1983:42). This led to growing capital intensity in all sectors of the economy; rapidly enhance the very high degree of economic concentration and centralisation; expanded the economic role of the state – particularly in the manufacturing sector; and, ultimately stimulated the growing economic bargaining power of black workers (Callinicos, 1981:80-90).

Thus, while labour repression and rich mineral resources attracted multinational capital, and while small capital could achieve high profits due to low labour costs in the 1960s and early 1970s, the development of economies-of-scale in the manufacturing sector was too small to make South African manufactured goods competitive on the international market. Like other newly industrialising countries in a similar structural position in the world capitalist system (Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Hong Kong and Taiwan) South Africa is dependant on primary exports and capital imports for economic growth. But unlike countries such as Brazil and some Southeast Asian countries, South Africa has not been able to become a significant exporter of manufactured goods. Contributing to this problem is the relatively low level of labour productivity, the lack of economies-of-scale due to a small black consumer market, and the fact that South African manufacturers' natural markets in the rest of Africa were severely restricted because of political reasons. Reinforced by tendencies such as growing inflation, the economy's vulnerability to fluctuations in the international gold market, growing military expenditure, international political pressure and a severe lack of skilled labour, South Africa experienced a severe economic crisis in the 1970s.

A number of tendencies turned the threatening accumulation crisis into a full-scale organic crisis. There were the intensification of the class struggle triggered by the 1973 strike waves by black workers in Durban; the international oil crisis; the fundamental change in the regional balance of power with the independence of Mozambique and Angola; and most importantly, the Soweto riots and subsequent unrest among black townships in 1976-1977. Again, this second organic crisis required formative action on the economic, political and ideological levels – action which increased the degree of corporatisation of functional interest group intermediation in South Africa (Callinicos, 1981:80-92).¹⁴

Capital's ability to accumulate is dependent on securing and maintaining the realisation of the value-form. In this process, the dual character of wages as variable capital and as revenue poses a strategic dilemma for capital. Capital has to strike a balance between the need to keep labour costs at a minimum whilst expanding demand and markets in order to realise added value and profits. The outcome of this balance favours some fractions of capital more than others. This applies to capital accumulation both at the national and international level of analysis. Moreover, accumulation requirements at the international level 'overdetermines' accumulation struggles at the national level. Thus, given South

Africa's structural position in the world capitalist system and its trade dependent economy, it has to compete successfully with other regions, especially the Far East (which already provides cheaper skilled labour and greater political stability) in order to meet the accumulation needs – extended consumer markets – of advanced industrial countries (Saul and Gelb, 1981:27). This led Biermann (1980:37) to argue that:

“The immanent capitalist contradictions will urge the South African settlers to reform their system. The main contradiction is no longer free wage labour vs apartheid, but peripheral South Africa vs the conditions of internationalised accumulation”.

Thus, argue Marxist writers and spokesmen for monopoly capital in South Africa, if a political solution between blacks and whites can be achieved, and given her mineral wealth, cheap energy resources, the regional infrastructure and the implanted industrial technology, a Southern African common market could be moulded on the basis of a greatly expanded consumer market that could provide South African-based capital with a sphere of accumulation protected against world market competition.

Since the early 1970s, but especially after 1976, representatives of manufacturing capital have used these arguments in their campaign to secure a export-promotion economic growth strategy for South Africa. This new accumulation strategy, based on the argument that import substitution as such could no longer provide the necessary growth stimulus to the economy, entails the following elements: the systematic and deliberate development of export-based industries; rapid expansion of the internal consumer market to enhance the development of economies-of-scale in manufacturing; the adoption of market methods of monetary control; less state intervention and restrictions on market forces; and, crucially, changes in the policies regarding the social reproduction of labour-power and industrial relations. The latter aspect involves the abolition of racial discrimination in employment practices, increased spending on black education, industrial training and urban housing; the stabilisation of a permanent urbanised black labour force, and statutory recognition of black trade unions. Furthermore, the living standards of black should be allowed to rise substantially by the granting of wage hikes, and at the same time, by the inclusion of a broader range of commodities in the wage basket. This implies an accumulation strategy based on the development of economies-of-scale to provide a basis for export-promotion, and with increased labour productivity rather than cheap labour as basis for exploitation.¹⁵

The acceptance of such an accumulation strategy involves the rejection of the former accumulation strategy which principally favoured small firms, the white working class, and state employees. It also implies a substantial change in the way the political and ideological preconditions for capitalist reproduction are secured. For the development of the CMP requires not only accumulation opportunities, but has to be legitimised as well. And in the 1970s trends in black politics – the rise of ‘black consciousness’, the Soweto-riots of 1976, the mobilisation of the black working class through trade union and strike action, and the increase in ANC guerilla activities – have led to the articulation of political ideas and practices that not only threaten the legitimacy of the racial character of the state, but also that of the capitalist system itself.¹⁶ Thus, the acceptance of this new accumulation strategy would require the articulation of a new ‘hegemonic strategy’.

Since 1948 the dominant classes and political elite have implemented a ‘two nations’ hegemonic strategy (Jessop, 1982:244-246). This involves a limited form of hegemony aimed at the mobilisation of the support of strategically significant sectors of the population (especially the white working class) and the shifting of the costs of this project to other sectors. The project was based on the containment and substantial repression of the ‘other’ nation, whilst at the same time selective access and concessions were provided for the

'favoured nation'. This was associated with the re-organisation of the bases of political support and the structures of the state, to reflect a vertical antagonistic cleavage between the 'civilised' (white) and the 'uncivilised' (non-white) sections in civil society. After 1976 the changing balance of class forces and accumulation needs required a substantial redefinition of the hegemonic principle (race), and a re-organisation of the bases of political support: the antagonistic cleavages must now be based on economic rather than racial categories – between the 'productive' (urban, industrial) vs the parasitic (homeland, traditional) sectors in civil society. Such a redefinition of the hegemonic principle also requires appropriate forms of political representation and state intervention to secure an adequate social base for the exercise of state power and for the smooth operation of the capitalist mode of production.

Since 1978 the Botha government has introduced political and economic reforms broadly, but not wholly, along these lines. This is due to the fact that military competition interacted with capital accumulation in mediating relations of domination and state intervention. The increased military involvement of the South African state in regional conflicts not only enhanced the military's position as the dominant state apparatus and the key element in the formulation of national policies,¹⁷ but also effected the formulation of economic policies which are not compatible and functional to the accumulation needs of monopoly capital. This can be illustrated by noting that although the government has accepted that long term economic growth can only come through an export-led strategy in the manufacturing sector, it continues to press ahead, for strategic reasons and despite 'unduly high costs', with import-substitution measures in such instances as consumer durables (motor cars); heavy intermediate products (chemicals and petrol), and certain capital goods (armaments) (Scheepers, 1982:23).

Nevertheless, since 1978 the Government and the NP itself have moved considerably closer to accepting, articulating and implementing many of the recommendations proposed by spokesmen of capital in order to secure the political conditions for accumulation. These policies include the attempted political incorporation of the coloured and Asian groups through the extension of formal parliamentary representation based on group interests; the attempted political *encadrement* of the African bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie; and the economic incorporation of the urban African working class through extensions of trade union rights, increased spending on education, training and urban housing, and the strengthening of influx control measures to create divisions between the urban and rural Africans.¹⁸

The process of reform has been associated with, and in part accomplished, through the increasing 'corporatisation' of functional interest organisations. This applies especially to the reform of the form of state intervention in the economic and industrial relations sphere. Ad hoc interaction between the Government and functional organisations increased when the Government first invited representatives of organised labour and capital to participate in the Wiehahn Commission of Inquiry into labour legislation, and later the De Lange Commission of Inquiry into education and training – both which made important policy recommendations. Secondly, prime minister P.W. Botha mobilised support of organised capital and labour for his reformist policies at the 1979 Carlton and 1981 Good Hope Conferences. This increased interaction was institutionalised with the establishment of the National Manpower Commission (NMC) in 1979.

The NMC was established in response to the militant black worker and youth actions since 1973, foreign pressures and capital's disenchantment with apartheid restrictions on the use of black labour and as the outcome of the recommendations of the Wiehahn Commission. The Commission argued for the establishment of a representative tripartite

body which would facilitate close co-operation between the state, employers and employees in processes related to the formulation of labour policy, and emphasised that the state should play a more 'active' and 'dynamic' role in the "designing and planning" of labour policy, including the training and retraining of workers, the creation of employment opportunities, the provision of labour market facilities and the preservation and promotion of industrial peace (Pretorius, 1982:20-21).

The creation of the NMC, as a product of "political crisis of participation and control", plays an important part in the Government's attempt to re-organise bases of political support,¹⁹ and to legitimise its reformist activities and the capitalist system itself. The significance of the NMC as an institution lies in the fact that it provides, for the first time, opportunities for the direct representation of black, and specifically African, functional interest organisations in key national policy-making bodies.²⁰ This fact is particularly important when seen against the background of the more general developments in the field of labour policy. These developments entail strategies designed to involve African trade unions in the statutory system of industrial reconciliation by means of registration and participation in the highly bureaucratised and centralised industrial councils, and strategies designed to rationalise the geographical flow and regulation of black labour through streamlined administration and influx control (Pretorius, 1982:23). This indicates that, just as the EAC was created to incorporate white (mainly capitalist) interest organisations in 1960, the NMC was created to incorporate black (mainly labour) functional interest organisations. And again, this could not, in terms of NP policy and ideology, be achieved through party political and parliamentary forms of representation. Moreover, the creation of the NMC as a corporatist institution has another important function – it helps to legitimise policy-making by making the organisations active participants in the process of government, and again it helps to 'depoliticise' issues as the bargaining takes place *in camera* (Pretorius, 1982:25).

POLITICAL REFORM AND CONDITIONS FOR CORPORATISM IN SOUTH AFRICA

Despite the development of corporatist forms of representation, we do not suggest that the mode of interest group representation in South Africa is already 'corporatist'. The white functional organisations enjoy a high degree of freedom of association and of organisational autonomy, so that its mode of representation can be described as pluralist. In contrast, the black functional organisations are subject to generalised state control – ranging from influx control which affects the very conditions of associational life to executive action under the guise of security legislation – which may even make the label 'state corporatism' inappropriate (Pretorius, 1982:26). It is, however, important to note that the development of consociational forms of political representation has been in consort with an increase in corporatism and other extra-parliamentary responses to political conflict management in South Africa.

The general decline of the party political and parliamentary form of representation had the effect of increasing the independence of the executive branch of the state. This tendency was enhanced by the Botha-government who:

- 1 Deprived the NP party conferences of the power to determine policy – they are now restricted to the discussion of matters of principle, not of policy;
- 2 by the 'rationalisation' of the public service, which included severing parliamentary control over the executive by the establishment of cabinet committees responsible to the prime minister, the creation of the multi-racial president's council over which parliament had no control, and the use of 'expert' commissions of inquiry to make policy recommendations;

- 3 through the involvement of the military in the State Security Council, which is regarded as the key decision-making body of the executive, and which deals with 'national security management' – covering matters ranging from political action, economic planning, manpower management to telecommunications and 'cultural action'; and,
- 4 by the inclusion of representatives of big business in a number of state apparatuses.²¹

The development of the South African state into a Bonapartist-type of state has been consolidated with the acceptance of the proposed new constitution by the white electorate in November 1983.²² The new constitution entails an independent executive presidency; the creation of a tri-racial-tricameral legislative assembly for whites, coloureds and asians with each chamber responsible for legislation dealing with "own affairs" according to the consociational principle of 'segmental autonomy', and finally, the creation of a partially elected president's council which will act as the final arbiter when conflict arises among the three chambers (Hugo and Kotze, 1983:100-112).

Although the proposed new constitution provides ample opportunity for the representation and management of "own affairs" (e.g cultural and religious affairs, education, community politics and certain welfare functions), the representation and management of "mutual affairs" is largely undefined and problematic. And as these "mutual affairs" are largely economic and functional in character – and concern the African population as well – one may well expect the further development of corporatist institutions to deal with the problems of functional and economic interest representation and state intervention. This idea seems to attract some support from representatives of capital, for during the 1981 Good Hope conference, the president of the Federated Chamber of Industries (FCI) urged the Government to "formalise an on-going debate between the social partners of business, labour and government in a tripartite alliance" which, it seems, must run "parallel to the political system" and "could successfully weld a national consensus on many of the critical choices facing South Africa" (Pretorius, 1982:26).

Many of the conditions associated with "state corporatism" are already present in the South African social formation, and could be built upon to create further corporatist institutions as a partial solution to problems of political representation and the legitimisation of capitalist relations, and to provide a stable framework for an accumulation strategy favouring monopoly capital. These conditions include:

- 1 The dominant classes and political forces have rejected a liberal-democratic state form with a 'Westminster-style' of parliamentary representation as an inadequate solution to the political problems of South Africa – and for that matter, the problem of capital, as black, socialist-oriented parties could endanger the capitalist system itself.²³
- 2 The form of the state, the articulation of state apparatuses and forms of political representation have already been transformed towards a Bonapartist-type of state; the military is the key force in national policy determination and is backed up by a large bureaucracy, and elaborate state technocratic planning and control agencies (Grundy, 1983).
- 3 The interaction between party political and functional interest representation is already severely restricted and disaggregated. The Industrial Conciliation Act (28/1956) and Labour Relations Amendment Act (59/1981) restricted the opportunities for formal and overt co-operation between political parties and employers' organisations and trade unions. Trade unions and employers' organisations are prohibited to affiliate with any political party, to grant financial assistance to a political party or candidate for political office, and to influence their members with the object of giving assistance to parties or to persons seeking positions within parties (Pretorius, 1982:11).
- 4 There is extremely tight bureaucratic and administrative control over large policy

domains, regime levels and territorial units (especially in so far as the black population is concerned) (Saul and Gelb, 1981:48-52).

- 5 With the changes in labour and industrial relations legislation since 1979, industrial conflict has been institutionalised through labour courts and bureaucratic and centralised industrial council bargaining mechanisms.²⁴
- 6 The Government has provided relative economic incentives, welfare benefits and urban development schemes to urban Africans in order to re-inforce social divisions between urban and rural blacks (Saul and Gelb, 1981:63-83).
- 7 Despite introducing policies and making concessions to the black labour force which have opened up new terrains of political struggle, the State continue to use security legislation and repressive measures to suppress large-scale popular political and industrial action (Saul and Gelb, 1981:84-90).
- 8 The realignment of white party political representation in class terms, reinforced by divisions caused by the 1983 referendum, has served to demobilise Afrikanerdom as an ethnic political force – regarded by observers as an essential precondition for political reform in South Africa (Southall, 1983:81).
- 9 Capital in South Africa is highly concentrated, centralised and integrated at the economic level, well organised in terms of employers' organisations, and has greatly enhanced its political power under the Botha government.²⁵
- 10 A crucial factor shaping the effectiveness of corporatist structures is the presence of a highly organised and bureaucratised trade union movement. In South Africa, capital and the state was notoriously successful in incorporating and depoliticising the white working class, and to some extent the coloured and asian workers through racial privileges. By 1982 large numbers of economically active whites (470,000 or 27%), and coloureds and asians (326,000 or 33%) were organised into trade unions (Gencoroma, September 1983:8). And the biggest trade union confederation, for example, is the multiracial TUCSA, whose policies and ideology are closest to the state's views on trade unionism. As far as African workers are concerned, by the end of 1982 approximately 400,000 (12%) were organised into trade unions – 90% of them belonging to registered trade unions (Gencoroma, September 1983:9). Black trade unions are also at present negotiating to establish a national confederation in order to unify the 'independent' and 'progressive' unions which support socialist policies. Paradoxically, although a unified black trade union movement is a *sine qua non* before blacks can challenge the state and capital in any coherent and organised way, it could, under a corporatist system, more easily lead to the adoption of reformist and 'economistic' policies, thus leading to a decline in mass political struggles.

It is precisely this ability of corporatism to inhibit the development of revolutionary working class action, that makes it an attractive option for monopoly capital. For not only could corporatist structures of representation, extended to include urban Africans and dealing with a broader range of issues than just industrial relations, help to legitimise capitalist relations of production; it could also present blacks with a material interest in the system – thereby defusing revolutionary goals and actions. And if recent tendencies in changes in the form of the state in South Africa are anything to go by, one can reasonably expect to find more corporatist structures of representation developing alongside, and to complement consociational forms of representation. This can include, for example, a national corporate body analogous to the present president's council, with representation of economic-corporate and functional, rather than racial or ethnic segmental, interests.

The development of a privileged 'corporatist bloc' is also compatible with an accumulatoin strategy of monopoly capital that relies on higher productivity from skilled black labour in capital intensive, internationally competitive industries, and on extended consumer markets in manufactured goods, since monopoly capital may well be able to shift the costs

of economic concessions accruing to the black proletariat in the corporatist bloc, on to 'unproductive' and 'overpaid' sections such as state employees, white workers, small businessmen, and the rural blacks. Such a 'corporatist bloc', based on co-operation between state, employers and trade unions at the macro-, meso- and micro-levels and regulated through material concessions and market forces, can reproduce itself under conditions of high profits, good wages, secure employment, stable competition and skilled labour at the expense of the marginal and marginalisable economic and social groups for whom intensified world competition means a deteriorating economic position. The latter will be – as it is the case at present – subject to political control, administrative regulation and judicial and police repression and isolated in the impoverished black 'national states'. This suggests that 'mature' corporatism, South African-style, will not so much resemble Pahl and Winkler's celebrated vision of the new corporatism as 'fascism with a human face' (Pahl and Winkler, 1974), but that it will more likely be the case of the apartheid Emperor's fashionable new clothes.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

By way of conclusion some of the main arguments will be restated. Basically, I have argued that there is a close theoretical association between consociational and corporatist forms of political representation and conflict management and have indicated how they can complement each other. I have also pointed out that recent changes in the form of the state along consociational lines in South Africa were accompanied by, and partially accomplished through, increased corporatisation of functional interest group intermediation. This development suggests that consociational and corporatist forms of political representation in South Africa cannot be counterposed, and I have speculated that both forms of representation will in the future be extended as part of a reformist strategy in South Africa. This speculation is based on an analysis of state and societal forms of corporatism as responses to accumulation crises, in which I have isolated the conditions associated with the introduction of corporatist structures by reformist authoritarian regimes.

Finally, I have tried to indicate how corporatist forms of political representation and state intervention can benefit an accumulation strategy pursued by monopoly capital in South Africa. This is not to deny that there are numerous serious obstacles and contradictory forces facing such a strategy – the most obvious of these are the persistence of racial practices in society, and the efforts of political forces, both within and outside that the country, opposing any reformist initiatives. However, the reformist changes have to some extent been successful in mobilising support and disorganising opposition forces, and corporatist institutions would seem to serve the long-term economic and political interests of monopoly capital better than exclusive reliance on political repression under the control of a white parliament propped up by military force. On the other hand, the creation of corporatist structures would not only be a threat to the black working class, but could also provide new opportunities to the black trade union movement to take the struggle for socialist-orientated reform into the heart of the state apparatus, thereby enlarging the scope for popular mass struggle – opportunities that need not be opposed in terms of essentialist arguments without evaluating their transformatory potential.

NOTES

- 1 See in this respect Hugo and Kotzé (1983: 96-112); Slabbert and Welsh (1979); and *Buthelezi Commission - The Requirement for Stability and Development in KwaZulu and Natal*; for a general discussion see Nolutshungu (1982).
- 2 See Lehbruch (in Schmitter en Lehbruch, 1979); McRae (1979: 517-522); Kieve (1981: 313-338).
- 3 Nolutshungu (1982: 91) for instance, argues that it is a 'counter insurgency', rather than a 'reform' strategy.
- 4 See also O'Donnell (in Malloy, 1977: 47-48).
- 5 C M P = Capitalist mode of production.
- 6 See Kaufman (1976); and also Schmitter (1976: 107).
- 7 See O'Donnell (1977: 63); and Jessop (1978: 29-30).
- 8 See also Kaufman (1976); Malloy (1974).
- 9 See also Kaufman (1976); Spaldin (1981: 41).
- 10 On these conditions, see Jessop (1979); Panitch (in Schmitter and Lehbruch, 1979); and Crouch (1979).
- 11 See Jessop (1978: 40-43); and Jessop (1979: 198-199).
- 12 See, inter alia, Panitch (1981: 21-43); Strinati (in Crouch, 1979); and Offe (1981: 146).
- 13 Pretorius' work is by far the most useful account of interest organisation representation in South Africa.
- 14 See also Clarke (1978: 32-77).
- 15 This conclusion is based on the following work: Ariovich (1979: 188-197); Scheepers (1982: 13-25); Viljoen (1983: 43); and Saul and Gelb (1981: 28-31).
- 16 For the most comprehensive recent account of black politics, see Lodge (1983); on developments in the 1970s, see Lodge (1983: 321-362). On class consciousness and anti-capitalist ideas, see Nolutshungu (1982: 187-201).
- 17 See Grundy (1983); and Geldenhuys and Kotzé (1983: 33-45).
- 18 On the creation of a black middle class, see Nolutshungu (1982: 116-145).
- 19 In this respect it is interesting to note that the multiracial Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA) has been granted representation on the NMC, whilst the all-white, conservative South African Confederation of Labour (SACOL) is excluded.
- 20 Africans are represented through the African Federated Chamber of Commerce (NAFCOC), and the National Union of Clothing Workers (NUCW) (Pretorius, 1982: 22).
- 21 See Grundy (1983: 9-21); Geldenhuys and Kotzé (1983: 37-42); and Wolpe (1983: 11).
- 22 In the referendum, 1 360 223 voted for, and 691 577 against the new constitution (*South African Digest*, November 4, 1983).
- 23 Attacks on the viability and functionality of the 'Westminster' system is a constant theme of NP reformist rhetoric. For example, the Afrikaans Sunday paper *Rapport* on 30.10.83 praised the NP and its leaders "for having obeyed the deep responsibility to save South Africa from the foolishness and the debacle towards which the Westminster system was heading".
- 24 For a discussion of the implications of the new labour legislation, see Bronner (1983: 16-36).
- 25 On the concentration of capital in South Africa, see Du Plessis (1979:303-309); Innes (1983).
- 26 TUCSA supports the Government's ideology of tripartite labour relations: close collaboration between labour, management and the state; the belief that all three essentially have strong common interests; the neutrality of the state, and no trade union participation in politics. TUCSA's strength lies in its large bureaucratic organisation and extensive closed shop arrangements. It is currently involved in a fierce ideological and organisational battle with the black Federation of South Africa Trade Unions (FOSATU) over the recruitment of African workers. See *South African Labour Bulletin* 8(3), 1982:4-6).

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SOUTH AFRICA

BRIEFS

TRADE STATISTICS--The latest statistics from the Department of Trade and Industry show that South Africa had a trade surplus of more than 1,000 million rands for May this year. Figures show that exports totaled more than 2,966 million rands in May, an increase of 36 percent over May last year. Imports amounted to nearly 1,950 million rands, representing a 5 percent increase over last May's figure. The trade surplus for April was 765 million rands. Imports were up more than 10 percent over the same period last year, and exports rose more than 43 percent. The head of SAFTA, the South African Foreign Trade Association, Mr (Win Halters), says South African trade with Africa rose about 70 percent in the first 5 months of this year over the same period last year. Mr (Halters) was commenting in Johannesburg on statistics released by the department. He told the SABC that the increase in trade was encouraging, because most African leaders rejected the South African Government's policies. [Text] [Johannesburg Domestic Service in English 0500 GMT 29 Jun 85 MB]

SWEDEN HALTING COAL IMPORTS--The agreement [between the Swedish Government and coal importers] is being upheld. The importing of coal from South Africa is to be stopped, but there will be some transitional problems. This was said by Energy Minister Birgitta Dahl on Wednesday [3 July] after a new conversation with those firms who are importing coal to Sweden. After the first talks, which took place in March, there were no South African imports during April. But during May there were approximately 3,000 tons of coal of South African origin, which is a little over one percent of that month's total coal import. "This is not anything dramatic, since some firms are bound by longer contracts," said Dahl. If found necessary, we will make new contracts in the fall. [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 5 Jul 85 p 8]

CSO: 3498/7

SWAZILAND

BRIEFS

NEW RADIO SERVICE BEGINNING--The Swaziland Broadcasting Service will open a new broadcasting service as from next Monday, 1 July 1985. This new channel will be known as the English Service of Radio Swaziland. This new daily service will start at 0530 in the morning and it will close down at 2000 in the evenings. Listeners are invited to tune to the English Service of Radio Swaziland on 954 khz and 882 khz on medium wave. /Text/ /Mbabane Domestic Service in English 0459 GMT 30 Jun 85/

CSO: 3400/614

TANZANIA

MUSLIM EFFORTS TO BROADEN ACCESS TO EDUCATION VIEWED

East Burnham ARABIA: THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW in English May 85 pp 90-91

[Text]

● The majority of Tanzania's population (about 70 per cent) are Muslims, and Christians, mainly Catholics, are the largest minority. Almost all the people on the five islands off Tanzania — Zanzibar, Pemba, Mafia Kilwa Kisiwani and Kilwa Kivinje — are Muslim.

The demographic advantage of Muslims has not, however, enhanced their educational and political position. The system of education in Tanzania stresses secularism, religion being considered a private affair. Although only a few Muslims have had secular education, the Tanzanian Muslim community has no centralised form of religious education except elementary Quranic schools.

In many Muslim towns, small children study in Quranic schools called "chuo" in Swahili. They spend about six years learning the Arabic alphabet and all the surahs in the last part of the Holy Quran. Then they go on to more advanced Islamic studies (Islamiat) with emphasis on Salat (prayer), Saum (fasting), Nikah (marriage), Khutba (sermon) on Friday, Eid and other festivals.

Such courses do not on the whole give the pupils an adequate level of proficiency in Arabic as a language, nor do they teach the history of Islam or Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) in the light of the four Fiqh schools of thought.

Some of the madrasas (schools) in the country are:

- The Islamic Centre in Dar-es-Salaam, established by the Egyptian government in 1966.
- Ghazal Muslim School in Ujiji Kigoma in the west of Tanzania. Started in 1952,

this school enjoys the patronage of some wealthy Muslims.

- Katoro Muslim School in Bukoba, north west Tanzania.
- Tanga Muslim School, a very famous madrasa which has produced many excellent students.
- Kondoa Muslim School is a newly-established madrasa which was started by a group of devoted Tablighi Jamaat people, who are keen on the promulgation of Islam and the revival of traditional mosque education.
- A new college, "El-Haramain," sponsored by Saudi Arabia is being established in Dar-es-Salaam for the teaching of advanced Islamic studies.

There are several other small madrasas run by individual Muslims in their homes. It is estimated that there are around 500 Maktabas (small madrasas) in the country at present.

Muslim students are a minority in the Tanzanian higher institutions of learning. The majority of pupils in Tanzanian primary schools are Muslim (80 per cent), a percentage which dwindles to 15-20 per cent in secondary schools, sinking to a mere five per cent at university level.

The so-called "secular" education came to Tanzania with the onslaught of European Christian missionaries who nursed intense hostility against Islam and Muslims. To acquire that prestigious western education a Muslim student had, as a requirement of admission, to repudiate his faith.

When the Tanzanians started fighting for freedom, some Christians joined with the Muslims to drive away the colonialists. Independence was achieved in 1961. As Muslims were

lagging behind Christians in education, the latter almost monopolised the government at the time of independence. So from 1971 until now more than two-thirds of government and party posts are in Christian hands. Most of the Muslims are at the lower rungs in offices and other establishments.

Secular education, the only means of getting a decent job in this country is scarce among Muslims. Historically this type of education was first introduced to Tanzania by churches at the end of the 18th century as a prologue for the establishment of colonial rule. The schools, therefore, admitted only Christians and those Muslims who were ready to embrace Christianity. This being the case, Muslims refrained from joining these widespread schools.

After independence, the government policy of free education for all was announced. In 1964 few selected church mission schools and other private schools, including all Muslim schools, were nationalised. The struggle for independence against colonialism made Muslims acutely conscious of their situation. They realised the need to set up schools of their own as the Christians did. Unless they did so, they realised, they would remain subject to the discrimination and control of Christian educational establishments.

In colonial days missionary schools were directly sponsored by the government, something which would have caused an uprising had it become obvious to the Muslims in the post-independence era. Concealing this fact was necessary for continuing the colonial policy of education without Muslim resentment.

By 1964 Muslims were doing very well in running Muslim primary schools. But their newly-acquired confidence was soon to be tried. For just as they were starting to set up secondary schools, the government intervened, making all schools public. The Muslims were the only group to be affected by this legislation, which was tantamount to academic suppression.

In contrast, few Christian schools were made public and many church schools were left untouched. This left the churches with an ample opportunity to carry out their objectives, which include the conversion of the shaky and ideologically uprooted Muslim, together with animists, using every conceivable means to attain their goals. They have started, for example, to broadcast programmes from Seychelles to people in East Africa. The

programmes are recorded at Marangu, Moshi and Dodoma (Tanzania). Other tempting means include providing social services such as water, hospitals, orphanages, centres for the disabled and schools for the blind, all with the strings of cultural manipulation attached.

Their schools, which emphasise Biblical studies and religious education, provide the public sector with more than 50 per cent of its employees. Another 40 per cent of the civil service are Christians who come from public schools, compared with about 10 per cent of Muslims. To make things worse, the state is tending to adopt a church law and abolish Islamic Shariah, dismissing it as "traditional law." A glaring example of this is the marriage code of 1970 which states that the state recognises monogamous marriages only.

It is clear that the leftists in command of the affairs of this country are intent on severing the young from their cultural traditions and religious values. Materialism and Marxist thought is propounded in all the colleges. The ministry of culture seems to give unfailing support to this orientation. Sad to say, it is Islam which suffers since churches are capable of wooing the sympathy and favour of whatever system comes to power.

Another burden weighing on Tanzanian Muslims is the Qadianiah movement which despatches its agents to cause confusion among Muslims and floods the community with its literature. Qadianis give presents and money to encourage people to join their sect.

As for cultural activity, the Muslims have established the National Muslim Council (Bakwata) in 1969 following the closure of the East African Muslim Society. This Council used to be the sole Muslim body representing all Muslims. However, it was only in 1981-82 that the council approved the formation of an autonomous Muslim youth movement in the country.

These small groups are insignificant, lacking manpower, education, facilities and funds. Many of these poor groups are led by sincere Muslims, young devoted spirited activists. One such group is Msaud, a body of Muslim students at the University of Dar-es-Salaam whose twin objectives are to educate themselves and to propagate Islam.

Msaud has played an important role in checking the influence of Marxism at the university. It organises bi-annual

seminars, the last of which was held in June 1981 on the theme of Zakat. The organisation issues a quarterly journal called *Al-Islam*, which is one of the two Islamic magazines in the country, the other being *The Muslims* (Muislamu) published by the National Muslim Council of Tanzania in Kiswahili.

Another landmark of Islamic cultural activity in Tanzania is the Warsa or Muslim Writers' Workshop. It was formed in 1975 by a few young men with the objective of writing and translating Islamic literature from Arabic or English into Kiswahili, which is the lingua franca in Tanzania and East Africa.

So far seven different titles have been published dealing with themes mainly concerned with the fundamentals of Islam. But the workshop finds it hard to fulfil expectations. It cannot afford what it now badly needs: full-time personnel, a printing press and instructors. Msaud and Warsha are desperately trying to face up to these problems. It is sad that rich Muslim countries and individuals do not come to their aid.

The work of propagating Islam in Tanzania is usually done by individuals. There is, however, an organisation called Tablighi Jamaat of Tanzania which has established a

centre in central Tanzania. Some Asian Muslims have started this organisation to make African Muslims aware of their faith and unity of purpose.

As for preaching, some devoted young men go to schools to talk to pupils. There is also a radio programme, the External Service of Radio Tanzania, Dar-es-Salaam, every Friday. In Dar-es-Salaam, there is a pavilion where a display of Islamic books and materials is held every year during the national festivals. In some regions there are Muslim students associations where students meet to discuss affairs pertaining to their welfare. They are not sufficiently effective, however, because of their lack of training, literature and funds.

Except for Msaud, Warsha and Tablighi Jamaat, there are no other active dawa organisations. The Shia Muslims have set up a promulgation movement called Bilal Muslims Mission, which publishes a bi-monthly *The Light*, and has also published so far about 20 booklets. According to their journal they have converted several hundred African families, and many African students have been sent to the Iranian city of Qom for higher religious studies.

CSO: 3400/553

TANZANIA

BRIEFS

WEAPONS SEIZED IN MARA--Police in Mara (northwestern Tanzania) have seized 11 rifles, 129 rounds of ammunition and two handgrenades in a search carried out in Tarime region. Regional Commissioner Ndugu Augustine Mwingira said the search was undertaken to combat livestock thieves on the border area; 189 suspects have been arrested and 41 of them had medical drugs (presumably stolen); 11 had rifles of assorted types, ammunition and hand grenades. Another 27 persons were arrested after they were found in possession of uniforms of the People's Defence Force, 12 had contraband goods which included more than 1,000 hides and skins which were being transported to a neighbouring country; another 12 had 92 head of cattle and 40 goats believed to have been stolen. [Text] [Paris AFRICAN DEFENCE JOURNAL in English Jun 85 p 15]

DEVALUATION EFFECTS ON ZANZIBAR--Because of the devaluation of the Tanzania shilling, Zanzibar will spend a total of 387m shillings more than was estimated in the 1984/85 budget. The Zanzibar House of Representatives was informed that the extra expenditure would force the prices of various commodities to rise by 35% so as to balance government estimates; the devaluation of the Tanzania shilling by 26% last year had adverse real term effects on the Zanzibar Government's efforts to meet requirements and expenditure envisaged in the budget. [Text] [Paris AFRICAN DEFENCE JOURNAL in English Jun 85 p 15]

NORWEGIAN AID--Dar es Salaam, 4 Jul (SHIHATA/PANA)--Tanzania is to receive a grant of US dollars 25 million from Monday to help alleviate its balance of payment problems under an agreement signed in Dar es Salaam today. Under the agreement on import support for 1985, the money will be used to import machinery, spare parts, raw materials and other inputs for productive sectors. According to an agreement, the agricultural sector had been earmarked as the main priority. One-third of the amount earmarked is for the import of fertilizers. The grant was signed by the Norwegian Ambassador to Tanzania, Ola Dorum, and the principal secretary in the Ministry of Finance, Gilman Ritihinda. [Text] [Dakar PANA in English 1705 GMT 4 Jul 85 EA]

CSO: 3400/591

ZAMBIA

RADIO FREEDOM BLAMES PRETORIA FOR LUSAKA BOMBING

EA041653 Addis Ababa Radio Freedom in English to South Africa 1930 GMT 3 Jul 85

[Inako Mayshor commentary: "Yet Another Cowardly Act of Vandalism"]

[Text] Compatriots, it is only a few days since we laid our compatriots, our dead friends and beloved ones to rest in the Botswana capital, Gaborone, victims of a sadistic and dastardly act of terror carried out by heavily armed thugs of the fascist Pretoria regime on defenseless and unarmed refugees and Botswana citizens who were ruthlessly butchered while still asleep. And yet, as we speak, only 10 days after that shameful criminal massacre on helpless citizens, the banditry Pretoria regime has gone into action again, causing mayhem and havoc in yet another independent and sovereign state. As we should all have heard by now, countrymen, hirelings of the criminal apartheid regime yesterday planted a powerful bomb at the headquarters of our vanguard liberation movement, the ANC in the Zambian capital, Lusaka, which nonetheless caused very minimal damage if any at all.

The large-scale damage intended by the intruders was prevented only by the vigilant and intrepid security personnel at the office who were quick to repulse the racist bombers before they could place their deadly weapon in a position where it could have had devastating effects on civilians and buildings. This latest act of banditry and vandalism, countrymen, comes only a few days or to be precise just in the wake of another warning issued by the African National Congress to the international community and our embattled people at large that the ANC has received reliable intelligence information that the Pretoria regime is planning to carry out fresh acts of aggression against one or more of the independent states of southern Africa following the Botswana carnage.

The ANC's warning pointed out that this regime continues to make false allegations that the ANC has military bases in such countries as Lesotho, Botswana and others in the region and that we direct and control the armed struggle fought in our country from these countries, as it was, only a day or two after the ANC issued that warning, the fascist troops once again invaded the sovereign territory of independent Angola under the old and worn out pretext that they were pursuing so-called terrorists. This was yet not only a gross violation of the territorial integrity of Angola but also an abrogation of the Lusaka agreement on security signed between Angola and the same fascist Pretoria

regime and another vindication of the ANC's assertion that it is our conviction that this regime, which is dripping from head to foot with the blood of thousands of people it has murdered throughout southern Africa, cannot be an architect of justice and peace in our region. That invasion yet again exposes the lies and distortions told by the Pretoria regime that it had withdrawn its troops from southern Angola. And now, countrymen, only a week after the invasion into Angola and hardly 10 days from Gaborone, the blood-dripping fascist generals in Pretoria have ordered their bandits to strike in Zambia. Apparently not quenched by the innocent blood of helpless babies and defenseless pregnant women they have been gulping since (?yesterday) to Gaborone [words indistinct] savage programs they have been carrying out on our people and those of the region within a period of only 3 months.

As we pointed out, countrymen, even this latest savagery has come not as a surprise to us of the ANC. Neither was the Gaborone terror a surprise. Indeed we warned as far back as May that the Pretoria rulers were on the verge of launching a series of invasions into neighboring states with the aim of slaughtering defenseless and unarmed refugees there under the pretext that they were ANC targets. The ANC has long been aware of the coming of these premeditated acts of terror and intimidation aimed not only against the peoples and governments of the neighboring states but also against the general membership of the ANC itself and our courageous people at home.

Indeed, these barbarous acts are not inexplicable, countrymen, they are no doubt the desperate acts of a dying beast. The Pretoria regime has never found itself in such a serious and confounded crisis, crisis of continuing its illegal rule over our people and country. It is now in a serious stage of chaos as it lurches from side to side, fumbling for an equilibrium it knows it can no longer regain.

Our people have become and are daily becoming more and more ungovernable and the criminal and inhuman system of apartheid more and more unworkable and all attempts by it find alternative solutions have landed on rocks. These unending acts of terror and sadism only demonstrate that no doubt even to the racist rulers themselves it has finally dawned to their dull minds that they can no longer rule in the same old way. Their bankrupt and dying regime can now only survive through those who carry arms in its defense and are ready to eliminate women and school children indiscriminately in the dusty streets of our townships and (?gunbearers) to plant deadly bombs and slaughter defenseless and unarmed civilians in their sleep.

Compatriots, there is no doubt also that the bomb blast at our offices in Lusaka yesterday was merely just out from frustration and desperation by the apartheid killers in their [word indistinct]. The closeness of this [word indistinct] dastardly act to the historic Second National Consultative Conference of our vanguard movement, the ANC, which has just ended in Zambia, clearly points that the office was actually not the intended target, but the conference itself. We were quite aware that even the savage act perpetrated in Gaborone a few days ago, just on the eve of the convening of the conference, was not just a coincidence of date. These are all part of the enemy's desperate attempts to intimidate us into submission, to cow us down into

surrender and to render our movement paralyzed with fear, confusion and confounded to a situation where it will finally end up going cap in hand to the fascist Botha and asking for talks.

The enemy failed to strike fear into the hearts of our galaxy of leaders and elected delegates through the Gaborone attack, countrymen, let alone to even disrupt the conference itself. For out of that conference, instead, the ANC emerged more united and strengthened than ever before, more determined and poised to confront the enemy and deliver the final crushing blow on its entire inhuman edifice and bring genuine liberation to our country. Instead of frightening us through the massacre in Gaborone, the Pretoria's regime only told us in action, countrymen, that whether we wanted war or not, the only way we could stop this bloodletting was for us also to go to war, to take to arms, countrymen. Indeed now this latest act of terror in Lusaka will do nothing else but toughen our hearts, morale and determination to implement to the letter and spirit the solutions of that historic conference.

We have resolved, countrymen, that from the venue of the conference, we are moving forward to victory, we are moving forward to bring to a definite end this bloodletting on our defenseless and unarmed civilians and those of the regions. We are moving to an all-out war with the perpetrators of these unending savage acts of brutality. The Gaborone massacre opened the way forward and threw the gauntlet to our historic conference. Now this dastardly act has put the barricade behind us. The enemy is telling us loudly and clearly that there can be no going back. We either fight and win our freedom or perish as slaves. This vicious circle of barbarism must be brought to an end once and for all and the only way is for all of us to go to war, countrymen. Now is the time, we must to arms.

CSO: 3400/590

ZIMBABWE

HERALD URGES SUPPORT FOR MAPUTO AGAINST MNR

MB021542 Harare THE HERALD in English 25 Jun 85 p 12

[Editorial: "Ten Years On"]

[Text] The independence of Mozambique 10 years ago today brought to an end centuries of Portuguese colonial rule.

It also meant an end to Frelimo's war of liberation which it had launched and pursued since 1964.

Using the tactics of people's war Frelimo gradually wore down the Portuguese colonial army in Mozambique and contributed to its uprising in Lisbon which brought down Portuguese fascism.

The Frelimo war of liberation was part and parcel of the African struggle against colonialism, for national independence and sovereignty.

The anti-imperialist character of that struggle was reflected in the revolutionary and prosocialist ideology of the Frelimo party.

In practice the Government of Mozambique pursued a policy of active identity and solidarity when the progressive liberation movements of Africa and other parts of the world. Thus no sooner than Mozambique hoisted its national flag than it threw its weight behind the struggle for the liberation of Zimbabwe, strategically cutting off any outlets of meaningful survival for the Smith regime.

The latter mounted harsh military attacks on the independent state, which refused to be intimidated until Zimbabwe was liberated. It is this militant policy characterised by consistent opposition to colonialism and racism which has earned for Mozambique the profound and undying hatred of the racist South African regime in particular and that of imperialism in general.

The South African Government regrouped the MNR which had been put in disarray by the victory of the people of Zimbabwe over the Smith regime and unleashed it against the Government of Mozambique, threatening its very existence.

The downfall of Frelimo, which South Africa is seeking, would herald an era of the reconquest of Africa by the forces of neocolonialism. It would mean the beginning of the reversal of all the political achievements Africa has made since 1960.

That cannot be allowed to happen. Africa must stand shoulder to shoulder with Frelimo to defeat the MNR, as Frelimo has stood with Africa and defeated Smith and the Portuguese colonialists.

During his recent visit to Belgrade, the prime minister, Cde Mugabe, put the case for active solidarity with the Frelimo government as a priority for all progressive forces without mincing words.

He said that as the apartheid regime was receiving assistance from its imperialist allies in its policies of destabilization in southern Africa the frontline states also looked to their friends to assist them in the struggle against the apartheid regime.

It goes without saying that the struggle against Pretoria from an international perspective can be successfully prosecuted only in conjunction with a policy of active support for Mozambique under Frelimo to defeat the MNR.

Such a policy would represent a fitting and legitimate countermeasure to Pretoria's strategy in southern Africa which aims at weakening all the frontline states and forcing them to undertake the morally and politically indefensible position of fighting the liberation movements of South Africa to avoid South Africa's wrath.

This is what the Zionist state of Israel has achieved with some Arab regimes in the Middle East with regards to the Palestine Liberation Organisation.

CSO: 3400/518

END